Summary

In 1869, on the six islands known today as the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, several codes were implemented, including a code applicable to the judicial system and a code of civil procedure. In the same year, the Court of Justice (Hof van Justitie) was created on Curacao. Additionally, six district courts (kantongerechten) were set up, one on each island. In 1919, the judiciary were reorganised. One district court judge travelled between three islands. The position of district court judge was filled by a member of the Court of Justice. Until 1919, the Court of Justice itself had acted as a court of first instance on a regular basis. Since then, the Court of Justice acts as an appeal court only, apart from some rare exceptions. In 1919, the civil procedural rules were also revised. To a large extent, the procedural rules in place at the Residence Courts (residentiegerechten) of Java and Madura (in the former Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia) were applied. These were characterized by an active role of the judge. In appellate cases, however, the Court of Justice did not travel. Only from 1951 onwards did the Court of Justice start to hear cases on Aruba on a regular basis and since 1980 it also sits on St. Maarten. In 2005, the Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering) was completely revised.

During the years 1869-1965 it was possible to appeal to the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) in The Hague against decisions handed down by the Court of Justice as a court of first instance. This led to seventeen civil rulings by the Supreme Court. Since the Cassatieregeling (statutory provision on appeals on points of law) came into force in 1965, it has been possible to appeal to the Supreme Court on points of law (cassatieberoep) against Antillean and Aruban decisions. This has resulted in roughly five hundred rulings by the Supreme Court to date.

It is noteworthy that in 1919 legislation in the colony of Curacao was passed which deviated in important aspects from legislation in the Netherlands, in spite of the then strictly interpreted principle of concordance of legislation (concordantiebeginsel), under which legislation in the colonies should concur with legislation in the Netherlands as much as possible. Apparently, the problems were serious enough to justify these deviations. These problems mainly existed on islands other than Curacao, where laymen acted as judges and professional legal aid was virtually non-existent. The travelling judge was a professional and could play an active role. Also, any appeal to the Court of Justice was organised in such a way that the need to travel to Curacao was minimized.

Decisions of the court of first instance (gerecht in eerste aanleg) are, in principle, subject to appeal to the Joint Court of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (Gemeenschappelijk Hof van Justitie van de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba). Orders of a merely organizational nature, such as orders setting a timetable, and decisions that are subject to a statutory appeal prohibition cannot be appealed. Such prohibitions can be disregarded under certain circumstances. The rules for appeal against default judgments (judgments in absentia) are different for claimants as opposed to defendants.

A party that has acquiesced in the judgment cannot appeal. In 2005, a new pro-vision was established in the Code of Civil Procedure that the appeal court may dismiss an appeal on the ground that it has been brought for the sole reason that the appellant was ordered to pay costs. If a final judgment is appealed, usually the appeal court also takes interlocutory judgments into account. Interlocutory judgments can also be appealed before the final judgment is given. In such cases, the permission of the appeal court is required. This is not required for appeal against partial judgments (deeluitspraken), which are judgments that contain both interlocutory and final judgment components. Nowadays, an application for interlocutory appeal is considered a statement of appeal, and vice versa. In 2005, the statutory time limit for filing a statement of appeal was changed from thirty days to six weeks. This time limit cannot be extended. The first day of the time limit is different for appellants who were present at the pronouncement of the decision of the lower court as opposed to those who were not. Within the time limit, a written notice of appeal must be filed or an oral declaration of appeal must be made at the clerk's office of the court of first instance on the island where the decision was handed down. The only requirement regarding the content of the notice of appeal is that it specifies the judgment against which it is directed. Also, the court's fees must be paid in advance.

In the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba there is no requirement to file an appellant's notice containing grounds of appeal (memorie van grieven). However, it is nor-mal practice. It can only be filed within a non-extendable time limit of six weeks after the notice of appeal. If the appellant's notice is filed too late, the notice will be struck out, but the appellant will nevertheless be admitted to the hearing. The respondent can file a notice containing the defence on appeal (memorie van antwoord). The same rules apply to this; it is not compulsory and a non-extendable time limit of six weeks applies. If the time limit is exceeded, the respondent will still be admitted to the hearing. The notice of appeal, the appellant's notice and the respondent's notice are served on the other party by order of the lower court.

In preliminary relief proceedings (kort geding), time limits of three weeks apply. In the event of extreme urgency these time limits can be shortened.

In the respondent's notice, the respondent can cross-appeal a decision of the lower court (incidenteel appel), in which case the appellant will be given an opportunity to file a notice in reply.

The appeal court may order a stay of the decision of the lower court. However, the statutory system for interim decisions at the stage of exchange of notices, is incomplete.

Following the exchange of notices the clerk of the court of first instance sends the documents to the Court of Justice on Curacao. The clerk of the Court of Justice then enters the case on the docket of the Court of Justice and sets a date for the hearing of the appeal either on Curacao, Aruba or St. Maarten. In the past, parties were sometimes not admitted to a hearing (which meant a decision on the basis of the filed documents only), but nowadays there are no such limitations. In the vast majority of cases there is no oral arguments, but only an opportunity for both parties to submit written pleadings (pleitnota). The date for filing these can be adjourned and this often occurs. The appeal court can hand down an interlocutory judgment in which parties can be ordered to file additional notices.

In 1919 the appeal court usually decided a case exclusively on the basis of the filed documents. A development took place which led in 2005 to the statutory pro-vision that the appeal court receives evidence in the same manner as the lower court does. For instance, the appeal court now hears witnesses. The procedural rules applicable are the same as those in the Netherlands, except that the judge can refuse to hear a party as a witness.

The appeal court may refer a case back to the lower court. This statutory provision was intended to be applied in the case of appeal against an interlocutory judgment. However, the Court of Justice also applies this provision in the case of appeal against a final judgment. The provision applies if the lower court has reached a final judgment without having considered the case on the merits. This includes but is not limited to the case that the lower court has ruled that it has no jurisdiction.

The 1919 statutory provision that judgments on appeal will never be considered as judgments in absentia, was upheld in 2005.

There are two types of final decisions: judgments (vonnissen) and orders (beschikkingen). Different procedural rules apply for each type. Also different rules apply for appeals against these two types of decision. The rules that were applicable in the Netherlands before 2002 were used as a model for the rules that apply for appeals against orders. An important difference from appeals against judgments is that appeals against orders commence with an appellant's notice (beroepschrift) without additional time being permitted for submitting the grounds of appeal. The clerk of the court of first instance sends the appellant's notice to the Court of Justice, and the Court of Justice sets a date for the hearing and a time limit for filing a respondent's notice with the clerk of the Court of Justice. If the respondent wants to cross-appeal, he can do this in the respondent's notice.

The appellant may limit the issues to be heard in appeal by only appealing part of the judgment of the lower court. The judgment of the appeal court may, on the one hand, not be more beneficial to the appellant than was requested in the appeal; on the other hand, it may not be less favourable than the judgment of the lower court. The respondent may circumvent the Jatter restriction by bringing a cross-appeal. In that case, a statutory provision applies requiring the respondent to submit grounds of appeal. In my opinion, this does not imply any requirement regarding the quality of those grounds of appeal.

The original claimant can lessen his claim during the appeal proceedings, regardless of whether he is appellant or respondent in those proceedings. He can also withdraw the claim altogether, but if the other party has already incurred legal costs in the appeal he cannot avoid being ordered to reimburse legal costs by unilaterally withdrawing the case. Conversely he can increase or change the claim during the appeal proceedings. The claim can also be increased or changed if the defendant fails to appear at the proceedings, but in that case a notice of the change of claim must be served on him. The same rules apply for changing of the grounds of a claim as for changing of the claim itself. In the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba the claim can also be changed in the written pleadings.

The court must, at its own initiative or at the request of the defendant, test whether the claim change meets the standards of due process (eisen van een goede procesorde). In this test various factors play a role, including the stage of the proceedings, the impact and the nature of the change, the reason for the change, the nature of the dispute and the attitude of the other party. At an early stage of the proceedings in the appeal, i.e. at the stage of the appellant's notice or the respondent's notice, a change with a much greater impact is allowed than at a late stage of the proceedings in the first instance.

The defendant may not, on appeal, present new preliminary pleas (excepties) to the claim, nor may he present defences that he has previously abandoned (gedekte verweren). However, he may present new defences, provided that he does so in accordance with the standards of due process. The court must test this at its own initiative.

On appeal, the appellant may present reasons why, in his view, the judgment of the lower court should be set aside; these reasons, as understood by the court, are called grieven' (grounds of appeal). To be distinguished from these are 'appelgrieven': these are parts in which the appellant has subdivided the appellant's notice. Although it is not compulsory, in the vast majority of cases grounds of appeal are submitted. They are of great importance to the proceedings. In the Netherlands, it is compulsory to submit grounds of appeal. This is referred to as grievenstelser (system based on grounds of appeal). I believe that it is incorrect to say that the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba have no grievenstelser at all. It is better to say that these countries have a mitigated 'grievenstelsel'.

In the case of Pitt v. Van Frederici, the Supreme Court has given directions regarding the question of whether arguments and statements of fact must be taken into account, if they are presented in the written pleadings without having been presented before. I believe that the (only) decisive test should be the standards of due process.

The respondent may present preliminary defences against the appellant's right to appeal, but no new preliminary pleas against the claim itself are permitted. Furthermore, he may present new reasons why, in his view, the judgment of the lower court should be upheld. Also, for the respondent the standards of due process apply as a test for deciding whether new arguments and new statements of fact in the written pleas should be taken into account.

In the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, on the basis of Article 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the judge has power to make suggestions to the parties for altering the claim and making additions to the statements of fact, the grounds of the claim and the defence. This power is not unlimited. In my view, this power too should be used in accordance with the standards of due process. The principle of hearing both parties requires that the judge must allow both parties to discuss the suggestion. The 'principle of determination' (beginsel van partijautonomie, principium dispositivum) requires that the judge must respect a party's choice not to pursue any particular suggestion.

The judge does not have to examine or respond to all arguments of the parties. He is not allowed to respond to arguments that must be disregarded because they were presented in conflict with the standards of due process. He does not have to respond to 'non-essential' arguments, such as arguments that are too unclear to understand or too unspecific. He does not have to respond to arguments that have become irrelevant as a result of decisions about other arguments. Other than that, he must respond to the arguments of the appellant if they are presented properly in the appeal proceedings, regardless of whether they were presented in the first instance or not. Therefore, the presence and the quality of the grounds of appeal are of importante. Some grounds of appeal not only compel the appeal court to provide a detailed response, but also to conduct further investigations. The appellant can only force the appeal court to respond to an argument that was rejected by the lower court, by presenting it properly in the appeal proceedings. If the argument was presented to the lower court and not rejected by it, the appeal court cannot ignore the argument unless the appellant has unambiguously abandoned it. This is due to the devolving nature (devolutieve werking) of appeals. This devolving nature works to some extent for the appellant. For the respondent, the devolving nature has much wider effect. The respondent does not have to repeat any argument on appeal, it is sufficient that he does not abandon his arguments.

The judge must, in accordance with Article 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of his own initiative set out the legal grounds of the claim and the defence. I will distinguish three forms of the judicial duty to apply the law at the judge's own initiative. In the first form, the judge, by interpreting the arguments that are presented by the parties to argue that the claim must be accepted or rejected, and by using his knowledge of the law, must identity the legal grounds that the parties essentially rely upon. These can also be grounds that the judge could not have taken into account if the parties had not relied upon them at all. Secondly, the judge must determine whether the arguments are in accordance with the law or not. Thirdly - the use of Article 52 in this sense is controversial - the judge must apply principles with a certain weight, even when parties have not addressed the matter at all. The court of first instance must do this if the principle is 'van dwingend recht' (mandatory). The obligations of the appeal court to apply the law at its own initiative are different in cases where they lead to setting aside the judgment of the court of first instance, as opposed to cases where they lead to upholding that judgment. However, the appeal court must always apply the principle if it is 'van openbare orde' (public policy, i.e. a rule with even more coercion than 'dwingend recht'). Some considerations of public policy are so important that they can compel the judge to investigate the facts at his own initiative.

The concept of 'openbare orde' (public policy) has different meanings in different contexts. The concept is not only used in the context of Article 52, but also as a criterion for hearing a case in chambers, in the context of international or interregional (i.e. between the three countries that constitute the Kingdom of the Netherlands) civil law, EU law, arbitration law, and as a criterion for determining the validity of legal acts in general.

Under Article 281a of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appeal court in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba has power to set aside a judgment for reasons other than those covered in the grounds of appeal. In my opinion, it has an obligation to use that power if it finds that the judgment of the lower court is wrong on points of law, and no further investigation of the facts is needed to establish that this has led to an incorrect outcome. However it has no obligation to use that power if it finds that the lower court may have been wrong in points of fact and/or further investigation of the facts is required. When determining whether or not to use that power, the appeal court will weigh factors that are similar to the factors that are used to test whether new arguments meet the standards of due process. If the parties did not discuss a specific point and reasonably could not foresee that the judge would find that point decisive in the case, the judge cannot decide the case without giving the parties an opportunity to address the matter.

The Supreme Court can quash a decision and refer the case back to the Court of Justice. When this happens, the case must be decided on the basis of the same procedural rules as are applicable in the Netherlands, unless the character of the Netherlands Antilles/Aruba proceedings requires otherwise, which it hardly ever does. The case must, in principle, be decided in the state it was in when the quashed judgment was given, but the Court of Justice is bound by the decisions that were not contested before the Supreme Court or that were contested there without success. In addition, the Court of Justice has to comply with any specific instructions the Supreme Court may have handed down. In the vast majority of cases it would constitute a conflict with the standards of due process if the Court of Justice, after referral by the Supreme Court, used its above-mentioned power under Article 118 to make suggestions to the parties.

The question of how civil procedural law should be organised is fundamental in various ways. There is the fundamental choice as to what degree the law should advance unity within the Kingdom on the one hand, and the autonomy of the countries that constitute the Kingdom on the other. In a second fundamental way the conservative and progressive approaches are each other's antipode. Followers of the conservative approach are attached to tradition and continuity, while followers of the progressive approach want to implement ideals. A third choice is between a material and a procedural approach. In the material approach, the procedure is subservient to the goal of reaching a decision that does justice to the underlying legal relationship between the parties. In the procedural approach, the assumption is that the quality of the decision benefits from doing justice which reflects the behaviour of the parties in the proceedings.

The most important differences between procedural rules in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and procedural rules in the Netherlands originate from the rules that were copied from Java and Madura in 1919. Nevertheless, for a good understanding of present day Antillean/Aruban procedure it is not necessary to fully comprehend the background of the rules copied.

The Antillean and Aruban societies are characterized by pluralism, rapid changes and small-scale. These characteristics provide a good breeding ground for a procedure that is simple in statutory design, but that allows for adaptation by the judge to the peculiarities of the parties and the circumstances of the case. Therefore, it makes sense to maintain the concept that the judge should have elbow room. This requires judges to be reliable and to maintain a proper professional standard.

The power under Article 118 to make suggestions to the parties provides a useful instrument to the judge in his eifort to do justice to the specific circumstances of the case. If the judge uses this power wisely, the benefits outweigh the drawbacks. The power to set aside a judgment for reasons other than those covered in the grounds of appeal can also be useful. Under the mitigated 'grievenstelsel', there is a fair balance between the roles of the parties on the one hand, and the judge on the other.

In the Netherlands, the lower court decides whether an appeal against an interlocutory decision is permitted. In the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, the appeal court decides that. I have no strong preference for either system. In the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, the appeal court may refer the case back to the court of first instance more often than in the Netherlands. The system in the Netherlands has the benefit that the appeal court cannot take its own interest into account in the decision.

Nowadays, communication and travel between the islands of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba is no longer very difficult. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to maintain all of the limitations that previously existed in procedural law. For instance, it is no longer necessary to have the appellant's and respondent's notices filed at the lower court. As a result, the appeal procedure can be improved in a number of ways.

In section 4.6 I make three kinds of suggestions for changing the rules about appeals: some of the suggestions do not require legislative changes, some require minor legislative changes and others have a bigger impact on the system of appeals as a whole. The suggestions of the Jatter kind are:

Since 1965 it is possible to appeal to the Supreme Court on points of law (cassatieberoep) against Antillean and Aruban decisions. The rules about those appeals are, for the most part, laid down in internal legislation of the Netherlands. Changes in Dutch national legislation, establishing that appeals on points of law can be decided by three judges (1986), and can be dismissed without reasons being given (1988), have, as far as I know, been implemented without consultation with the governments of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Starting in 1994, the Supreme Court has regularly dismissed appeals in Antillean/Aruban cases in unreasoned decisions.

The Atterney General at the Supreme Court has never used the power to appeal on points of law at his own initiative (cassatie in het belang der wet) against an Antillean or Aruban civil ruling.

Under Article 2 of the Cassatieregeling (statutory provision on appeals on points of law), it is possible to appeal against judgments (vonnissen) and orders (beschikkingen), provided that the claim exceeds a minimum amount, but not against the judge's conduct of the proceedings (handelingen). Appeal to the Supreme Court is also possible against decisions of the court of first instance. No appeal is possible against some types of decisions concerning bankruptcy. The Civil Codes of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba differ somewhat from the Civil Code of the Netherlands in respect of the way appeals can be made against decisions concerning registered goods (registergoederen). Nevertheless, in my opinion, the rules of the Netherlands may apply in Antillean/Aruban cases, as a result of Article 1(1) of the Cassatieregeling. In cases that are decided by order (beschikking), a person who failed to appear in the proceedings in the lower courts cannot appeal to the Supreme Court. As an exception to this rule, the Dutch government can appeal in cases about Dutch nationality, even if it failed to appear in the proceedings in the Court of Justice.

Under Article 3 of the Cassatieregeling, interlocutory judgments cannot be appealed on points of law before the final judgment is given. Contrary to the situation in the Netherlands, the Court of Justice does not have power to give permission to do so. Case law on Article 3 of the Cassatieregeling has not always been consistent. In the case of Wakawa v. Mecs, the Supreme Court has ruled that the admissibility of appeals on points of law against partial judgments (deelvonnissen) must be decided the same way as in the Netherlands. In my opinion, the same should apply for the admissibility of appeals by parties who are not affected by the final judgment, but only by an interim decision.

Article 7 of the Cassatieregeling refers to a financial support system for legai aid for appeals on points of law in Antillean/Aruban cases. The article is obsolete, but it still makes clear that there ought to be such a system in place.

The first day of the time limit for appeals on points of law is the same as in Dutch cases. In the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, appeal court decisions are never considered to be decisions in absentia. In my opinion, in cases where the respondent did not appear in the proceedings in the court of first instance, nor in the proceedings in the appeal court, the time limit for appeal to the Supreme Court should not start on the date of the decision of the appeal court, but on the first date on which the respondent has knowledge of the decision. The time limit for appeals on points of law is three calendar months. In preliminary relief proceedings (kort geding), the time limit is nine weeks.

In accordance with Article 79(1) of the Act on Organisation of the Judiciary (Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie), an appeal on points of law is allowed on the ground that the appeal court did not observe proper application of the law. In Antillean/Aruban cases, just as in Dutch cases, complaints can be made about violations of the law of the Netherlands, as well as about violations of the law of the Netherlands Antilles or the law of Aruba. Article 1(2) of the Cassatieregeling is unnecessary and confusing. Complaints can also be made about violations of unwritten law, international civil law or interregional civil law.

The views that are generally accepted in the Netherlands Antillean and Aruban societies (maatschappelijke opvattingen) can constitute law in the sense of Article 79(1) of the Act on Organisation of the Judiciary. If it is generally accepted in society that a certain rule exists, this rule can be considered law. In my opinion, the Supreme Court sometimes has a duty to assess what the generally accepted views are in the Netherlands Antillean and Aruban societies. It cannot always fully rely on the assessment of the Court of Justice on the issue.

In the case of Jacobs v. Jonkhout, the Supreme Court has decided that in Antillean/ Aruban cases an appeal on points of law can be lodged by way of serving a summons (dagvaarding) on the defendant, but also by way of filing a petition (verzoekschrift) at the Supreme Court. The first route is rarely taken nowadays. The petition must be signed by a Supreme Court barrister (advocaat bij de Hoge Raad). The clerk of the Supreme Court will forward a copy of the petition to the respondent. In my opinion, he should not only provide a copy to the representative of the respondent, but also to the respondent in person. The respondent can file a respondent's notice, which also must be signed by a Supreme Court barrister.

The Practice Directions of the Supreme Court are applicable in most Antillean/Aruban cases. Article 15 of the Practice Directions was specifically written for Antillean/Aruban cases. Oral or written argument can also be offered by Dutch lawyers who are not Supreme Court barristers, and under Article 8 of the Cassatieregeling also by Antillean/Aruban lawyers. However, as far as I know, Antillean/ Aruban lawyers never use this facility.

In Antillean/Aruban cases, if a defendant did not appear in the proceedings in the Supreme Court, there is, in my view, no provision that enables him to complain about the way he has been notified of the proceedings. There might be a need for such a provision.

In the case of Zonuca v. Aruba, the Supreme Court referred to the principle of concordance of case law (beginsel van concordantie van rechtspraak), stipulating that case law in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba should concur with case law in the Netherlands as much as possible. This principle is based on Article 39(1) of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Article 23(1) of that Charter in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Cassatieregeling. None of these articles clearly compel judges to observe such a principle. However, these articles do have the effect that judges in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba have a tendency to decide cases in accordance with the case law of the Netherlands. They will do that especially in cases where the applicable Antillean/Aruban legislation is meant to be in accordance with the legislation in the Netherlands, regardless of whether or not the legislation is within one of the fields specified in Article 39(1) of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The principle of concordance of case law is related to the question of when a case law rule in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba should be the same as the corresponding case law rule in the Netherlands. If a case law rule is based on the interpretation of legislation, then it should be the same if the legislation is meant to be the same in all relevant respects. This is especially so in cases where the legislation is of a more stringent nature. However, if the legislators of the countries make different choices, then the judge must, in principle, respect that.

Sometimes an Antillean/Aruban statutory provision is the same as a statutory provision that previously existed in the Netherlands, but has since been changed. If the changes are not material or not relevant, a proper conclusion can be reached that the same case law rules still apply. But if the changes are material and relevant, the new statutory provision in the Netherlands will not affect the Antillean/Aruban case law.

Sometimes an Antillean/Aruban statutory provision is obsolete in the sense that the meaning in accordance with the original intent can no longer be accepted. In such cases, a new meaning must be given to the provision. There is no reason to assume that this new meaning should be in accordance with new statutory provisions in the Netherlands. Those new provisions can serve as a source of inspiration at best.

In conclusion, case law rules in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba should only be the same as case law rules in the Netherlands if they are based on legislation that is meant to be the same in all relevant respects. In my view, this can also be concluded without any reference to the principle of concordance of case law.

In the case of Zonuca v. Aruba, the Supreme Court has linked the principle of concordance of case law to the concept of the generally accepted views in society (maatschappelijke opvattingen). It is my impression that the Supreme Court uses this concept as an instrument to promote unity within the Kingdom. I believe such an instrument is not necessary. It is hard to determine which generally accepted views exist in a society. For the societies of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba this is particularly true, because they are characterized by pluralism and rapid changes. Also, judges are not always familiar with these societies.

Recently there has been much new legislation in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and it has been clearly deflned which statutory provisions of the Netherlands have been copied and which have not. Under such circumstances, there is no reason to use the concept of the generally accepted views in society as an instrument to promote unity within the Kingdom.

Article 23(1) of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands prescribes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Antillean/Aruban cases to be given by an Act that has been established through a special legislative process (rijkswet). Therefore, this jurisdiction cannot easily be changed. Article 1(1) of the Cassatieregeling has proven to be a successful provision. The facility for appeal on points of law against Antillean/Aruban decisions is often used and it has not been necessary to change the Cassatieregeling, even though some of its provisions could have been devised betten

A committee, presided by Supreme Court Judge A. Hammerstein, issued a report on the reinforcement of the system of appeals on points of law in February 2008. The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba should be consulted about the recommendations of the committee. This would reflect the broad support and high regard that the Supreme Court enjoys in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. For instance, if the recommendation is adopted that the lower courts will be given power to request the Supreme Court to issue a preliminary ruling, it could be useful to also give the Court of Justice the power to give permission to the parties to appeal against an interlocutory judgment before the flnal judgment is given. Furthermore, it could be appropriate to amend the Cassatieregeling in such a way that the possibility for the Supreme Court to decide a case without reasons being given is limited or even excluded for Antillean/Aruban cases. Even without such an amendment, I believe that the Supreme Court should use that power less often in Antillean/Aruban cases.