Hof Den Haag, 29-01-2021, nr. 200.126.804-01 200.126.834-01

of Oruma, Bayelsa State, Federal Republic of Nigeria,

2. the late Alali EFANGA,

former resident of Oruma, Bayelsa State, Federal Republic of Nigeria,

3. the association with legal personality VERENIGING MILIEUDEFENSIE,

established in Amsterdam,

appellants, also respondents in the cross-appeal,

hereinafter referred to as: Oguru, Efanga and MD, and jointly as: MD et al. (plural),

attorney-at-law: mr. Ch. Samkalden of Amsterdam,

versus (case a)

established in The Hague,

2. the legal person incorporated under foreign law THE “SHELL” TRANSPORT AND TRADING COMPANY LIMITED,

established in London, United Kingdom,

respondents, also appellants in the cross-appeal,

hereinafter referred to as: Shell NV and Shell T&T, and jointly as: Shell (singular),

attorney-at-law: mr. J. de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk of Amsterdam,

and versus (case b)

established in London, United Kingdom, with its registered office in The Hague,

2. the legal person incorporated under foreign law SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA LTD.,

established in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Federal Republic of Nigeria,

respondents, also appellants in the cross-appeal,

hereinafter referred to as: RDS and the SPDC, and jointly as: Shell (singular),

attorney-at-law: mr. J. de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk of Amsterdam.

Contents

The contents of this ruling has been divided as follows:

Course of the proceedings

General

The course of the proceedings in cases a and b

The further assessment

1. The facts (legal grounds 1.1 and 1.2)

2. The claims of MD et al. and the judgments of the district court (legal ground 2.1-2.2)

3. The appeal; preliminary considerations

Applicable law (legal ground 3.1-3.2)

Renewed assessment of the claims (legal ground 3.3-3.10)

Nigerian law; general (legal ground 3.11-3.21)

Exclusivity of the OPA (legal ground 3.22-3.25)

Liability of a parent company under Nigerian law (legal ground 3.26-3.33)

The extent of the contamination (legal ground 3.34)

4. Preliminary defences of Shell

Introduction (legal ground 4.1)

Right of action of Oguru and Efanga (legal ground 4.2-4.7)

Right of action of MD et al. under the OPA (legal ground 4.8-4.11)

5. The claims in respect of ‘Origin’ (of the leak)

Claims I and III.a against the SPDC (the subsidiary) (legal ground 5.1)

Sabotage defence: burden of proof and threshold of proof (legal ground 5.2-5.12)

Evaluation of the evidence (legal ground 5.13-5.27)

Conclusion on claims I and III.a-a against the SPDC in respect of ‘Origin’ (legal ground 5.28-5.30)

Claims I and III.a-a against the parent companies in respect of ‘Origin’ (legal ground 5.31-5.32)

Claim VI: keeping the pipe/pipes in a good state of repair (legal ground 5.33-5.34)

6. The claims against the SPDC in respect of ‘Response’

Background and bases (legal ground 6.1-6.5)

Access problems (legal ground 6.6-6.7)

Argument I: knowledge of moment of origin of the leak (legal ground 6.8)

Argument II: LDS (legal ground 6.9-6.26)

Argument III: oil supply pipe shut off too late (legal ground 6.27)

Argument IV: spilled oil contained too late (legal ground 6.28-6.29)

Conclusion on ‘Response’ claims I and III.a-a against the SPDC (legal ground 6.30-6.31)

Claim VII: order in respect of ‘Response’ (legal ground 6.32-6.46)

7. The claims against the Shell parent companies in respect of ‘Response’

Preliminary considerations (legal ground 7.1)

The knowledge requirement (legal ground 7.2-7.4)

The structure and management of the Shell group (legal ground 7.5-7.9)

Involvement in the LDS? (legal ground 7.10)

Re a) DEP 31.40.60 (legal ground 7.11-7.14)

Re b) the bonus policy (legal ground 7.15-7.18)

Re c) the statement of [witness 1] (legal ground 7.19-7.23)

Conclusion on the involvement issue and the further assessment (legal ground 7.24-7.29)

8. The claims in respect of ‘Decontamination’

Preliminary considerations (legal ground 8.1-8.4)

The EGASPIN recommendations (legal ground 8.5-8.8)

The further assessments of the Decontamination claims (legal ground 8.9)

The temporal aspects of the decontamination (legal ground 8.10)

Soil decontamination (legal ground 8.11-8.24)

Water decontamination (legal ground 8.25-8.27)

Conclusion on the negligence-based Decontamination claims (legal ground 8.28)

The Rylands v Fletcher rule (legal ground 8.29)

9. Claims II and III.b: the fundamental right to a clean living environment (legal ground 9.1-9.6)

10. Claims III.a-b and IX (legal ground 10.1-10.2)

11. Concluding considerations (legal ground 11.1-11.5)

Decision

Course of the proceedings

General

In this ruling, the Court of Appeal assesses cases a and b, which form part of six cases brought against Shell by MD and the Nigerian claimants/farmers. The current cases a and b concern a leak which occurred at the Nigerian village of Oruma in 2005. Cases c and d concern a leak which occurred at the Nigerian village of Goi in 2004. Cases e and f concern a leak which occurred at the Nigerian village of Ikot Ada Udo in 2007.

The appellant under 2, Alali Efanga, died in 2016. The lawsuit was continued under his name (see also point 47 of Shell’s defence on appeal, also statement of appeal in the cross-appeal stage 2).

The course of the proceedings in cases a and b

Please refer to the most recent interlocutory judgment of 31 July 2018 and the three preceding interlocutory judgments of 27 March 2018, 11 October 2016 and 18 December 2015 for a detailed overview of the course of the proceedings up to that date. A summary of the entire course of proceedings is presented below.

MD et al. have brought their appeal against the 30 January 2013 judgment of The Hague District Court (hereinafter: the district court) in time. This judgment is based on the following documents, inter alia:

- the initiating summons of MD et al. (IS);

- Shell’s statement of defence (SoD);

- the reply of MD et al. (R);

- Shell’s rejoinder (Rej);

- the written summaries of the oral arguments of MD et al. (WS-MD) and of Shell (WS-S) of 11 October 2012.

On appeal, the following court documents were submitted/the following procedural acts took place:

- the motion for the production of exhibits of MD et al. (M-Exh);

- Shell’s defence on appeal in the procedural issue pursuant to Section 843a Code of Civil Procedure including a motion for the court to decline jurisdiction in the procedural issue (DoA-Exh);

- the defence on appeal regarding the motion for the court to decline jurisdiction in the procedural issue pursuant to Section 843a Code of Civil Procedure of MD et al. (DoA-J/Exh);

- the record of appearance of the parties of 30 June 2014 (RA-2014), showing that the procedural agreement was made to split up the appeal proceedings into two phases, in which (phase 1) firstly an opinion would be given on the competence of the Dutch court, concurrently with a decision on the claim/claims in the procedural issue pursuant to Section 843a Code of Civil Procedure, followed by (phase 2) a decision on the merits;

- Shell’s statement of appeal in the cross-appeal stage 1 (SoA-cross/1);

- the statement of appeal on the dismissal of the Section 843a Code of Civil Procedure claim in phase 1 of MD et al. (SoA/1);

- Shell’s defence on appeal stage 1 (DoA/1);

- the defence on appeal against Shell’s statement of appeal (phase 1) of MD et al. (DoA-cross/1);

- the written summary of the oral arguments of MD et al. (WS/1-MD) and of Shell (WS/1-S);

- the interlocutory ruling of this Court of Appeal of 18 December 2015 (the 2015 ruling), in which it was decided (i) that the Dutch court had international jurisdiction to take cognizance of all claims and (ii) that MD had locus standi in the class action and in which (iii) the 843a Code of Civil Procedure claims of MD et al. were partially allowed;

- the interlocutory ruling of 27 March 2018 (the 2018/1 ruling) in which an expert examination into the cause of the leaks in Oruma and Goi was ordered – following a personal appearance of the parties and a documents exchange;

- the interlocutory ruling of 31 July 2018 (the 2018/2 ruling), in which a further application of MD et al. in the 843a Code of Civil Procedure procedural issue was dismissed;

- the expert opinion of 17 December 2018 (the expert opinion);

- the order of this Court of Appeal of 25 January 2019, in which the costs of the experts were estimated at € 44,840.18 for D. Koster and W. Sloterdijk and at £ 17,000.00 for T. Sowerby;

- the 260-page statement of appeal stage 2 of MD et al. (SoA/2);

- Shell’s 375-page defence on appeal/statement of appeal in the cross-appeal stage 2 (DoA/SoA-cross/2);

- the defence on appeal in the cross-appeal stage 2 of MD et al. (DoA-cross/2);

- the document commenting on exhibits in the principal appeal stage of MD et al. (DC-MD/2) in which they comment on Exhibits 56-57 to the DoA/SoA-cross/2;

- the document containing Exhibits Q.72-Q.80 of MD et al.;

- Shell’s additional Exhibits 77 and 78;

- Exhibits Q.81 and Q.82 of MD et al.;

- Shell’s Exhibits 79 and 80;

- Exhibits Q.83 and Q.84 of MD et al.

On 8 and 9 October 2020, the attorneys-at-law of the parties pleaded the cases (the 2020 hearing). They used written summaries of the oral arguments (WS/2-MD and WS/2-S), which they submitted. A record of the hearing was drawn up (RH-2020). The objections raised at the hearing against the submission of exhibits and against the arguments brought forward at the hearing were withdrawn.

The parties also submitted a folder (digital and in hard copy) containing the correspondence conducted, numbered 1 - 113. That folder also contains the report of findings of 18 July 2017 of mr. B.E. ter Haar concerning the confidential documents filed by Shell. Shell also submitted those documents on a USB flash drive.

The exhibits of MD et al. are identified with a letter and a number (for instance, M.1 and Q.83), Shell’s exhibits with only a number (for instance, 66).

Where reference is made hereinafter to the court documents, this is taken to mean the court documents in case b, unless expressly stated otherwise.

The further assessment

The Court considers the following facts as established:

a. Nigeria has been burdened for a long time by serious problems for people and nature due to the oil extraction activities of oil companies, including the Shell group. The Shell group, a multinational which is headquartered in The Hague, has been carrying out oil extraction activities in Nigeria since 1958. Nigeria experiences many oil leaks from oil pipelines and oil installations each year. Oil leaks may arise due to defective and/or obsolete material of the oil companies or due to sabotage, which could effectively involve insufficient security measures. Sabotage is often committed to steal oil or to receive compensation from oil companies for the oil contamination in the form of money or paid orders for decontamination work to be carried out after the leak.

b. Up until 20 July 2005, Shell NV in The Hague and Shell T&T in London jointly headed the Shell group as parent companies. Via subsidiaries they held shares in the SPDC, the Nigerian legal person in the Shell group involved in the oil extraction activities in Nigeria. RDS – established in London but headquartered in The Hague – has been at the head of the group since the restructuring of the Shell group of 20 July 2005. Since then, RDS has held the shares in the SPDC via subsidiaries.

c. Oguru is, and Efanga who died in 2016 was, a Nigerian farmer from the village of Oruma in Nigeria’s Bayelsa State. MD is a Dutch organization whose objective is to protect the environment worldwide and which assists Oguru and the late Efanga in these proceedings.

d. On 26 June 2005, the SPDC received a report of an oil leak in the underground oil pipeline operated by the SPDC near Oruma (hereinafter also simply referred to as: the leak). This pipeline runs between Kolo Creek and Rumuekpe and is 37.10 kilometres long. At these sites there is a manifold, an installation where the supply lines and main pipelines are connected to each other. The leak, which was verified by the SPDC on 29 June 2005, occurred at 7.7 km from the Kolo Creek manifold and had been caused by a more or less round hole. The top side of the pipeline was at a depth of a little over a metre at the location of the leak. The oil came bubbling up out of the ground as a result of the leak. A photograph of the leak is provided below:

e. The leaked oil spilled beyond the strip of land where the SPDC has right of way. Right of way is the exclusive right to use land by having pipelines in the ground and whereby the owner of the land is no longer allowed to use the land.

f. On 7 July 2005, the so-called Joint Investigation Team (JIT) visited the site of the leak, at which time, inter alia, the thickness of the pipe wall was measured with an ultrasonic measuring device, the so-called ultrasonic thickness (UT) measurements. The JIT was composed of representatives of the ministries concerned, of the Oruma community and of the SPDC as operator of the pipeline. Thereafter, still on 7 July 2005, the leak was closed: first provisionally with a wooden plug to prevent any residual oil from leaking from the pipeline, and then definitively by fitting a round clamp, a so-called PLIDCO split sleeve clamp, around the pipeline at the location of the leak.

g. The JIT drew up a report that in any case was signed by representatives of the Nigerian ministries and of the SPDC. Part A of the report states the following, inter alia: ‘Estimated quantity of oil spilled: 400 BBLS’ (400 barrels of 159 litres each). Part B of the report includes the following, inter alia.

Evidence of previous excavation noticed at leak site.

During excavation to expose pipe, the soil texture at the leak spot was softer than the surrounding soil.

The pipe is coated with coalton emanel material. During de-coating, there was satisfactory coating adhesion to the pipe, however, there was coating damage around the leak spot – suspectedly caused by a third party interference.

The leak hole was at 8.30 o’clock position. The hole measuring 8 mm in diameter was round and circular in shape with smooth edges consistent with damage done with a drilling device by unknown persons.

Ultrasonic thickness measurement taken with a (…)-meter around the leak hole and around the circumference of the pipe indicated no significant wall loss.

U.T. Around leak hole: a – 9.7 b – 9.6 c – 9.6 d – 9.6 e – 9.5 f – 9.6

h. On 9 July 2005, the SPDC contained the leaked oil. On 18 August 2005, the decontamination mobilization effort was initiated. In the period of August to October 2005, the oil was collected and removed, and in the October-November 2005 period, clean-up efforts were made. In the period of November 2005 to April 2006, remediation activities were carried out according to the Remediation by Enhanced Natural Attenuation (RENA) method through land and farming process, entailing that contaminated soil is mixed with clean material, following which nature restores itself over time. This involved excavating the contaminated soil to a depth of 30 centimetres. The decontamination process was finalized in April/June 2006. On 2 May 2006, Normal Nigeria Enterprise drew up the Report on Recovery, Clean Up and Remediation Project at 20” Kolocreek-Rumuekpe Trunkline at Oruma (hereinafter: the Clean-Up report) for the SPDC.

i. In August 2006, the Joint Federal and States Environmental Regulatory Agencies drew up the Clean-Up and Remediation Certification Format (hereinafter: the Clean-Up certificate), which was signed by three Nigerian government institutions, for the decontamination of the pollution at Oruma. The following, inter alia, is stated in this certificate:

B. Cause & Date of Spill: SABOTAGE 2005

C. Area (…) of Impact: 60.000 M2

(…)

Completion date: June 2006

(…)

STATUS: Site Certified

j. The pipeline referred to under d. (hereinafter also: the Oruma I pipeline or pipe) had been in use since 1994, and at the time of the leak was the only functioning oil transport pipeline in the area. A spare pipeline lay next to this pipeline and was replaced with a new main pipeline (hereinafter also: the Oruma II pipeline or pipe), which was put into use in July 2009. The Oruma I pipeline has been the spare pipeline for the Oruma II pipeline since then.

MD et al. have submitted survey plans with maps of the area around the leak in Exhibits Q.59 A and B, which are dealt with in more detail in legal grounds 4.5 and 4.6. Two adjacent SPDC pipes, marked S1 and S2, are drawn in the survey plans (see also point 7 of the legend). Especially in light of this, the Oruma I and Oruma II pipelines can be considered a unit of one length (37.10 kilometres between Kolo Creek and Rumuekpe), while these pipes’ purpose changed in 2009. The parties also view them as one pipeline, or at least in their analyses have not attached consequences to the fact that, strictly speaking, there are two adjacent pipelines. Therefore, the Court will refer to said unit as, simply, the ‘Oruma pipe/pipeline’ and will only use the terms Oruma I pipeline and Oruma II pipeline if this is required for reasons of clarity.

MD et al. assert that Shell is liable for the origin of the leak, failed to respond adequately to the leak, and failed to clean up properly after the leak. MD et al. claim, following an amendment of claim III on appeal, in a somewhat abridged form (whereby ‘Shell’ is understood to mean the four summoned Shell legal persons), in a decision that is provisionally enforceable:

I to rule that Shell acted unlawfully towards Oguru and/or Efanga based on the assertions in the court documents of MD et al., and that Shell is jointly and severally liable towards Oguru and/or Efanga for the damage they incurred and will incur as a result of Shell’s unlawful conduct, which damage is to be assessed later during separate follow-up proceedings and settled according to the law, plus statutory interest from the date of the summonses until the date on which payment is made in full;

II to rule that Shell is liable for the violation of the physical integrity of Oguru and Efanga caused by living in a contaminated living environment;

III.a to rule that Shell acted unlawfully by allowing the contested leak to occur, and/or failing to respond properly to the contested leak, and/or failing to properly decontaminate the soil/farmland and fish ponds which were contaminated as a result of the contested leak, for the benefit of the local population and in order to counter any and/or further environmental and health damage, current and future, in the persons living in the vicinity of the contested leak in Oruma, whose interests – which are similar to those of the individual claimants – MD also seeks to protect in these proceedings, in accordance with its objectives as set out in its articles of association; and/or

III.b to rule that Shell infringed on the right to a clean living environment, as enshrined in Articles 20, 33 and 34 of the Nigerian Constitution and in Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, by allowing the contested leak to occur, and/or failing to respond properly to the contested leak, and/or failing to properly decontaminate the soil/farmland and fish ponds which were contaminated as a result of the contested leak, for the benefit of the local population and in order to counter any and/or further environmental and health damage, current and future, in the persons living in the vicinity of the contested leak in Oruma, whose interests – which are similar to those of the individual claimants – MD also seeks to protect in these proceedings, in accordance with its objectives as set out in its articles of association;

IV to instruct Shell to commence decontaminating the soil around the oil leak within two weeks from the service of the ruling so that it will meet the international and local environmental standards in force, and to complete the decontamination process within one month from the start;

V to instruct Shell to commence purifying the water sources in and around Oruma within two weeks from the service of the ruling, and to complete the purification process within one month from the start;

VI to order Shell, after its replacement to keep the oil pipeline at Oruma in a good state of repair;

VII to order Shell to implement in Nigeria an adequate response plan to tackle oil spills and to ensure that all conditions are met for a timely and adequate response in case a new oil leak occurs at Oruma; for MD et al. this includes at least making available sufficient materials and means – as proof of which Shell will send MD et al. overviews – in order to limit any damage of a potential oil leak as much as possible;

VIII to order Shell to pay to MD et al. a penalty of € 100,000 (or another amount as determined in the proper administration of justice in the ruling) every time Shell, separately and jointly, acts in violation of the orders referred to under IV, V, VI and/or VII (as the Court understands it);

IX to hold Shell jointly and severally liable for compensation of the extrajudicial costs;

X to order Shell to pay the costs of these proceedings in both instances, including the costs of the experts, or at least to compensate the costs of the parties.

The district court dismissed all claims of MD et al. To that end, the district court considered, inter alia, that MD et al. failed to contest with sufficient substantiation Shell’s defence that the leak was caused by sabotage (legal grounds 4.20 and 4.27 of the judgment), that the SPDC effectively stopped and remedied the leak as quickly as possible on 29 June and on 7 July 2005, so that it cannot be stated that Shell’s response was factually inadequate (legal ground 4.53 of the judgment) and that it was not established that insufficient decontamination had been carried out (legal ground 4.60 of the judgment).

Applicable law

As is stated under 1.3 of the 2015 ruling, the claims of MD et al. must be assessed substantively according to Nigerian law, and Dutch law/procedural law – as laid down, inter alia, in the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure – applies to the manner of litigation, cf. Book 10 Section 3 Dutch Civil Code. It has to be noted here, though, that substantive aspects of procedural law, including the question which penalties may be imposed, are governed by the lex causae (in this case: Nigerian law), as well as the substantive law of evidence, as currently expressed in Book 10 Section 13 Dutch Civil Code, including special rules on the division of the burden of proof relating to a certain legal relationship and which seek to specify the subjective rights ensuing from that legal relationship. In all other respects, the division of the burden of proof, as well as the obligation to furnish facts, is governed by the lex fori, in this case Dutch law, more specifically Dutch procedural law.

In Dutch procedural law, an appeal is considered a continuation of the proceedings in the first instance, whereby on appeal A) new factual and/or legal positions may be taken, also if they could have been brought forward earlier (the repeat function) and B) (partly for that reason) the judgment rendered in the first instance is not necessarily reviewed, but rather the claims are re-assessed, in principle based on the situation existing at the time when the ruling on appeal was rendered (ex nunc). Feature B) is specifically pertinent in the situation that the claim was dismissed in the first instance, such as is the case here.

Renewed assessment of the claims

With the grounds of appeal in the principal appeal of MD et al. and Shell’s grounds of appeal in the cross-appeal, the dispute has been submitted to the Court virtually to its fullest extent. The Court will therefore not discuss the grounds of appeal separately, but re-assess the claims of MD et al.

The factual basis underlying the claims is the ‘contested leak’/‘the oil leak’ (see the text of claim III and IV). In view of the procedural documents, that is the leak that occurred ‘in Oruma’/‘(in and) near Oruma’ on 26 June 2005. This location is also stated in so many words in claims III and V through to VII. Due to the connection between these claims, as described below under 3.8 and 3.9, and claims I and II, that date and location must also be understood to apply to claims I and II.

The claims of MD et al. are based on three (groups of) acts/unlawful acts, namely acts/unlawful acts that are related to i) the origin of a leak, ii) Shell’s response to a leak that has arisen and iii) the decontamination of the leak. This is expressly stated in claims III.a and b, as well as in claims IV and V (on decontamination), VI (on origin) and VII (on response). In light of this, the acts referred to in claim I and underlying claim II must therefore be interpreted in the same manner. The Court will hereinafter assess the claims of MD et al. based on these three themes (‘Origin’, ‘Response’ and ‘Decontamination’). In this respect, it is noted – and this is also the interpretation of Shell (point 620 DoA/SoA-cross/2) – that ‘Response’ also covers measures that should have been taken before the leak occurred, which would have enabled Shell to respond to an occurrence of a leak in a timely and adequate manner.

Claim I – which was only lodged by Oguru and Efanga, and not also by MD – extends, strictly speaking, to the issuance of a declaratory decision that Shell is liable for the damages due to unlawful acts by Shell on the three aforementioned themes. However, the Court understands, inter alia from point 201 WS-MD, that MD et al. seek a referral to follow-up proceedings for the determination of damages pursuant to Section 612 et seq. Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, which is applicable here as part of Dutch procedural law. This is also Shell’s interpretation (points 12 and 264 DoA/SoA-cross/2). This claim revolves around the situation in the years 2005-2006, when the alleged unlawful acts were committed.

Claims IV through to VII were lodged by Oguru and Efanga and by MD, and are intended for injunctions/orders. These orders – which the district court did not issue – must be assessed based on the state of affairs at the moment this ruling is handed down (see legal ground 3.2). Claims for injunction IV and V are for the effect that the residual damage is sanitized after the decontamination (point 444 R). Claim for injunction VI is for the effect that the pipeline near Oruma is kept in a good state of repair (point 437 R). Claim VII seeks, inter alia, to ensure that Shell is able to respond in a timely and adequate manner should another leak occur again near Oruma.

The Court deduces from points 768, 780, 784 and 789 SoA/2 that claim III.a – which was only lodged by MD, and not also by Oguru and Efanga – has two intentions. That claim for a declaratory decision serves:

a) as a prelude to the compensation to be obtained by the local residents (not being Oguru and Efanga) for damages past and future;

b) to represent the public and/or environmental interest/the interest of these local residents that the oil contamination is cleaned up after all/further, and new oil contamination is prevented.

Aspect a) regards the area also covered by claim I and effectuates that that claim is also lodged for the benefit of the local residents (see point 854 SoA/2). To this extent, claim III.a is in line with claim I. Aspect b) regards the area also covered by claims for injunction IV through to VII. To this extent, claim III.a is in line with claims IV through to VII. A difference between claim I and aspect a) of claim III.a is that claim III.a does not concern a referral to follow-up proceedings for the determination of damages, but encompasses future claims for compensation of the local residents. Shell’s defence, namely that the claims for compensation of the individual local residents have already expired (legal ground 4.8 of the 2015 ruling; point 123 SoA-cross/1 and point 907 DoA/SoA-cross/2), does not alter the fact – unlike Shell appears to believe – that MD still has an interest in claim III.a on account of the future damage of the local residents, whose interests MD also seeks to protect, and on account of aspect b). It may well be the case, as Shell notes in point 122SoA-cross/1, that the Dutch court will be found to have no international jurisdiction as regards the claims for compensation to be lodged against the SPDC by said local residents. However, this does not mean that the argument Shell has attached to this, namely that the declaratory decision under claim III.a cannot form a basis for such claims for compensation, is correct. Foreign decisions of ‘superior courts’ (courts with general jurisdiction, such as this Court) may be recognized in Nigeria based on the 1961 Nigeria Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, currently Chapter C35 in the 2004 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. There are no reasons, nor have any reasons been put forward, to assume that this is not the case for the decision to be taken in this case on claim III.a. It should also be considered here that foreign decisions are generally speaking recognized in the Netherlands (Supreme Court 26 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2838 (Gazprombank)), so that the reciprocity requirement from the aforementioned Nigerian act cannot be viewed as a hindrance to recognition of this ruling’s decision on claim III.a in Nigeria.

Whenever the difference between both aspects of claim III.a is relevant, this claim will be designated as ‘III.a-a’ when referring to aspect a), and as ‘III.a-b’ when referring to aspect b).

Claim III.b – which was only lodged by MD, and not also by Oguru and Efanga – seeks a declaratory decision that with its acts on the three themes, Shell infringed on the local resident’s fundamental right to a clean living environment. Claim II – which was only lodged by Oguru and Efanga – seeks such a declaratory decision to their benefit, as the Court understands from point 854 SoA/2. This claim initially also pertained to future health damage (point 442 R), but by the document of 11 September 2012, page four, MD et al. dropped this part of their claim, see also point 215 WS-MD.

All claims have been lodged against Nigerian operating company SPDC and against the Shell parent companies. In the period up to 20 July 2005, this concerned Shell NV and Shell T&T jointly, after which RDS became the only remaining parent company. RDS was not formed by a merger of Shell NV and/or Shell T&T (point 17 SoD). Therefore, the claims relating to compensation in respect of ‘Origin’ and ‘Response’ covering the period up to and including 9 July 2005 only extend to Shell NV and Shell T&T.

Nigerian law; general

The Federal Republic of Nigeria consists of states. The Nigerian judicial system has federal courts and state courts. From high to low, the federal courts are the following: the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the Federal High Court. The highest state courts are the State High Courts. When reference is made below to these courts, without any addition, this is taken to mean the Nigerian courts. When referring to English courts (of the same name), this is indicated with the addition: UK.

The sources of Nigerian federal civil law include the following: English law and Nigerian legislation and case law. The English law that applies in Nigeria comprises ‘the common law of England and the doctrines of equity’ (section 32 (1) of the Interpretation Act Chapter 192 Laws of Nigeria, 1990), with the proviso that judgments of English courts dating from after Nigeria’s independence in 1960 formally have no binding authority in Nigerian courts, but do have persuasive authority and are often followed in Nigerian court decisions.

Common law has the legal remedy of damages (including the purely compensatory option of compensation). The mandatory injunction, which is based on equity (equitable remedy), only comes into play if compensation is not sufficient. The equity principles, including the principle of ‘he who comes to equity must have clean hands’ may further limit the equitable remedies. In a ruling of 10 February 2012, C 112/2002, LOR (10/2/2012) (Military Governor of Lagos State v Adebayo Adeyiga), the Supreme Court considered as follows (p. 26):

The court will always invoke its equitable jurisdiction and exercise its discretion to grant a mandatory injunction where the injury done to the plaintiff cannot be estimated and sufficiently compensated by damages and the injury to the plaintiff is so serious and material that the restoration of things to their former condition is the only method whereby justice can be adequately done.

In point 846 SoA/2, MD et al. rightfully pointed out that according to Nigerian law awarding or dismissing a claim for injunction falls under the discretionary power of the court. From the above-cited consideration of the Supreme Court it can also be deduced that a Nigerian injunction is intended to end an unlawful state (‘restoration of things’), which also covers a continuing unlawful omission. Nigerian law also has a declaratory decision, known as declaratory relief, as equitable remedy, see Supreme Court 13 April 2007, S.C. 243/2001 (Ibator v. Barakuro).

The Nigerian Evidence Act 1945, replaced with the Evidence Act 2011, forms part of Nigerian federal legislation. Section 135(1) of the 1945 version and Section 131(1) of the 2011 version convey the main rule of the division of the burden of proof:

Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.

As is considered in 3.1 in fine, the ‘normal’ division of the burden of proof must be determined based on Dutch law as the lex fori, meaning in accordance with Section 150 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, which states as the main rule that the party invoking the legal effects of the facts or rights alleged by said party carries the burden of proof as regards the respective facts or rights.

The Oil Pipelines Act 1956 (OPA) also forms part of Nigerian federal legislation. Section 11(5) OPA – which MD et al. have invoked – stipulates as follows:

The holder of a licence shall pay compensation –

(a) to any person whose land or interest in land (whether or not it is land in respect of which the license has been granted) is injuriously affected by the exercise of the right conferred by the licence, for any such injurious affection not otherwise made good; and

(b) to any person suffering damage by reason of any neglect on the part of the holder or his agents, servants or workmen to protect, maintain or repair any work, structure or thing executed under the licence, for any such damage not otherwise made good; and

(c) to any person suffering damage (other than on account of his own default or on account of the malicious act of a third person) as a consequence of any breakage of or leakage from the pipeline or an ancillary installation, for any such damage not otherwise made good.

If the amount of such compensation is not agreed between any such person and the holder, it shall be fixed by a court in accordance with Part IV of this Act.

Section 19 OPA, which forms part of Part IV (‘Compensation’), stipulates the following, inter alia:

If there be any dispute as to whether any compensation is payable under any provision of this Act or if so as to the amount thereof, or as to the persons to whom such compensation should be paid, such dispute shall be determined by (…) the High Court exercising jurisdiction in the area concerned (…) there shall be an appeal to the Court of Appeal:.

Section 20(2) OPA, which also forms part of Part IV, determines as follows:

If a claim is made under subsection (5) of section 11 of this Act, the court shall award such compensation as it considers just having regard to (…).

The SPDC – the operator of the Oruma pipeline – is the licence holder of that pipeline in the sense of Section 11(5) OPA. It is stated under (a) of this section that the owner, holder or user of land is entitled to compensation if he experiences nuisance as a result of activities of the licence holder (statutory nuisance). It is stated under (b) that the licence holder has a statutory duty of care to protect, maintain and repair his pipelines, and that he is obligated to pay compensation for any damage in case he fails to do so (statutory negligence). It is stated under (c) that the licence holder has strict liability for damages resulting from a leak from his pipeline (statutory strict liability), from which he is only relieved if he successfully proves that the damage is the result of the injured party’s own acts or of a malicious act of a third party, such as sabotage. This concerns an affirmative defence (‘yes, but’ defence) with respect to which the licence holder bears the burden of proof (like Shell in point 355 DoA/SoA-cross/2).

MD et al. have also invoked several torts (unlawful acts under common law), namely: the tort of negligence, the tort of nuisance and the tort of trespass to chattel.

Tort of negligence, which is comparable to a breach of the standard of care under Dutch law, requires that:

a) there is a duty of care;

b) said duty of care has been breached;

c) damages have occurred as a result.

Whether or not a duty of care exists must be determined on the basis of the so-named Caparo test:

i) is the damage foreseeable?

ii) is there proximity?

iii) is it fair, just and reasonable to assume a duty of care?

Under Nigerian law, a claimant also carries the burden of proof with respect to a), b) and c), see legal ground 3.14 and also Supreme Court 6 June 2008, [2008] 13 NWRL (Abubakar v Joseph) (Appendix 1 to Exhibit 19), legal ground 14 on p. 317, legal ground 20 on p. 318 and p. 341 – except in the case of res ipsa loquitur, a common law principle explaining that the mere occurrence of an event implies negligence, without direct or further evidence being required. In the aforementioned ruling, the following was further stated on the meaning of negligence (legal ground 12 on p. 316/p. 350):

Negligence is the omission or failure to do something which a reasonable man under similar circumstances would do, or the doing of something a reasonable man would not do.

The view expressed by Shell in point 320 DoA/SoA-cross/2 that Nigerian law has no liability for ‘pure omissions’ is therefore incorrect.

The proximity requirement will generally be met in case of physical proximity, but in absence thereof, there may still be proximity; the concept covers a range of relationships. A ruling of the predecessor of the UK Supreme Court (House of Lords 8 February 1990, [1990] ALL ER 568, [1990] 2 AC 605 (Caparo Industries plc v Dickman) – from which the name of the Caparo test is derived – states the following about the proximity requirement (p.633):

“Proximity” is no doubt a convenient expression so long as it is realised that it is no more than a label which embraces not a definable concept but merely a description of circumstances from which, pragmatically, the courts conclude that a duty of care exists.

MD et al. have partly based their standpoints in this case on soft law, including the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN), issued by the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), revised edition of 2002 (Exhibit G.2 and Exhibit 13), which their expert E. Duruigbo describes as ‘recommendations’ reflecting the ‘industry custom’ (Exhibit M.1, no. 60). It is obvious to assume, also according to the common law such as it is applied in Nigeria, that such non-binding standards – depending on their nature and contents – may aid to specify or illuminate a duty of care. This is confirmed in point 50 of the opinion M.T. Ladan and R.T. Ako of 13 December 2011, submitted by MD et al. as Exhibit L.1.

MD et al. describe the tort of nuisance as: nuisance (point 125 R), the tort of trespass to chattel as: breach of property or goods not being land (such as trees, crops and fish), whereby breach is taken to mean: inflicting damage or disrupting use (point 134 R, point 827 SoA/2). The tort of trespass to chattel requires intent or negligence, while the tort of nuisance requires unreasonable acts on the part of the party causing the nuisance (points 825 and 817 SoA/2).

Another part of common law is the rule of the English case of Ryland v Fletcher (House of Lords 17 July 1868, (LR 3 HL 330)). The court of appeal in that case described that rule as follows:

The person who for his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at this peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.

The then House of Lords affirmed this rule, with the addition that the rule only pertains to ‘non natural use’ of the land. The Rylands v Fletcher rule imposes strict liability – which incidentally is not unlimited – on the occupier of the land for the damage that occurs if the conditions of this rule are met. The strict liability of Section 11(5)(c) OPA can be viewed as the implementation of this rule in case of pipe damage.

Exclusivity of the OPA

Shell has argued that Section 11(5)(c) OPA provides an exclusive arrangement for the liability of a licence holder for damage caused by a leak from a pipeline, and that there therefore is no place for liability for such damage on a common law ground such as negligence, nuisance or trespass. In this context, Shell refers to the following rulings:

- UK High Court 20 June 2014, (2014) EWHC 719 (TCC) (Bodo v SPDC) in which (in legal ground 64) that exclusivity of the OPA is assumed;

- Court of Appeal 25 July 2017 (Nigerian Agip Oil Co v Ogbu) (Exhibit 61, Appendix 2) in which on p. 29 in an obiter dictum, referencing inter alia Bodo v SPDC, it is noted that Section 11(5) OPA has set aside the common law;

- High Court 15 January 2019 (Johnson v SPDC) (Exhibit 61, Appendix 4) in four consolidated cases in which it was determined that the OPA ‘has provided a comprehensive compensation regime’.

Before Bodo v SPDC, the Nigerian courts did not view the OPA, or Section 11(5) OPA, as exclusive. This is apparent from, for example, the ruling in the case SPDC v Otoko (Court of Appeal 25 May 1990, [1990]6 NWLR 693) (Exhibit J.5). This case concerned leaks from pipelines, so that that case (also according to Shell; point 291 DoA/SoA-cross/2) fell within the OPA’s scope of application. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal did not apply the OPA but rather common law (tort of negligence) (see, inter alia, points 19 et seq. of the dictum). In the ruling in the case of SPDC v Edamkue (Supreme Court 10 July 2009, 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 1; (2009) 6-7 S.C. 74) (Appendix 1.12 to Exhibit M.1)) the common law rule of Rylands v Fletcher was used in a case regarding a pipeline leak. In a ruling (Supreme Court 5 June 2015, LOR (5/6/2015/SC) (SPDC v Anaro) delivered after Bodo v SPDC, the Supreme Court determined in a case which (also according to Shell; point 291 DoA/SoA-cross/2) fell under the scope of application of the OPA, that the Rylands v Fletcher rule was rightfully applied (Exhibit Q.24, see mainly p. 13 of said ruling). From this it can be deduced that the Supreme Court did not view the OPA as exclusive, both before and after Bodo v SPDC. A Federal High Court (14 December 2016 (Ajanaku v Mobil) (Exhibit Q.23) considered as follows: ‘It is settled law that victims of oil operations spillage/damage can maintain an action for compensation under the rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher’.

The OPA dates from 1956. From the above considerations the argument follows that this act is exclusive, was first put forward, or at least was first embraced, in a UK High Court procedure which in 2014 led to Bodo v SPDC, and was later sporadically used by lower Nigerian courts, but not by the Supreme Court, which continued to assume its non-exclusivity. In view of the system of precedent, this court must follow the Supreme Court. All the more so now the only higher Nigerian court has assumed the exclusivity, the Court of Appeal in NAOC v Ogbu, namely in an obiter dictum (see, inter alia, point 37 of the opinion of Shell’s expert F. Oditah in Exhibit 61), which has no binding effect (see Uniken Venema/Zwalve, Common Law & Civil Law, 2008, p. 80). Therefore, Shell’s argument as stated under 3.22 does not succeed. The OPA is not exclusive, so that common law legal actions are also an option, with the associated legal and equitable remedies.

The standpoint taken by Shell – following on from the aforementioned opinion in Exhibit 61 – that there is no room in the OPA for a declaratory decision, but only for compensation (point 74 WS/2-S and point 262 DoA/SoA-cross/2) is also rejected. The rulings discussed in points 44 through to 47 of the Exhibit 61-opinion only reveal that the OPA does not allow any/other damages, because it mentions ‘compensation’. From this it does not follow that a declaratory decision (whether or not as a prelude to compensation) is in conflict with the wording, system or purpose of the OPA. A declaratory decision may well be an appropriate means to settle or streamline a dispute as referred to in Section 19 OPA, which may or may not involve a declaratory decision in a dispute about the question whether or not a compensation obligation exists under the OPA, after which the amount of compensation may either be agreed between the parties, within the meaning of the last sentence of Section 11(5) OPA or may be determined by the court on the basis of Section 20(2) of said act.

Liability of a parent company under Nigerian law

The claims of MD et al. against the parent companies of Shell are governed by Nigerian law. This is agreed between the parties (see also legal ground 1.3 of the 2015 ruling as well as legal ground 3.32, cf. also Section 6 of the Dutch Unlawful Act (Conflict of Laws) Act, Article 14 Rome II Regulation). These claims are not based on a direct piercing of the corporate veil (where the separation of legal personalities between the parent company and subsidiary is disregarded), but on what is also known as an indirect piercing of the corporate veil, namely the liability of the parent company for its own acts or omissions with respect to third parties that were/are affected by the acts or omissions of its subsidiary (inter alia, points 126 and 127 SoA/1) – based on the negligence/breach of a duty of care.

Shell has noted that there is no Nigerian precedent for this liability of a parent company. A question that was posed by the Court at the 2020 hearing in response to this remark was answered on behalf of Shell that, to its knowledge, no case had ever occurred in which a parent company was called to account/included in a summons (RH-2020, p. 13) in a context such as the one in this case. Therefore, it must be established that in Nigeria no comparable case of parent company liability has been settled in legal proceedings. Considering this state of affairs, English case law – which after all has persuasive authority in Nigeria – must be consulted.

The relevant recent English rulings in this area are:

- UK Court of Appeal 25 April 2012, [2012] EWCA Civ 525 (Chandler v Cape) (Exhibit 25), in which in substantive proceedings the liability of the parent company with respect to employees of the subsidiary was assumed;

- UK Court of Appeal 14 February 2018, [2018] EWCA Civ 191 (Okpabi v RDS) (Exhibit Q.34), in which in the context of the competence issue it was determined that the claimants had no arguable case against the parent company (appeal before the Supreme Court pending, case id: UKSC 2018/0068));

- UK Supreme Court 10 April 2019, [2019] UKSC 20 (Vedanta v Lungowe), in which the opinion in the context of the competence issue, that claimants had an arguable case against the parent company, was upheld.

The most importance must be attached to the ruling (delivered in unanimity) of the UK Supreme Court. In this ruling, the following was considered, inter alia:

44. (…) In the present case the critical question is whether Vedanta sufficiently intervened in the management of the Mine owned by its subsidiary KCM to have incurred, itself (rather than by vicarious liability, a common law duty of care to the claimants (…).

49. (…). (…) the liability of parent companies in relation to the activities of their subsidiaries is not, of itself, a distinct category in common law negligence. Direct or indirect ownership by one company of all or a majority of the shares of another company (which is the irreducible essence of a parent/subsidiary relationship) may enable the parent to take control of the management of the operations of the business or of land owned by the subsidiary, but it does not impose any duty upon the parent to do so, whether owed to the subsidiary or, a fortiori, to anyone else. Everything depends on the extent to which, and the way in which, the parent availed itself of the opportunity to take over, intervene in, control, supervise or advise the management of the relevant operations (including land use) of the subsidiary. All that the existence of a parent subsidiary relationship demonstrates is that the parent had such opportunity.

50. (…) the (…) in my view correct summary of this point (…):

“There is no special doctrine in the law of tort of legal responsibility on the part of a parent company in relation to the activities of its subsidiary, vis-à-vis persons affected by those activities. (…). The legal principles are the same as would apply in relation to the question whether any third party (such as a consultant giving advice to the subsidiary) was subject to a duty of care in tort owed to a claimant dealing with the subsidiary. (…)”

(…).

51. (…). (…) I would be reluctant to seek to shoehorn all cases of the parent’s liability into specific categories (…). There is no limit to the models of management and control which may be put in place within a multinational group of companies. At one end, the parent may be no more than a passive investor in separate businesses carried out by its various direct and indirect subsidiaries. At the other extreme, the parent may carry out a thoroughgoing vertical reorganization of the group’s businesses so that they are, in management terms, carried as if they were a single commercial undertaking, with boundaries of legal personality and ownership within the group becoming irrelevant (…).

52. (…) In the Chandler case (this is the ‘Chandler v Cape’ case referred to under 3.28, added by the Court), the subsidiary inherited (by taking over a business formerly carried on by the parent) a system for the manufacture of asbestos which created an inherently unsafe system of work for its employees, because it was carried out in factory buildings with open sides, for which harmful asbestos dust could, and did, escape. As a result, and after a full trial, the parent was found to have incurred a duty of care to the employees of its subsidiary, and the result would surely have been the same if the dust had escaped to neighbouring land where third parties worked, lived or enjoyed recreation. (…).

(…).

54. Once it is recognized that, for these purposes, there is nothing special or conclusive about the bare parent/subsidiary relationship, it is apparent that the general principles which determine whether A owes a duty of care to C in respect of the harmful activities of B are not novel at all. (…).

The legal rule given by the UK Supreme Court in Vedanta v Lungowe (hereinafter: the Vedanta rule) means that it must be assessed according to the usual standards – the Caparo test, see legal ground 3.18 – whether or not a parent company has a duty of care with respect to third parties that have a relationship with its subsidiary, that a further classification in Fallgruppen is not applicable, and that involvement in the subsidiary is a basic condition (cf. point 8 WS/2-S). Point 80 of Chandler v Cape states as an extra condition for a duty of care of the parent company that the parent company knew or should have known about the unsafety of the system used by the subsidiary. This knowledge requirement must be deemed to form part of the Vedanta rule. If the parent company is not aware or should be aware of the injurious acts of the parent company, it is difficult to recognize that, as far as the parent company is concerned, the foreseeability requirement – step a) of the Caparo test – has been met nor that it would be fair, just and reasonable – step c) of the Caparo test – to impose a duty of care on the parent company.

Including the knowledge requirement, the Vedanta rule may be represented as follows: if the parent company knows or should know that its subsidiary unlawfully inflicts damage on third parties in an area where the parent company involves itself in the subsidiary, the starting point is that the parent company has a duty of care in respect of the third parties to intervene.

Especially considering the above-cited consideration 54 of the Vedanta v Lugowe ruling, there is no reason to assume that the Nigerian court would not adopt the Vedanta rule, as shown above. Therefore, this rule must be deemed to form part of Nigerian law. Since Nigerian law is identical to English law in this respect, it would make no difference whatsoever if the parent company liability were to be assessed not according to Nigerian law (see legal ground 3.26) but to English law.

In this context, the following can also be noted:

- The Shell parent companies are not licence holders in the sense of the OPA; this act therefore does not apply to them;

- In light of the view under 3.24 that the OPA does not have an exclusive nature, this act does not preclude – unlike Shell believes (point 770 DoA/SoA-cross/2) – an assumption of parent company liability on the basis of common law;

- Along with Shell (point 770 DoA/SoA-cross/2), it must be assumed that, looking at specifically this case, if there is no tort of negligence/nuisance/trespass to chattel of the subsidiary – perhaps with the exception of special circumstances, of which there is no evidence here – a breach of a duty of care on the part of the parent company cannot be assumed.

The extent of the contamination

The JIT report states that the equivalent of about 400 barrels of oil leaked in the spill of 26 June 2005, which comes down to about 64,000 litres. The Clean-Up certificate states that this caused contamination in area of about 60,000 m2, the equivalent of about ten football pitches. MD et al. have cast doubt on the accuracy of these figures (see, inter alia, point 10 SoA/2 and points 139 et seq. WS/2-MD), while failing to provide the figures (approximations) which should be assumed, even though logically speaking they should have done so (legal grounds 3.14 and 3.18), especially when it comes to the size of the contaminated area they could have determined on the basis of their own investigation. However, the Court understands from points 79-88 WS-MD, point 10 SoA/2 and points 146 and 157 WS/2-MD, that the argument of MD et al. regarding the inaccuracy of the figures is only in support of their standpoint that the JIT report and Clean-Up certificate are unreliable (cf. point 53 WS/2-S).

Introduction

Shell has put forward several preliminary defences, which were largely processed in the 2015 ruling. That ruling discussed Shell’s reliance on the lack of a right of action of Oguru and Efanga (see legal grounds 4.1 through to 4.3 of said ruling), but no final decision on that has been taken. In the 2015 ruling, Shell’s reliance on the general dismissal of MD’s right of action was definitively rejected (legal grounds 3.1 through to 3.4 of said ruling). Shell subsequently and specifically put forward in points 223-230 and 932 and 933 DoA/SoA-cross/2 that MD et al. have no case based on the OPA due to non-fulfilment of a condition precedent. The Court will now assess/further assess, in the aforementioned order, the preliminary defences on which no definitive decision has yet been taken.

Right of action of Oguru and Efanga

MD et al. have asserted as follows. Oguru and Efanga use and occupy the land on which they grew their crops and economic trees (jointly: the plants). This land was situated near the right of way of the SPDC. Oil spilled over this land due to the leak of 26 June 2005, so that the land and the plants (of which they were owners) were affected and destroyed. Oguru and Efanga also had a number of fish ponds, which they had installed in the bush on both sides of the Olumogbogbo-Gbara Creek. The oil that spilled into this creek was spread by the current and tidal movement, so that some of the oil also ended up in the fish ponds of Oguru and Efanga. The fish in the ponds died as a result and the ponds became unusable for fish farming and fishing.

To contest the right of action of Oguru and Efanga, Shell has put forward three arguments, namely a) that they should have submitted documents showing how they acquired the ownership/right of use of the land and the fish ponds, b) that they failed to make clear the exact location of the land and the fish ponds, and c) that it does not appear that the oil had leaked up to this land and these fish ponds and caused damage there (inter alia, points 243, 244, 253, 254, 562 and 564 DoA/SoA-cross/2).

Section 11(5)(b) and (c) OPA confers right of action on ‘any person suffering damage’. The words ‘any person’ show that the group of persons with a right of action is very broad and that no specific requirements are set as to the capacity of the injured party. This does not tally with expecting an injured party that is able to prove that they have the capacity of owner or (lawful) user – which is not required – to also demonstrate how they acquired the ownership or right of use. The same applies to a claim on the basis of negligence. This also does not require specific requirements as to the capacity of the injured party. Insofar as the claims of Oguru and Efanga are based on Section 11(5)(b) and (c) OPA and the tort of negligence, Shell’s argument a) does not succeed for these reasons alone. Whether or not this argument is applicable to the other bases of the claims of Oguru and Efanga needs no consideration, in view of the considerations in 5.30, 6.29, 8.29 and 9.6.

In the first instance, MD et al. submitted signed statements of the Oruma community from 2012, in which the community states that the land and the fish ponds circled on the attached Google Earth maps ‘are owned and used by’ Oguru and Efanga with ‘the right to do so’ (hereinafter: the M.4 statements). On appeal, in DoA-cross/2, MD et al. have submitted survey plans with maps of 4 October 2019 as Exhibit Q.59 (A and B), on which is stated: ‘shewing property area’ of Oguru and the deceased Efanga. The land and the fish ponds are depicted in red lines on the maps. According to the assertions of MD et al. in point 31 WS/2-MD, following on from points 92 and 106 DoA-cross/2, a survey plan is an official, certified document on which the location and demarcation of a piece of land is depicted, comparable to a cadastral map in the Netherlands. Shell has not contested this. From the last sentence of point 61 WS/2-S, it can be deduced that Shell deems the M4 statements to be incorrect, because the map associated with the statements show the lands and fish ponds at different locations than on the map of the survey plan, which Shell apparently does deem to be correct. In point 92 (with note 102) DoA-cross/2 and point 17 WS/2-MD, MD et al. have given a credible explanation for this, namely that the person who drew the circles on the map of the M.4 statements had mistaken a path between the lands of Oguru and Efanga for the right of way, and that if the map of the M.4 statements is turned 45º to the right, it is clear that it corresponds with the maps in the survey plans, as is made clear with the photograph on p.8 WS/2-MD. Regardless, it is at any rate sufficiently clear from the not-contested survey plans where the lands and fish ponds of Oguru and the late Efanga are situated, and that they in any case were the users of the lands and the fish ponds (‘property area’). Therefore, argument b) also does not hold.

The maps to the survey plans show the location of the leak (spillpoint). It appears from the scale of the map that Oguru’s land starts at about 100m from the spillpoint and that Efanga’s land borders it. The land and fish ponds of Oguru and Efanga are situated so close to the location of the leak that, also in light of the considerations in 3.34, the oil flow inevitably reached those lands and fish ponds and at least covered parts of the lands and fish ponds, also considering that Shell has not asserted that the oil almost exclusively flowed in the opposite direction. It can therefore be considered certain that Oguru and Efanga incurred at least some damage as a result of the leak. Shell’s argument c) also does not hold.

It must be concluded that Oguru and Efanga are entitled to claim pursuant to Section 11(5)(b) and (c) OPA and pursuant to the tort of negligence. This also applies to MD where it seeks to protect the interests of other, currently unknown, persons living in the vicinity of the spillpoint, within the area measuring about ten football pitches, and the environment affected by the leak.

Right of action of MD et al. under the OPA

Shell argues that MD et al. have no right of action under the OPA, because they do not meet the condition (condition precedent) set out in the last sentence of Section 11(5) OPA, in conjunction with Sections 11(6) and 20(2) OPA, to be able to claim compensation at law based on that condition, namely that the parties must have first consulted each other in an attempt to reach agreement on the amount of compensation. MD et al. counter this with the statement that the OPA does not contain such a condition precedent and, in the alternative, that it cannot be alleged against them since the amount of compensation is not yet at issue (points 14 and 21-32 DoA-cross/2).

In assessing this point of contention, the Court states first and foremost that Shell has failed to argue that as an interest group MD cannot invoke Section 11(5) OPA. The fact that Shell believes that MD has no right of action (see the heading above point 223 DoA/SoA-cross/2) due to not meeting the alleged ‘consultation’ condition in that section, and not in the alternative sense, indicates that it – rightly – assumes that there is no further hindrance to deem MD entitled to bring an action based on that section. In this context, reference is made to legal ground 3.3 of the 2015 ruling (a+b).

Section 19 OPA distinguishes between, inter alia: ‘any dispute as to whether any compensation is payable under any provision of this Act’ and ‘any dispute’ ‘as to the amount thereof’. The last sentence of Section 11(5) OPA, containing the alleged condition precedent, only pertains to disputes on ‘the amount of such compensation’. Claims I and III.a-a, which are partially based on the OPA, are for declaratory decisions with a referral to follow-up proceedings for the determination of damages, and declaratory decisions as a prelude/basis for future claims for compensation, respectively. Those claims therefore pertain to disputes about the question ‘as to whether any compensation is payable’ and not, or not yet, about the question of ‘the amount of such compensation’. The alleged ‘condition precedent’ does not come into play here. Therefore, MD et al. have rightfully put forward that this cannot be alleged against them.

Superfluously, the Court notes the following. MD et al. sent notices of liability to the SPDC and RDS before the summons in case b, to which the SPDC responded with the remark that it ‘under no obligation is to compensate your clients for the damage claimed (…)’. During the appeal proceedings, the Court repeatedly requested/urged the parties to examine whether or not they could reach a mutual agreement (see, inter alia, p. 6 of the record of appearance of the parties of 24 November 2016 and p. 18 of the RH-2020). At the 2020 hearing, Shell noted that a settlement is not an option – as the Court understands it: for Shell – because MD also seeks to protect the interests of three communities, including the Oruma community, and not just those of several individual claimants. Taking all this into account, Shell effectively halted ahead of time the consultations it now emphasizes so much. Considering this state of affairs, the condition precedent must be deemed as fulfilled, in view of the underlying principle, as regards Dutch law, of Book 6 Section 23 subsection 1 Dutch Civil Code.

Claims I and III.a-a against the SPDC in respect of ‘Origin’

The Court will now assess claims I and III.a-a of MD et al. against the subsidiary SPDC insofar as they pertain to the theme ‘Origin’. These claims – also as regards claim III.a, see legal ground 4.9 – are firstly based on Section 11(5)(c) OPA, which imposes strict liability on the SPDC for damages ensuing from a leak in a pipeline. However, this strict liability does not apply without limitation; it does not apply, inter alia, if the damage is the result of a malicious act of a third person, such as is the case with third-party sabotage.

Sabotage defence: burden of proof and threshold of proof

The SPDC asserts that the leak was caused by sabotage. MD et al. have contested this. According to them, the leak was the result of overdue maintenance. Shell has not argued that the sabotage it has presumed was caused by Oguru and/or Efanga or the local residents whose interests MD seeks to protect. Shell bases its defence on third-party sabotage.

It is – rightfully – not in dispute that Shell has the burden of proof as regards the third-party sabotage it alleges (see also legal ground 3.16 in fine). However, it is in dispute which evidence evaluation standard (threshold of proof) applies here: is that the special standard for civil cases, beyond reasonable doubt, such as MD et al. believe, or the regular standard of preponderance of weight of evidence, such as Shell believes?

The Nigerian Evidence Act 2011, already discussed in legal ground 3.14, states the following, inter alia:

134 Standard of proof in civil cases

The burden of proof shall discharged on the balance of probabilities in all civil proceeding.

135 standard of proof where commission of crime in issue and burden where guilt of crime etc. asserted

(a) If the commission of a crime by a party to any proceedings is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(…).

Section 138 subsection 1 of the 1945 version of the act stipulated the same as Section 135(a) of the 2011 version.

These legislative texts at first glance seem to suggest, as Shell notes in point 15 WS/2-S, inter alia, that in cases of criminal offences committed by a non-party, such as with third-party sabotage, the special standard of beyond reasonable doubt does not apply. However, according to MD et al. Nigerian courts do apply this special standard in third-party sabotage cases.

The Court first of all points out that in the Supreme Court ruling in the SPDC v Edamkue case of 2009, referred to in legal ground 3.23, the beyond reasonable doubt standard was used in a civil oil leak case in which third-party sabotage was invoked, as the Court understands. This is not out of the ordinary considering Section 138 subsection 1 of the Evidence Act 1945.

From the ruling of a Court of Appeal (7 December 2011, (2011)LPELR-9783(CA) (SPDC v. Firibeb) (Appendix 1 to Exhibit 60)) regarding Section 11(5)(b) and (c) OPA it becomes clear that in the first instance, the Federal High Court ruled (p. 8): ‘I do agree (…) that the standard of proof required for claims of vandalisation and acts of a third party are high. Vandalization and acts of a third party conno[n]tes criminality and the standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt’. On appeal in that case, the SPDC did not submit grounds for appeal against this judgment.

The ruling of a Court of Appeal of 17 December 2018 (2018)17NWLR (Pt. 1649) 420 (SPDC v Okeh) (Exhibit Q.60, Appendix A) also concerned third-party sabotage. In an explanation of the law on p. 436/437, reference is made to the beyond reasonable doubt standard from SPDC v Edamkue and to Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act. From this it can deduced that this Court of Appeal effectively applied the beyond reasonable doubt standard. The fact that on p. 439, second paragraph, mention is made of reliable proof does not take away from this, especially not since that paragraph emphasizes that in that case there was actually no proof at all for sabotage (‘little or no iota of proof ‘).

Another case between the SPDC and Okeh, in which a Federal High Court gave a decision on 20 February 2018 (Exhibit Q.60, Appendix B) also involved third-party sabotage. This court considered the following as regards the proof to be submitted: ‘I entirely agree with the submission of (…) that allegations of crime in civil matters must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and specially pleaded and particularized’. It was then determined that this threshold had been met.

In I.T. Amachree, Compensation claims relating to cruel oil spillage & land acquisitions for oil & gas fields in Nigeria (A Suggested Practice Guide), Peral Publishers, 2011, p. 315 (Exhibit Q.14) the following can be read:

Ordinarily, where a criminal allegation forms part of a civil action, the standard of proof of that allegation is beyond reasonable doubt by virtue of section 138(1) of the Evidence Act. Pipeline vandalism is a criminal offence by virtue of section 3(7)(a) and (b) of the Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous) Act, 1984. It is therefore, submitted that companies alleging this criminality of sabotage must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the particular spillage complained of was caused by the act of third parties and without their negligence.

Shell and its experts Oditah and Ayoola could not identify a single legal decision in which the regular standard pursuant to Section 134 Evidence Act 2011 rather than the beyond reasonable doubt standard was used in third-party sabotage cases to counter the legal sources discussed in 5.6 through to 5.9, which strongly suggest that in legal practice the beyond reasonable doubt standard is applied in cases involving third-party sabotage. In his opinion in Exhibit 77 (under 224) Ayoola acknowledged that there is a ‘temptation for civil courts’ to interpret Section 138(1)/135(1) Evidence Act in a way that requires beyond reasonable doubt, also in cases of non-party sabotage. The Court finds that under applicable Nigerian law, as it is applied by the Nigerian courts, this high threshold of proof must be applied in third-party sabotage cases. The fact that Oditah and Ayoola deem this incorrect, does not alter this. The opinions of these party experts carry insufficient weight in relation to the legal practice, as is evident from 5.6 through to 5.9.

As is evident from the foregoing, there is a specific threshold of proof in Nigeria to prove sabotage. Such a specific rule can be considered as belonging to the substantive law of evidence, which is subject to the lex causae (see legal ground 3.1), because it is closely related to substantive law. Unlike argued by Shell, inter alia, in points 11-14 WS/2-S, it is not the case that in a situation like this, whether special or not, the threshold of proof to be applied is determined by Dutch law as the lex fori.

The Court will now assess if Shell has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the leak at Oruma of 26 June 2005 was caused by sabotage.

Evaluation of the evidence

Against the assertion of MD et al. that the leak at Oruma was caused by overdue maintenance, more specifically by corrosion, Shell presented the following evidence in the first instance as proof of the alleged sabotage:

- the JIT report, which concludes that there were fresh traces of digging and a round hole (inconsistent with corrosion) with smooth edges (drill hole), thereby proving sabotage;

- videos made during the JIT visit, which allegedly confirm the conclusions from the JIT report;

- the UT measurements carried out during the JIT visit, which would prove that the thickness of the wall around the leak had not or had hardly decreased compared to the original wall thickness, so that internal corrosion could allegedly be excluded;

- the results of 6 April 2005 of a measurement carried out by the company Rosen in December 2004 – using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) technique – with a type of robot (a so-called intelligent pig) which moves through the pipeline and inspects it from the inside (a pig run, also known as an inline inspection (ILI) run), which results apparently proved that at the time (six months before the leak) the pipe showed no thinning at the location of the leak, so that it would not seem logical that the damage to the pipeline was due to corrosion.

The district court found this evidence sufficient to deem sabotage certain.

In the 2018 ruling, the Court ordered an expert opinion with the following areas that require investigation:

1) To what extent does the available material enable you to obtain a complete picture of the possible cause of the leak? If the material is insufficient, which extra information do you need?

2) If the current material enables you to render an opinion: in your expert opinion, what caused the leak? On what grounds do you base your opinion?

3) In your expert opinion, are there other possible causes of the leak? If so, which are they and on what grounds do you base this opinion?

4) Is it possible on the basis of the available material to draw a definitive conclusion about the cause of the leak?

5) Are there other facts and circumstances you deem relevant for answering the questions?

It was originally planned for the experts to physically examine the hole in the pipeline (legal ground 5.3 of the 2015 ruling), but due to the unsafe situation on site this plan was abandoned (see, inter alia, point 2.2 of Shell’s ‘Memo for the appearance of the parties of 24 November 2016 (in cases a through to e))’. So the experts carried out a desk research.

Before the 2020 hearing, MD et al. submitted at the request of the Court the relevant documents, some digitally, as Appendices 1 through to 18, about the creation of the experts’ report (hereinafter referred to as B-D 1 through to 18). One of these documents is the experts’ draft report of 18 September 2018, designated as B-D 12, to which Shell responded (B-D 13) on 16 October 2018 and also MD et al. (B-D 15). Thereafter, MD et al. sent an e-mail with questions and remarks in response to Shell’s B-D 13 input (B-D 16). B-D 17 contains an e-mail exchange between the parties and the experts. B-D 18 is an e-mail from expert Sowerby to the Court.

Shell provided the experts with new or further information on 3 November 2017 (B-D 2) about the ILI runs carried out in 2000, 2004, 2011 and 2016, which in the expert opinion are designated as: B (2000), E/F/G/AG/AH (2004), M/AG/AH (2011) and U/AG/AH (2016). When asked, on 23 August 2018 Shell provided further information (B-D 10 and 11) to the experts about the ILI runs of, inter alia, 2005, designated in the experts’ report as: Z. On 16 October 2018 (B-D 14 Exhibit A) – so after the draft report – Shell provided additional information from Rosen about the ILI runs it had carried out, which in the expert opinion is designated as: AJ). MD et al. complained that Shell provided the information requested by the experts either not at all or too late (point 88 WS/2-MD).

On 17 December 2018, the experts issued their final report. The parties gave their respective interpretations of the report. According to MD et al., there is too much doubt among the experts to assume sabotage, while according to Shell, the experts arrive at the conclusion that the leak was caused by sabotage, even according to the beyond reasonable doubt standard. The final report leaves room for both interpretations at first reading. The report states, inter alia, that on the one hand the experts could not come to a definitive conclusion about the cause of the leak and that it is only their ‘impression’ that the sabotage was the cause (p. 18, point 4), which is in line with the interpretation of MD et al., but on the other hand that their doubt about that ‘is now very low’ (p. 16, second paragraph), which is more in line with Shell’s interpretation. A further analysis of the experts’ report shows the following (references pertain to the final report, unless stated otherwise).

First of all, the experts established that the ILI reports ‘clearly’ state where the 2005 leak is located (p. 11, final paragraph), namely at 7749.68-7750.04 meters downstream from the Kolo Creek manifold (p. 8, seventh asterisk in conjunction with p. 7, second asterisk). They also specified the position of the leak at 07:55 hours while the JIT report stated 08:30 hours, see p. 8 seventh asterisk. The experts also plainly established that external corrosion could not have caused the leak, which leaves only internal corrosion or external interference as potential causes, with the proviso that external interference ‘by plant machinery and tractors etc’ (probably) is also excluded, so that, in the end, only internal corrosion and sabotage remain as the possible causes, or so the Court understands (p. 12, seventh paragraph; p. 18 point 3).

The experts also described the JIT report as being ‘of very poor quality’ (p. 12, third paragraph): it is not detailed enough, does not have good photographs and generally does not meet the standards set to such a report (p. 16, third paragraph). The experts also find the JIT’s UT measurements ‘questionable as to their accuracy’ (p. 12, fifth and sixth paragraph; p. 16, third paragraph) because due to the corrosion found in the pipeline (see under 5.21 below) the measurements should have revealed a greater variation in wall thickness. Therefore, the Court understands that the experts answered question 2 about the cause of the 2005 leak based solely on the information they obtained from the ILI runs of 2005, 2011 and 2016.

The experts focused on the 2016 ILI measurements because these had revealed a lower number of corrosion sites than the earlier ILI measurements and Rosen had given a convincing explaining for this in B-D 14 Exhibit A (= AJ) (p. 11, paragraphs 2 through to 6; p. 8, seventh asterisk).

The experts established that internal corrosion was visible on the bottom part of the pipeline across the entire length/ ‘the 6 o’clock position’, but that for the first 15 km, where the Oruma leak occurred (see legal ground 5.18, first sentence) the depth of it was in ‘general’ less than 40% (p. 10, last paragraph; p. 12, sixth paragraph). Based on ‘Z’, the experts also came to the conclusion that it is clear that the area around the position of the leak was ‘clean’, ‘with no corrosion evident around the leak’ (p. 16, fifth paragraph). This concerns the situation in the direct and wider vicinity of the leak.

The experts also examined the situation at the site of the leak, underneath the clamp (the PLIDCO split sleeve clamp). The experts initially wondered if ‘at’ the place of the leak there could be three ‘defects’; this was, according to the experts in their draft report, implied by the ILI reports, which at the same time indicated no ‘significant areas of internal corrosion’ ‘at the position of’ the leak, and which, still according to the experts in their draft report, in this respect provided conflicting information (see p. 13, third and fourth paragraph of the draft report B-D 12). Shell then noted that these concerned two ‘minor indications’ which were the result of corrosion and one ‘larger indication’, which is the leak this case revolves around (B-D 13, p. 27 under 2). On p. 8, seventh asterisk of the final report, this remark by Shell was apparently accepted as correct on the basis of the statement of Rosen B-D 14 Exhibit A (= AJ), which ‘suggests that the additional corrosion features under the repair clamps are very low level ≤ 10%’. This solves the problem of the conflicting information.

The findings stated under 5.20 through to 5.22 caused the experts to conclude in their final report that ‘the most likely cause of the leak is external interference rather than corrosion’ (p. 16, sixth paragraph). On p. 18, point 4 of the final report, the same was stated in slightly different wording: ‘it is our impression that everything we have seen points to external interference as being the likely cause of the leak’. This conclusion/impression was already present in the draft report B-D 12, in identical wording (p. 14, second paragraph; p. 16, point 4). The Court understands that the experts’ thought process behind this conclusion/impression is that, since underneath the clamp (not the place of the leak) a very small amount of corrosion was found, in the direct vicinity of the leak no corrosion was found and in the wider area of the leak at best less deep corrosion was found, it is not likely that (underneath the clamp) at the location of the leak corrosion had developed so deep that it caused a hole.

However, the experts have also stated that the material made available by Shell does not enable them to obtain a complete picture of the possible cause of the leak, mainly due to the lack of photographs and high-quality measurements (p. 15, final paragraph/p. 16, first paragraph of the final report; p. 13, second paragraph of the draft report), and that the only way ‘to absolutely confirm’ that the leak was caused by sabotage is to remove the clamp from the leak, re-examine the leakage area, and drawing up a high-quality report, containing good photographs and research information (p. 19, third bullet point of the final report; p. 16 at 5, 5th bullet point of the draft report B-D 12). The Court understands that the experts’ intention was to convey that although the information about the corrosion situation in the immediate and wider vicinity of the place of the leak could reveal something about the probability of the existence of deep corrosion at that location (indirect information), but that a definitive answer can only be obtained with information about the leak itself and the place of the leak, such as photographs and measurements (direct information), which Shell has not provided.

On p. 16, second paragraph, of the final report the experts noted – further to their above-mentioned complaint that due to the lack of good photographs and measurements, they could not obtain a complete picture – the following comment:

The latest ILI data supplied by Shell on 16 October 2018 does however, provide a full set of good quality data around the leak points which gives us a high level of confidence as to the cause of the leaks but without a good investigation report as mentioned above there is some remaining doubt as to the cause although this doubt is now very low (underlining added by the Court).

In assessing the meaning of this passage, two things must be stated first and foremost: i) this passage does not appear in the draft report and ii) the ‘latest ILI data supplied by Shell on 16 October 2018’ refers to the statement of Rosen B-D 14 Exhibit A, designated as AJ in the expert opinion. B-D 14 Exhibit A/AJ was only raised in the expert opinion as a solution to the ‘conflicting information’ issue flagged in the draft report (see legal ground 5.22) – except to justify the focus on the 2016 ILI run (see legal ground 5.20), which is not relevant in this context. Against this background, the passage cited above must be understood as follows: even though a complete picture cannot be obtained due to the lack of good photographs and measurements, ‘the latest ILI data supplied by Shell on 16 October 2018’ ‘however’ provide sufficient data to resolve the problem of the conflicting information to such an extent that the doubt, raised by the problem, is (‘now’) very low. In view of this and considering the solving the ‘conflicting information’ problem has not lead to an adjustment of the conclusion/impression mentioned in legal ground 5.23 – which, after all, was already stated in the draft report using the same terms – the remark that ‘doubt is now very low’ cannot be considered as a refinement of the conclusion/impression.

Insofar as any specific objections against the expert opinion can be read in the assertions of Shell (such as in point 90 DoA/SoA-cross/2), they cannot succeed on the ground of the aforesaid considerations.

The Court accepts and adopts the expert opinion, as reflected and interpreted in the foregoing. This brings the Court to the opinion that based on the available indirect information sabotage is the most likely hypothesis for the origin of the leak, but that due to the lack of direct information it has not been established/proven beyond reasonable doubt that sabotage was indeed the cause of the leak.

Conclusion on claims I and III.a-a against the SPDC in respect of ‘Origin’

Pursuant to Section 11(5)(c) OPA, the SPDC therefore has strict liability – to Oguru, Efanga and MD as the representative of the other residents – in respect of the origin of the leak. The Court issues a declaratory decision on this, allowing claims I and III.a-a to this extent, whereby it has been taken into account that it is likely that Oguru and Efanga and the other residents incurred damage as a result of this leak (some damage has even been established, see legal grounds 4.6 and 4.7), which underlines once more their interest in the declaratory decisions. This also means that the referral to follow-up proceedings for the determination of damages sought by Oguru and Efanga with claim I is allowable. Those proceedings will deal in greater depth with the questions of which damage and loss items are eligible for compensation under Nigerian law applicable to these questions, and how the damage should be estimated.

Above point 284 of the IS in case a (against two parent companies) and in case b (against the SPDC and RDS) is the heading ‘In the alternative: insufficient security of the pipeline’. In point 214 SoA/2, MD et al. have stated that when it is established beyond reasonable doubt – as the Court understands: only when – sabotage was involved, a further investigation is needed to establish whether or not ‘Shell’ was negligent in the prevention of the sabotage. From this the Court deduces that the assertions of MD et al. regarding negligence of the SPDC and the Shell parent companies to sufficiently secure, or have secured, the pipeline against sabotage, were brought to bear in case/under the condition that sabotage has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Since this condition has not been met, the assertions of MD et al. can remain undiscussed.

MD et al. no longer have an interest in an assessment of claims I and III.a-a against the SPDC based on a tort/the Rylands v Fletcher rule in light of the considerations in 5.28 and 5.29. Incidentally, the claims would not have been allowable based on the torts of negligence, nuisance or trespass to chattel, because as is apparent from legal ground 5.27, sabotage – although not proven beyond reasonable doubt – rather than overdue maintenance is the most likely hypothesis for the origin of the leak, so that it cannot be determined that the leak was due to negligence or unreasonable acts of the SPDC.

Claims I and III.a-a against the parent companies in respect of ‘Origin’

To be able to assume a duty of care of the parent company/companies, MD et al. – which have the burden of proof in this respect – must at least prove that the subsidiary SPDC acted negligently or unreasonably (see legal ground 3.33 in fine). But it has not been proven, as explained in legal ground 5.30. This means that claims I and III.a-a in respect of Origin are not allowable against the parent company/companies.

It should be noted here that in this context Shell’s defence that the leak was due to sabotage rather than insufficient maintenance needs not be proven beyond reasonable doubt. This threshold of proof must be deemed to apply only to the party on which the burden of proof rests, such as the licence holder/occupier (the SPDC) pursuant to Section 11(5)(c) OPA/Rylands v Fletcher rule. In the context of parent company liability, the burden of proof rests on MD et al. rather than on Shell.

Claim VI: keeping the pipe/pipes in a good state of repair

Claim VI is for the issuance of an order to the Shell parent company/companies and subsidiary – as of today (see legal ground 3.7) – to keep the Oruma pipeline in a good state of repair, in view of the leak that occurred there in 2005.

It is also relevant in assessing this claim that it has not been established that that leak was the result of negligence or unreasonable acts of the SPDC. Its liability for compensation in this context rests on strict liability. Although MD et al. have argued that in the direct vicinity of Oruma, also in the period from 2010 to 2020, many leaks occurred (point 226 SoA/2, points 19, 20 and 110 WS/2-MD) – in, as far as the Court understands it, the Oruma I pipeline and/or (mainly) the Oruma II pipeline – they have also noted that ‘according to Shell’ these were ‘all cases of sabotage’ without contesting this standpoint of Shell. Considering legal ground 5.29, these leaks can also not be traced back to negligence/unreasonable acts of the SPDC. In short, an unlawful state in respect of Origin cannot be deemed to exist as regards the Oruma pipeline. Awarding the claims for injunction, instituted on account of Origin, against the parent company/companies and the subsidiary is therefore not applicable. Claim VI is rejected.

Background and bases

Preliminary considerations

Prior to assessing claims I, III.a-a and VII, second part, in respect of Response against the Shell parent companies, the Court now formulates several introductory remarks.

a. As has been explained in 3.33, the condition for liability of the parent company, which – in brief – is that the subsidiary has breached a duty of care. Since in the foregoing only a breach of a duty of care by the subsidiary (the SPDC) has been established in connection with not installing an LDS, or an adequate LDS, the alleged liability of the parent company/companies can also only be based hereupon.

b. Nigeria is of great financial importance for the Shell group. In the period 2005-2010, Nigeria for instance accounted for no less than 15% of the Shell group’s worldwide gas and oil production. In 2001, [managing director 1] , one of the then Managing Directors of Shell, described this as follows: ‘[o]ver the longer term Nigeria will continue to be an extremely important part of our portfolio (...)’ (point 641 SoA/2). On the other hand, Nigeria is also a source of constant concern for Shell. In legal ground 6.18, the large number of Shell leaks per annum in Nigeria was discussed. MD et al. have asserted without contest that in the period 2002-2007, the Nigerian Shell company (SPDC) was responsible for 33% of the total amount of the oil leaked by the Shell group. In the 2005 Business Assurance Letter, [managing director 2] , one of Shell’s Managing Directors at the time, wrote the following to the Shell group’s then CEO, [CEO] : ‘The Nigerian Delta security and reputation issues continue to be very challenging’ (note 615 to point 652 SoA/2, see also point 889 DoA/SoA-cross/2), whereby ‘challenging’ was apparently used as the well-known management euphemism for ‘problematic’ or ‘unpleasant’. In view of the considerations in legal grounds 6.37, 6.38 and 6.48, the current situation in Nigeria has certainly not become less worrisome for Shell. Under these circumstances, there are sufficient reasons to believe that the Shell leadership was and still is fairly intensively involved – directly and indirectly – with the SPDC. From the passage in the ruling of the UK Supreme Court, deemed normative by this Court in legal ground 3.29 in the case of Vedanta v Lungowe that ‘[e]verything depends on the extent to which, and the way in which, the parent availed itself of the opportunity to take over, intervene in, control, supervise or advise the management of the relevant operations (…) of the subsidiary’ (underlining added by the Court), it is apparent that the question whether or not the parent is liable does not necessarily revolve around whether the parent is involved in the subsidiary in general, but – as Shell has argued (in, inter alia, points 91(c), 104 and 116 WS/2-S) – that it is important whether or not that involvement encompassed the actions of the subsidiary on which the parent liability is based. In this case, it is the SPDC’s omission to apply an LDS or adequate LDS. Parent liability is also contingent on the requirement that the parent knows or should know about the subsidiary’s actions; the so-called knowledge requirement in legal ground 3.30.

c. In connection with claims I and III.a-a in respect of Response – which must be assessed according to the state of affairs up to 9 July 2005, when the Response was completed – it is therefore important i) if at the time the parent company was involved in the subsidiary extending to actions/decisions of the subsidiary in the period up to 9 July 2005 in relation to the application, or not, of an LDS at the Oruma pipeline and ii) if the parent company at the time knew or should have known about those actions/decisions of the subsidiary. This concerns Shell NV and Shell T&T as the Shell parents in the aforementioned period (the old parent companies, hereinafter also abbreviated as: the O Parents), see also legal ground 3.10.

d. In connection with claim VII, second part – which must be assessed according to the current state of affairs – it must be assessed i) if the parent company is currently involved in the subsidiary extending to actions/decisions of the subsidiary in relation to the application, or not, of an LDS at the Oruma pipeline and ii) if the parent company at this time knows or should know about those actions/decisions of the subsidiary. This assessment targets RDS as the current Shell parent company.

The knowledge requirement

Shell has contested (see, inter alia, point 228 DoA-Exh) that the O Parents knew before July 2005 that the Oruma pipeline was not equipped with an LDS, and Shell’s assertions also imply that they should not have known that. In response, MD et al. failed to prove and did not offer to prove specifically that the O Parents did know or should have known about it. As this has remained unproven, the knowledge requirement has not been met. Claims I and III.a-a against the O Parents fail for this reason alone. The ‘involvement’ question therefore does not warrant a further assessment as regards these claims.

However, the argument of MD et al. in 705 (c) SoA/2, that RDS knew that the SPDC was not able to respond adequately in case of a leak, has been established to such an extent that based on the arguments in case b against RDS, it has known for quite some time, or at least should know, that the SPDC has not equipped the Oruma pipeline with an LDS or adequate LDS. As regards claim VII, second part, the knowledge requirement has been met.

This means that as far as this claim is concerned the ‘involvement’ issue is relevant and must be assessed. In view of that assessment, the Shell group structure must first be explored as well as the question if in the Shell group, operating companies such as the SPDC are managed by RDS/the Shell leadership, and if so, how and to what extent.

The structure and management of the Shell group

In general terms, the following can be said about the structure of the Shell group. A distinction is made between the period before the restructuring (unification) of 20 July 2005, when the O Parents headed the group, and the period thereafter, when RDS became the only parent company (see, inter alia, points 26-32 and 37-38 Rej; points 538 ff. and 565 SoA/2 and points 846-851 DoA/SoA-cross/2). The O Parents were the shareholders of the two group holding companies – de holdings – which held the shares of the operating companies, including the SPDC. So, the O Parents were the indirect shareholders of the SPDC. The Managing Directors of the O Parents also acted as the holdings’ Managing Directors, while the boards of the holdings virtually entirely consisted of directors of the O Parents. In their decisions about the operating companies taken by the holdings pursuant to their shareholdership, the holdings were assisted by the Committee of Managing Directors (CMD), which consisted exclusively of the Managing Directors of the O Parents. There was also the Conference, an informal consultative body comprised of the full boards of the O Parents. The Shell group used to be functionally divided into four so-named businesses – including Exploration and Production (E&P or EP), under which the SPDC fell – which were managed by group directors, who were also members of the CMD. The Shell group was also regionally divided, with Regional Managing Directors heading the departments. Up to and including March 2004, the previously mentioned [managing director 1] was the EP Group Director and also the RMD for the region under which Nigeria fell. [managing director 2] later took over this position.

The restructuring took place, because – in brief – RDS was placed above the O Parents, a move that involved the shareholders exchanging their shares in the O Parents for shares in RDS. The restructuring also led to other changes, which are not relevant for this case, with the proviso that the CMD was replaced with the Executive Committee, the Conference with the Board of Directors and EP with Upstream.

From the assertions of Shell in points 42-46 Rej-a/44-48 Rej-b, point 190 DoA-Exh and points 859 and 860 DoA/SoA-cross/2, the following becomes apparent about the management in the Shell group. The leadership of the group – the parent/parents and/or the holding – adopt the policy in the areas that are relevant for the group as a whole, including Health, Safety & Environment (HSE)/Health, Safety, Security & Environment (HSSE). This policy is ‘detailed further in guidelines (standards and manuals)’ (point 42 SoD-a/44 Rej-b; point 860 DoA/2). The standards and manuals, which include the Design and Engineering Practice publications (DEP) referred to in legal ground 6.13, ‘(are) implemented by the various Shell companies (...)’. Checks on compliance with the group policy takes place at the group level (by RDS) by means of carrying out audits, inter alia.

The standards and manuals are drawn up and published by specially set up service companies, including Shell Global Solutions International B.V. (point 190 DoA-Exh and point 861 DoA/SoA-cross/2). From the assertion of Shell, in which the policy of the Shell leadership ‘is detailed further in (...) (standards and manuals)’, it therefore follows that the service companies detail the policy determined by the Shell leadership for implementation by the group companies.

The explanation given by MD et al. about management within the Shell group does not differ fundamentally from that which has been stated in legal grounds 7.6 and 7.7 (see, inter alia, points 534, 573 and 634 SoA/2 and mainly points 192-195 WS/2-MD), albeit that MD et al. have made some additions/specifications to it. For instance, MD et al. have asserted that information from the operating companies went ‘up’ to the CMD via the EP business, and the CMD’s management came ‘down’ based on that information (point 554 SoA/2), while concrete tasks in the area of, for instance, maintenance and HSE, were relayed in the annual business plans with associated budgets, which the parent company/companies had to approve and the operating companies had to state in Assurance Letters how they complied with the group’s security and HSE policy (points 578-585 SoA/2 and points 75 and 139 M-Exh).

The referred to standards and manuals were more specific than general goals and ambitions, according to Shell, but not that detailed that they prescribed exactly how the operating companies had to act (point 42 Rej and point 194 DoA-Exh). Shell has stated that the Shell parent companies are not involved in detail in the operations of the SPDC (point 203 DoA-Exh). MD et al. have confirmed this to such an extent that in their view, the standards and manuals left the operating companies some room for manoeuvre – albeit that they viewed this room as very closely regulated due to these central guidelines (point 75 M-Exh) – and the involvement of the parent was limited to matters of some importance or consequence (point 79 M-Exh). Based on these mutual assertions, it must be established that the involvement of the Shell parent companies at least did not extend to this free, unregulated space, and that at least unimportant issues fell under this free space.

Involvement in the LDS?

It must now be ascertained whether or not RDS’ involvement extended to the application or not application of an LDS on the Oruma pipeline. With their assertion in point 194 WS/2-MD, inter alia, that the technical standards in the area of LDS are covered by the group standards, MD et al. have expressed that LDS systems were subject of central involvement. They relied on several sources containing relevant information. These are:

a) DEP 31.40.60;

b) RDS’ bonus policy;

c) the witness statement of [witness 1] .

The Court will no assess these sources in more detail.

Re a) DEP 31.40.60

In legal ground 6.13 it was explained that DEP 31.40.60 from 2002 contains the recommendation to install an LDS. In point 89 M-Exh and point 624 SoA/2, MD et al. have pointed out the following passage on p. 6 of this DEP, which was also cited in legal ground 6.13:

An LDS reduces the consequences of failure by enabling fast emergency response. These consequences comprise economic consequences, safety consequences, environmental consequences and the more intangible socio-political consequences. Pipeline leaks can result in bad publicity and penalties, both of which can be reduced by having a proper pipeline integrity management and emergency response system in place including an LDS.

From the observation made here, that an LDS may reduce the economic, environmental and publicity consequences of a leak, it is apparent that the drafters of this DEP recognized that the group interest is affected by installing or not installing an LDS.

Shell has put forward (in point 198 DoA-Exh) that the Nigerian access refusal problem does not occur, or hardly ever, elsewhere in the world and that therefore the DEPs and HSE manuals do not contain concrete recommendations or guidelines in this area. Insofar as Shell seeks to argue that DEP 31.40.60 leaves room for manoeuvre in this area, as referred to in 7.9, that argument cannot be accepted. Since there is a need for an LDS specifically in the situation in which, like in Nigeria, access is refused on a regular basis, it is certainly not obvious to assume that that situation is not covered by the recommendation in that DEP to apply an LDS, especially considering that it is not an unimportant issue, as legal ground 7.11 shows.

Therefore, Shell’s reliance, in points 861 and 866 DoA/SoA-cross/2 inter alia, on the fact that the DEP was issued by Shell Global Solutions International B.V., and not by the O Parents/RDS, is of no avail to Shell. After all, from legal ground 7.7 – which is based on Shell’s own assertions – it follows that in this context Shell Global Solutions International B.V. is a vehicle/extension of the Shell leadership, as MD et al. have argued (in points 622 and 623 SoA/2 and point 188 WS/2-MD).

Taking all this into account, DEP 31.40.60 can be viewed as an expression of the involvement of Shell parent companies in the LDS issue, in particular in Nigeria, also considering that which is considered in 7.16 and 7.17 hereinafter.

Re b) RDS’ bonus policy

In point 171 WS-MD and points 610-613 SoA/2, MD et al. have used the argument that the amount of the bonuses for the members of the RDS Executive Committee, including [managing director 2] , is also determined by the number and volume of operational spills. According to MD et al., this shows that RDS exerts influence over it. The Court assumes, with Shell, which does not contest the existence of this bonus policy, that the number and volume of operational spills has only been included in determining the bonus amounts since 2010.

Shell has also pointed out (point 876 DoA/2) that this concerns the aggregated number/volume of operational spills on an annual basis across the entire Shell group. However, this does not alter the fact – unlike Shell seems to want to imply – that the focus would have been on specifically Nigeria considering the fact the Nigerian Shell operating company SPDC is ‘responsible’ for a very large share of the total volume of oil leaked by the Shell group, in the 2002-2007 period no less than 33% (see legal ground 7.1.b).

The volume of operational spills is determined, in part and to a considerable extent, by the presence or absence of an LDS in leaks that cannot be verified or whose verification is delayed by access issues. In these situations, an LDS is able to verify the leak within hours, after which the oil supply can be shut down, while without an LDS, this process can take up to three days, such as was the case with the 2005 leak at Oruma. In Nigeria, access refusal is a common problem (see legal ground 6.6), which the Shell leadership is sure to know, not only because of the fact mentioned in legal ground 7.16, but also because:

- the assertions of MD et al. in point 160 WS-MD and point 700 SoA/2 imply that RDS was aware of the WAC report mentioned in legal ground 6.21 and Shell did not deny this;

- the access issues in Nigeria, and also specifically in Oruma, were extensively discussed back in 2009 when the IS was issued in the proceedings against RDS (case b), and also thereafter.

In view of the considerations in 7.16 and 7.17, there are sufficient reasons to assume (res ipsa loquitur) that the members of the Executive Committee responsible for Nigeria will also acknowledge in their functional or regional management of the SPDC – due to the not so insignificant influence it may have on their bonus amounts – whether or not the pipelines in Nigeria (including the Oruma pipeline), should be fitted with an LDS, for which they will also base their final answer on other factors and a cost-benefit analysis. RDS’ bonus policy since 2010 will therefore have inspired the members of the Executive Committee to fervently involve themselves in the way the SPDC handles the LDS issue. This is also in line with the framework of DEP 31.40.60, presented in legal ground 7.11, and can also be viewed as a concrete specification of the framework, and also as confirmation of the observation therein that the LDS issue affects the group interest.

Re c) the statement of [witness 1]

As Exhibit Q.77, MD et al. have submitted a comprehensive written witness statement, dated 18 October 2017, of [witness 1] , who worked for the SPDC between 2006 and 2012, and which statement was submitted to the proceedings before the UK Court of Appeal in the case Okpabi v RDS, referred to in legal ground 3.28. This statement contains the following passage (see also point 70 WS/2-MD), in which (I), (II) and (III) have been added by the Court to distinguish three separate parts:

28. (I) SPDC held numerous meetings, workshops and discussion groups to consider different measures (…). During these events, we discussed various initiatives including:

i. (…)

ii. (…)

iii. Introducing leak detection systems (…)

iv. (…)

v. (…).

29. Senior Shell management from Corporate Security at The Hague, including James Hall (…), regularly attended these workshops and discussion groups in Nigeria. (II) However, despite numerous meetings and discussions very little action was actually taken in response to these proposals. The implementation of most of these measures would have involved significant expenditure, which would have required the approval of the Head of Upstream International, an RDS Executive Committee member. (III) I can only infer that the implementation of the majority of these measures was blocked by RDS on the basis that they were too expensive.

In response, Shell submitted – in the form of Exhibit 79 – a written statement, dated 9 November 2017, of [witness 2] , the former manager of [witness 1] at the SPDC, which statement was also submitted to the English proceedings. [witness 2] ’s statement starts with ‘ad hominem’ arguments to contest the statement of [witness 1] (‘ was an unreliable employee and a bad leaver’, points 12 through to 19). In general, such arguments are of themselves not very persuasive. [witness 2] then explained in point 21 the general position of [witness 1] :

‘ [witness 1] was a relatively junior employee of SPDC, and removed from decision making processes at SPDC. While (…) she was not herself involved or a participant in the taking of any significant decisions at SPDC. Because of her junior position, and because of her ever more frequent absences from work, she was never in a position to observe first hand what she alleges’.

In point 24 of [witness 2] ’s statement, it can be read that ‘[witness 1] seems to suggest (…) that there is a (…) security function that sits outside of SPDC (…) which exercises complete control over security matters at SPDC. This is not my experience at all’. Point 26 of [witness 2] ’s statements is as follows:

‘It is of course correct that we keep relevant colleagues within Business and Functional lines abreast of pertinent information, where it is appropriate to do so. For example, we will copy James Hall on email reporting serious security incidents. However, this does not mean, for example, that James Hall or anyone else can seize complete control of security operations at SPDC. That suggestion is simply false’.

The meetings, workshops and discussion groups referred to by [witness 1] in part (I) of her statements were, apparently, no bodies where decision-making took place; [witness 1] stated that ‘during these events’ ‘various initiatives’ were discussed, and [witness 2] did not argue that this (also) involved decision-making. [witness 2] ’s remark that [witness 1] was ‘removed from decision making processes at SPDC’ and his remarks in point 21, which are elaborations of this point, can therefore not be viewed as a contention of part (I) of [witness 1] ’s statement. Nothing else in [witness 2] ’s statements proves that the statement of [witness 1] – note: based on personal observation – about the meetings, workhops and discussions and all that transpired there, was incorrect. Based on part (I) of [witness 1] ’s statement, the Court deems it proven that between the SPDC and the representatives of ‘The Hague’ (apparently RDS, see legal ground 1.b) discussions took place about the introduction of an LDS. This would not have concerned just an exchange of information on an equal basis. That which [witness 1] has stated in part (II) – namely, that the fairly expensive initiatives were not implemented and that the reason must have been that RDS did not approve them – is also based on personal observation. As a participant to the meetings it must be assumed that she knows the overall price of the measures that were discussed, and knowing that the more expensive projects require approval from ‘upstairs’ is not restricted to persons with a special (more than ‘junior’) position, to which group [witness 1] , according to [witness 2] , does not belong. An approval system for significant expenditure is not the same as the ‘complete control’ of which [witness 2] speaks. Part (II) of [witness 1] ’s statement has also not been refuted convincingly by [witness 2] . All in all, there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of this part of the statement, from which also becomes apparent, in addition to part (I) of [witness 1] ’s statement, that RDS was involved in the question of installing or not installing an LDS in Nigeria. [witness 2] places great emphasis on the lack of specifically ‘complete control’, which suggests that there was or could have been a less far-reaching type of involvement, such as influence or concern. To that extent, his statement can be interpreted as confirmation of [witness 1] ’s statement. Incidentally, in light of the words used by [witness 1] ‘I (…) infer’ part (III) of her statement cannot be assumed to be true in these proceedings.

That which Shell has put forward in point 113 WS/2-MD, independently of [witness 2] , against [witness 1] ’s statement does not alter detract from part (I) and (II). After all, Shell does not address these specific parts of the statement, either directly or indirectly.

Summarizing the foregoing, [witness 1] ’s written statement proves the assertion of MD et al., represented in legal ground 7.10, that LDS systems were the subject of central involvement.

Conclusion on the involvement issue and the further assessment

In light of the considerations in 7.11 through to 7.23, it follows from the three sources mentioned – each separately, but especially when viewing them (partially) in context – that RDS, at any rate from 2010, became involved, concretely and fairly intensively, in the question if pipelines in Nigeria should have an LDS installed, and consequently also in the question if the Oruma pipeline should be equipped with an LDS. The general defence of Shell, which does not focus on the LDS, that RDS is not involved in detail in the SPDC’s operational activities, is so vague that it cannot be considered as a convincing and/or sufficiently substantiated contestation of the assertion of MD et al., referred to in legal ground 7.10. This defence is therefore disregarded for being insufficiently substantiated, so that there is no room in this area for the rebutting evidence of Shell submitted in point 936 DoA/SoA-cross/2. Shell has also not indicated what else [witness 2] could have stated compared to his written statement submitted to these proceedings. As regards claim VII, second part, the ‘involvement’ requirement has been met.

In the further assessment of claim VII, second part, against RDS reference is firstly made to the considerations in 6.32 through to 6.46, which applies equally here, insofar as possible. The following is considered for that further assessment, reiterating several key points and making additions where needed.

As regards the Oruma pipeline, there is still the matter at hand of an unlawful situation, caused by the subsidiary SPDC, consisting of hitherto not equipping the Oruma pipeline with an LDS. RDS has known about this for a long time (see legal ground 7.3). Nevertheless, RDS has not exercised its authority – ensuing from its indirect or direct shareholdership in the SPDC, and concretely specified with its involvement in the LDS issue – to move the SPDC to install an LDS in/on the Oruma pipeline, although RDS has also known for some time – through the documents exchanged in these proceedings alone – that the lack of an LDS in the fairly likely scenario that another leak will occur in the Oruma pipeline in the future will and could have very serious consequences for Oguru, (the heirs of) Efanga and the other local residents. There is proximity between RDS and the ‘Oruma inhabitants’, which the Court deduces from the consideration in the ‘Vedanta v Lungowe’ ruling that ‘the result would surely have been the same if the dust had escaped to neighbouring land where third parties, worked, lived or enjoyed recreation’. In this ruling, the decision in the Chandler v Cape case, that the parent was liable to the subsidiary’s employees, who had been exposed to asbestos by the subsidiary, was applied to third parties, with which the ‘Oruma inhabitants’ can be compared. Under the circumstances outlined here, it is fair, just and reasonable to assume a duty of care of RDS to ensure that an LDS is installed on the Oruma pipeline. Seeing as RDS has not fulfilled this duty of care, this also constitutes an unlawful situation on her part. Since the SPDC has remained unwilling for a very long time to proceed to install an LDS on the Oruma pipeline, even in spite of the increased need for it, it is necessary, so that justice can be adequately done, to also impose an order on RDS, with which it can be ensured as far as possible that an LDS will be installed on the Oruma pipeline at long last.

RDS will be ordered to ensure that an LDS, referred to in legal ground 6.43, is installed on the Oruma pipeline, meaning: the Oruma I pipeline and the Oruma II pipeline (see also legal ground 6.43) within one year.

It must also be noted that RDS is a company under English law and that in the Vedanta v Lungowe ruling of the UK Supreme Court a rule of English company rule was given, namely that ‘[d]irect or indirect ownership by one company of all or a majority of the shares of another company (which is the irreducible essence of a parent/subsidiary relationship) may enable the parent to take control of the management of the operations of the business (…)’, see legal ground 3.29.

Since RDS has also not argued in the alternative for mitigating or capping the penalties claimed, it must be assumed that there is no reason for doing so.

Preliminary considerations

Shell believes that a violation of the fundamental right to a clean living environment at most could lead to civil liability in the case of ‘severe environmental pollution’ (point 765 DoA/SoA-cross/2). It implies that in Shell’s view this also applies to the fundamental rights invoked by MD et al. of that content in the Nigerian Constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. MD et al. have based their reliance on the assertion that their living environment is ‘severely’ contaminated (point 737 SoA/2). The Court will start from the common starting point, which is in line with the general opinion about the threshold that must be set in order to be able to designate a violation of fundamental rights for the protection of the environment, see for instance ECtHR, 9 December 1994, A303-C, NJ 1996, 506 (López Ostra/Spain), in which the requirement of severe environmental pollution was set.

The Court will now assess the fundamental rights claims II and III.b of MD et al. based on the three themes referred to in legal ground 3.5, namely Origin, Response and Decontamination (see also legal ground 3.9). From legal ground 3.14 it follows that MD et al. have the burden of proof – and consequently also the obligation to furnish facts – for the facts on which the fundamental rights violation they allege are based.

The contamination caused by the leak can undoubtedly be qualified as serious, but in connection with Origin, a violation by Shell of the right to a clean living environment (see claim III.b) or liability for its impairment (see claim II) nevertheless cannot be assumed because, in view of the considerations in 5.29 and 5.30, it cannot be established that the leak was caused by an act or omission on the part of the SPDC/Shell.

The only element of the theme Response which has led to the opinion that the SPDC/Shell has committed culpable acts/negligence relates to the LDS. However, MD et al. have failed to assert (sufficiently) concretely that the omission of the SPDC/Shell to install an LDS/to ensure that an LDS is installed, constitutes a violation of the fundamental right to a clean living environment. Considering this state of affairs, it cannot be concluded that this fundamental right was violated in connection with Response.

From the considerations in 8.20 through to 8.29 it follows that it has not been established that following the decontamination process there was severe residual pollution, required in this context as is apparent from legal ground 9.1, mainly because the contamination due to the 2005 leak was decontaminated below the intervention value. The Court also notes that in Article 8.1.1, second sentence of Part VIII F of the EGASPIN (‘Concentrations in excess of the intervention values correspond to serious contamination’) it is confirmed that contamination is deemed severe only when the intervention value is exceeded. Therefore, a violation of the fundamental right to a clean living environment in connection with Decontamination can also not be assumed.

Claims II and III.b based on the violation of the fundamental right to a clean living environment are not allowable, as follows from the foregoing. It needs no consideration whether or not under Nigerian law a violation of a fundamental right may constitute an independent basis for civil liability, as argued by MD et al. but contested by Shell.

Claim III.a-b was instituted by MD for the Oruma community, and this also applies to claims for injunction IV through to VII, assessed above, and which were also instituted by Oguru and Efanga. As has been considered in legal ground 3.7, the declaratory decision claimed with III.a-b also covers the area of the claims for injunction. Claim III.a-b simply seeks those claims for injunction and shares in their fate, in all respects. MD therefore has no interest in a separate assessment of claim III.a-b. That claim is denied.

The extrajudicial costs that were allegedly incurred in connection with the elements of claims I and III.a-a, which are to be allowed, cannot be estimated right away, also considering the defence of Shell (not provided on appeal) that Nigerian law does not provide for that (points 136-138 WS-S). This loss item could be brought up for further assessment in the follow-up proceedings for the determination of damages (claim I) or in any compensation proceedings for which claim III.a-a serves as a prelude. To this extent, claim IX for the compensation of the extrajudicial costs is not allowable (at present). The procedural documents contain no indications that extrajudicial acts were committed in connection with the LDS issue. Insofar as claim IX is for this effect, it is denied for this reason.

In the foregoing, the JIT report, the Clean- Up report and the Clean-Up certificate were included in the assessment, not to the detriment of MD et al. Their assertions about the extent of the contamination therefore need no further assessment – see legal ground 3.34.

In addition to that which has been stated above about the parties’ offers of proof, the following is considered. The offers of proof of MD et al. (see, inter alia points 851 and 852 SoA/2) were either insufficiently specified, not relevant or were submitted for assertions lacking in sufficient substantiation, and are therefore disregarded. The same applies to the offers of proof Shell made in point 179 SoA-cross/1, point 296 DoA/1 and point 936 DoA/SoA-cross/2 for the assertions for which it has the burden of proof. The offers of Shell of rebutting evidence in the same points are not relevant (inter alia, the tender of evidence in point 532 DoA/SoA-cross/2) and/or pertain to insufficiently substantiated assertions. Therefore, these offers are disregarded. In addition to this, the offer of rebutting evidence – unlike with the ‘regular’ offer of proof – was not accompanied with the statement that evidence of witnesses could be provided. This means that as regards the rebutting evidence, there is no right to the provision of evidence (Section 166 subsection 1 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure).

To sum up, also considering the 2015 ruling, the Dutch court is competent to take full cognizance of cases a and b, and claims I and III.a-a against the SPDC in respect of Origin and in respect of Response, insofar as they concern the LDS, are allowable, as are the claims for injunction against the SPDC and RDS based on the LDS. To this extent, grounds of appeal in the principal appeal of MD et al. succeed. In all other respects, the claims of MD et al. are not allowable and their grounds of appeal in the principal appeal fail. Shell’s grounds of appeal in the cross-appeal, with which it contested the competence of the Dutch court and the locus standi of MD et al. fail. The contested judgment is quashed and a decision will be made as stated above.

At any rate with a view to the payment of the costs of the proceedings, cases a and b can be considered as one case. In this particular case, both parties were partially unsuccessful. The costs incurred in both instances will therefore be compensated in such manner as described in the operative part.

The costs of the experts (€ 44,840.18 and £ 17,000) are for one part allocated to case b, and for the other part to case c. The amounts allocated to case b are therefore € 22,420.09 and £ 8,500.00. Since the SPDC failed on the issue to which the experts’ report pertained, it shall bear these costs.

DECISION

The Court of Appeal:

in cases a and b

- overturns the judgment given between the parties by The Hague District Court on 30 January 2013, and in a new ruling:

* rules that the SPDC with respect to Oguru, Efanga and the other local residents whose interests MD seeks to protect i) has strict liability for the damage resulting from the leak at Oruma on 26 June 2005 and ii) acted unlawfully by not installing in/on the Oruma pipeline a Leak Detection System (LDS), or at least an adequate one, before this date, and orders the SPDC to compensate Oguru and Efanga for the damage ensuing from i) and ii), to be assessed later during separate follow-up proceedings and settled according to the law;

* instructs the SPDC to equip within one year from service of this ruling the Oruma I pipeline and Oruma II pipeline with a Leak Detection System (LDS), as referred to in legal ground 6.43, and to ensure the LDS continues to be installed for as long as these pipes are used as a main pipe or spare pipe, and orders the SPDC to pay to MD et al. jointly a penalty of € 100,000 for each day (a part of a day counts as a full day) it fails to comply with this order;

* instructs RDS to equip within one year from service of this ruling the Oruma I pipeline and Oruma II pipeline with a Leak Detection System (LDS), as referred to in legal ground 6.43, and to ensure the LDS continues to be installed for as long as these pipes are used as a main pipe or spare pipe, and orders RDS to pay to MD et al. jointly a penalty of € 100,000 for each day (a part of a day counts as a full day) it fails to comply with this order;

* dismisses all other applications;

* compensates the costs of the proceedings in the first instance thusly that each of the parties bears their respective costs;

- dismisses all other applications (submitted for the first time on appeal);

- compensates the costs of the proceedings on appeal thusly that each of the parties bears their respective costs;

- determines that the SPDC bears the costs of the experts allocated to case b in the amounts of € 22,420.09 and £ 8,500.00;

- declares this ruling provisionally enforceable as far as possible.

This ruling was issued by judges mrs. J.M. van der Klooster, M.Y. Bonneur and S.J. Schaafsma and pronounced in open court at the hearing of 29 January 2021, in the presence of the court clerk, mr. M.J. Boon.

gevestigd te Den Haag,

2. THE ‘SHELL’ TRANSPORT AND TRADING COMPANY LTD.,

gevestigd te Londen, Verenigd Koninkrijk,

geïntimeerden in principaal appel, tevens appellanten in incidenteel appel, tevens verweersters in het art. 843a Rv-incident,

advocaat: mr. J. de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk (Amsterdam),

en tegen (zaak b - 200.126.834)

gevestigd te Londen, Verenigd Koninkrijk, kantoorhoudende te Den Haag,

2. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA LTD.,

gevestigd te Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Federale Republiek Nigeria,

geïntimeerden in principaal appel, tevens appellanten in incidenteel appel, tevens verweersters in het art. 843a Rv-incident en eiseressen in het bevoegdheidsincident,

advocaat: mr. J. de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk (Amsterdam).

Partijen ter ener zijde worden hierna genoemd: Oguru, Efanga en Milieudefensie, samen: Milieudefensie c.s.; partijen ter andere zijde: Shell Petroleum, Shell T&T, RDS en SPDC, samen: Shell. RDS en SPDC tezamen worden veelal RDS c.s. genoemd. RDS, Shell Petroleum en Shell T&T worden zowel tezamen als afzonderlijk ook wel aangeduid als ‘de moedervennootschap’.

Het verloop van het geding

zaak a - 200.126.804

Milieudefensie c.s. is bij exploten van 1 mei 2013 in hoger beroep gekomen van het door de Rechtbank Den Haag tussen haar en Shell Petroleum en Shell T&T gewezen vonnis van 30 januari 2013 en het daaraan voorafgegane tussenvonnis van 14 september 2011.

zaak b - 200.126.834

Milieudefensie c.s. is bij exploten van 1 mei 2013 in hoger beroep gekomen van het tussen haar en RDS c.s. door de Rechtbank Den Haag gewezen vonnis van 30 januari 2013 en het daaraan voorafgegane tussenvonnis van 14 september 2011.

in beide zaken voorts:

Op de rol zijn de volgende stukken gewisseld:

- een incidentele conclusie tot exhibitie (met producties) van Milieudefensie c.s.;

- een memorie van antwoord in het incident ex art. 843a Rv tevens houdende exceptie van

onbevoegdheid in het incident (in zaak b, toev. Hof) (met producties) van Shell;

- een memorie van antwoord in het bevoegdheidsincident in het incident ex art. 843a Rv van

Milieudefensie c.s.

Vervolgens is een comparitie van partijen gehouden in deze en in vier samenhangende zaken. Die vier samenhangende zaken zijn aangeduid als zaak c (200.126.843), zaak d (200.126.848),

zaak e (200.126.849) en zaak f (200.127.813). Op deze comparitie zijn procedureafspraken gemaakt, die voor zover thans van belang inhouden dat allereerst (‘fase 1’) een beslissing zal worden genomen over (i) de bevoegdheid van de Nederlandse rechter (voor zover in geschil), (ii) de vorderingen van Milieudefensie c.s. ex art. 843a Rv (met inbegrip van het appel van Milieudefensie c.s. tegen het tussenvonnis van 14 september 2011, waarin haar toenmalige vordering ex art. 843a Rv is afgewezen), alsmede de door Shell daartegen gevoerde verweren, waaronder die met betrekking tot (iii) de ontvankelijkheid van Milieudefensie en (iv) de vorderingsgerechtigheid van Oguru en Efanga. Overeenkomstig de ter comparitie gemaakte afspraken zijn nadien op de rol de volgende stukken ingediend:

- door Shell: een memorie van grieven fase 1 (in zaak f) tevens memorie van grieven

in incidenteel appel fase 1 (in zaken a tot en met e) (met producties);

- door Milieudefensie c.s.: een memorie van grieven inzake de afwijzing van de

vordering tot exhibitie ex art. 843a Rv (met producties);

- door Shell: een memorie van antwoord fase 1 (in zaken a tot en met e), tevens

memorie van antwoord in incidenteel appel fase 1 (in zaak f), tevens antwoordakte uitlating

appeldagvaarding (in zaak c) (met producties, waaronder als productie 53 een akte van depot

van stukken);

- door Milieudefensie c.s.: een memorie van antwoord bij de memorie van grieven

zijdens Shell (fase 1) (met producties).

Daarna hebben de advocaten van partijen - in fase 1 - alle zaken aan de hand van pleitnotities bepleit. Bij die gelegenheid zijn door Shell producties in het geding gebracht (productie 54 in de zaken a tot en met d) en heeft de advocaat van Milieudefensie c.s. enkele afdrukken van foto’s overgelegd. Na afloop van de pleidooien is een datum voor arrest bepaald.

De beoordeling

inleiding

Aanleiding tot het geschil is een olielekkage uit een gat in een ondergrondse oliepijpleiding bij het dorp Oruma, in de deelstaat Bayelsa State van de Federale Republiek Nigeria. De lekkage is op 26 juni 2005 opgetreden, maar kon eerst op 7 juli 2005 worden verholpen. Naar schatting van Shell was er toen een hoeveelheid van ca. 64.000 liter (400 barrels) olie gelekt. Milieudefensie c.s. wijt de lekkage en de daardoor ontstane schade - meer concreet: (milieu)schade aan door Oguru en Efanga ter plaatse geëxploiteerde visvijvers en landbouwgronden - aan onrechtmatig handelen en nalaten van (i) SPDC als operator van de pijpleiding, maar daarnaast ook van (ii) RDS als het hoofd van de Shell-groep en via concernvennootschappen houdster van de aandelen in SPDC en van (iii) Shell Petroleum en Shell T&T, die voorheen tezamen deze rol van moedermaatschappij/middellijk aandeelhouder vervulden. De vorderingen die Milieudefensie c.s. op deze grond heeft ingesteld strekken er toe dat Shell aansprakelijk wordt gehouden voor de (gevolg)schade en wordt geboden om de bodem- en watervervuiling ongedaan te maken en voorzieningen te treffen ter voorkoming van verdere lekkages en milieuschades. De rechtbank wees alle vorderingen af, daarbij als uitgangspunt nemend dat de lekkage het gevolg is van sabotage - in de vorm van een boorgat van ongeveer 8 mm aan de onderzijde (8.30 uurspositie) van de ondergrondse 20 inches pijpleiding - en niet, zoals Milieudefensie c.s. primair stelt, van onvoldoende onderhoud (corrosie). Tegen die afwijzing en de onderliggende motivering richt zich het hoger beroep.

In dit tussenarrest worden, zoals ter comparitie met partijen besproken, alleen enkele deelaspecten van het geschil beoordeeld, te weten: (i) het hernieuwde exhibitieverzoek ex art. 843a Rv van Milieudefensie c.s.; (ii) de grieven tegen de (motivering van de) afwijzing van haar eerdere verzoek dienaangaande; (iii) de door Shell tegen die verzoeken gevoerde verweren en (iv) Shells grieven tegen de verwerping van een aantal van die verweren door de rechtbank. Laatstbedoelde verweren, die zich mede richten tegen de vorderingen in de hoofdzaken, gaan over de internationale bevoegdheid van de Nederlandse rechter, de ontvankelijkheid van Milieudefensie en de vorderingsgerechtigdheid van Oguru en Efanga. De beoordeling in dit arrest betreft dus de over en weer opgeworpen incidenten, maar heeft daarnaast ook betrekking op enkele aspecten die van belang zijn in de hoofdzaken.

Vooraf wordt genoteerd dat tussen partijen thans eenstemmigheid bestaat over het toepasselijke recht, in die zin dat de vorderingen, ook die tegen de moedervennootschap, moeten worden beoordeeld naar Nigeriaans recht, zijnde het recht van de staat waar (i) de lekkage zich heeft voorgedaan, (ii) de daarmee samenhangende schade zich heeft gemanifesteerd en (iii) SPDC, op wier doen en laten onvoldoende toezicht zou zijn gehouden, haar vestiging heeft (vgl. het hier toepasselijke art. 3 Wet conflictenrecht onrechtmatige daad). Dienovereenkomstig wordt in dit arrest uitgegaan van de toepasselijkheid van Nigeriaans recht. Een uitzondering - ook daarover zijn partijen het eens - geldt voor de procesrechtelijke kwesties, waarop Nederlands recht als lex fori van toepassing is (vgl. art. 10:3 BW). Bij enkele aspecten, zoals de wisseling van de concernleiding, is daarnaast het toepasselijke incorporatierecht van belang.

bevoegdheid van de Nederlandse rechter m.b.t. de vorderingen tegen SPDC

Voor de vorderingen tegen de in Nigeria gevestigde vennootschap SPDC heeft de

rechtbank haar internationale bevoegdheid ontleend aan art. 7 lid 1 Rv (pluraliteit van gedaagden). Uitgaande van de niet ter discussie staande bevoegdheid van de Nederlandse rechter ten aanzien van medegedaagde RDS (ex art. 2 lid 1 juncto art. 60 lid 1 Verordening (EG) Nr. 44/2001 betreffende de rechterlijke bevoegdheid, de erkenning en de tenuitvoerlegging van beslissingen in burgerlijke en handelszaken, hierna: Brussel I-Verordening) bestaat deze bevoegdheid volgens die bepaling (art. 7 lid 1 Rv) ook ten aanzien van SPDC ‘mits tussen de vorderingen tegen de onderscheiden gedaagden een zodanige samenhang bestaat, dat redenen van doelmatigheid een gezamenlijke behandeling rechtvaardigen’. De rechtbank achtte die samenhang aanwezig, in weerwil van de betwisting ervan door SPDC. Andere, door de rechtbank eveneens verworpen, tegenwerpingen van SPDC in dit verband waren kort gezegd dat Milieudefensie c.s. misbruik van procesrecht maakt - omdat de vorderingen tegen RDS evident kansloos zijn en om die reden niet kunnen dienen als basis voor bevoegdheid als voorzien in art. 7 lid 1 Rv - en (naar analogie van het arrest HvJ EU 1 december 2011, C-145/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:798 Painer) dat de vorderingen tegen de onderscheiden gedaagden verschillende rechtsgrondslagen hebben, terwijl voor SPDC niet voorzienbaar was dat zij hier te lande zou worden opgeroepen.

In hoger beroep herhaalt SPDC weliswaar al deze tegenwerpingen, maar concludeert zij uiteindelijk dat de toets die moet worden aangelegd is of er een mogelijkheid bestaat dat de vorderingen tegen RDS worden toegewezen, welke mogelijkheid er volgens haar niet is, reeds omdat de lekkage (van 26 juni 2005) plaatshad voordat RDS op 20 juli 2005 aan het hoofd van de Shell-groep kwam te staan. Die omstandigheid maakt echter niet dat al op voorhand valt uit te sluiten dat RDS kan worden aangesproken voor de gevolgen van een falen van een voorgaande concernleiding en/of dat op haar een verplichting kan rusten met het oog op het voorkomen van nieuwe lekkages en het opruimen van een nog bestaande vervuiling. Ook is er nog de door de rechtbank in het midden gelaten stelling van Milieudefensie c.s. dat de samenvoeging/fusie van Shell Petroleum en Shell T&T onder de paraplu van de nieuwe moedervennootschap RDS - het éénwordingsproces, dat op het eerste gezicht gelijkenis vertoont met de driehoeksfusie naar Nederlands recht, vgl. art. 2:309 juncto art. 333a BW - vooral een ‘papieren transitie’ betreft, waarvan RDS thans misbruik maakt om zo onder aansprakelijkheid uit te komen. Die, mede aan de hand van het toepasselijke incorporatierecht te beoordelen, stelling, voor zover in hoger beroep niet prijsgegeven, vraagt om een nader (feiten)onderzoek, dat thans nog niet aan de orde is. En wat de door SPDC bedoelde toets betreft (hiervoor genoemd in de eerste zin van 2.2), geldt dat die besloten ligt in het samenhangvereiste zoals art. 7 lid 1 Rv dat stelt. Want als al op voorhand duidelijk is dat de vorderingen tegen RDS (de zogenoemde ‘ankervorderingen’) evident kansloos en om die reden onmogelijk toewijsbaar zijn, is slecht voorstelbaar dat redenen van doelmatigheid niettemin een gezamenlijke behandeling rechtvaardigen. Dit geval van ‘evidente kansloosheid’ doet zich evenwel niet voor, nu niet al op voorhand valt uit te sluiten dat op een moedervennootschap onder omstandigheden aansprakelijkheid kan rusten voor schade als gevolg van een doen of (na)laten van een (klein)dochtervennootschap. Overigens beweert SPDC niet het tegendeel; slechts meent zij, op vooral feitelijke gronden, dat, gelijk ook de rechtbank oordeelde, dergelijke omstandigheden zich hier niet voordoen, doch dat is nu juist voorwerp van debat in de volgende fase van het hoger beroep (hierna: fase 2), terwijl niet nu al vast staat dat SPDC het gelijk aan haar zijde heeft en, als voorbeeld, RDS naar Nigeriaans recht ook dan vrij is van aansprakelijkheden indien, zoals Milieudefensie c.s. primair stelt, de lekkage en de daardoor ontstane schade het voorzienbare gevolg waren van een ook bij de moedervennootschap reeds lang bekend onderhouds-/ corrosieprobleem, dat te wijten was aan een systematisch falen van SPDC, waar de moedervennootschap van afwist, doch niets aan deed, hoewel zij daar op grond van kennis, mogelijkheden en middelen zeer wel toe in staat was. Gezien de voorzienbaar ernstige gevolgen van olielekkages voor onder meer het milieu ter plaatse van een potentiële lekkagebron valt niet op voorhand uit te sluiten dat van de moedervennootschap in een dergelijk geval verwacht mag worden dat zij zich de belangen bij het voorkomen van lekkages aantrekt (dat er met andere woorden een duty of care bestaat volgens de criteria uit de uitspraak Caparo v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2, [1990] 1 All ER 56), eens temeer indien zij een speerpunt heeft gemaakt van het voorkomen van milieuschade door activiteiten van de concernvennootschappen en tot op zekere hoogte actieve bemoeienis heeft met en sturing geeft aan de bedrijfsvoering van die vennootschappen, waarmee overigens niet gezegd wil zijn dat zonder die aandacht en bemoeienis een schending van de zorgplicht ondenkbaar is en een verwijtbaar negeren van bedoelde belangen nimmer tot aansprakelijkheid kan leiden. Dat er volgens Shell geen uitspraken van Nigeriaanse rechters zijn waarin concernaansprakelijkheid op deze grond is aanvaard maakt het voorgaande niet anders. Daarmee is immers niet gezegd dat het Nigeriaanse recht per definitie geen aanknopingspunten biedt voor een onder (die) omstandigheden aan te nemen (schending van de) zorgplicht van de moedervennootschap, ook niet in het kader van het opruimen van de vervuiling en het voorkomen van herhaling. Nu het Nigeriaanse recht als common law systeem gebaseerd is op het Engelse recht en de common law c.q. Engelse jurisprudentie geldt als belangrijke kenbron binnen het Nigeriaanse rechtstelsel zouden die aanknopingspunten ook gevonden kunnen worden in uitspraken zoals die in de zaak Chandler v Cape [2012] EWCA Civ 525. Dat laatstbedoelde uitspraak - waarin niet is uitgesloten dat ook andere omstandigheden dan welke in die zaak aan de orde waren kunnen leiden tot een duty of care voor de moedervennootschap - in een geval als hiervoor geschetst in geen enkel opzicht precedentwerking kan hebben (ten nadele van RDS) staat niet op voorhand vast en volgt meer speciaal ook niet uit de nadien gegeven beslissing in de zaak Thompson v The Renwick Group Plc [2014] EWCA Civ 635, waarin een niet in alle opzichten vergelijkbare casus speelde; onder andere was sprake van een zuivere holdingvennootschap, met dochtervennootschappen met sterk uiteenlopende bedrijfsactiviteiten - vgl. enerzijds punt 33 van laatstbedoelde uitspraak (over de reikwijdte van Chandler v Cape): ‘It is clear that Arden LJ intended this formulation to be descriptive of circumstances in which a duty might be imposed rather than exhaustive of the circumstances in which a duty may be imposed.’ en anderzijds punt 36 (over de afwijking): ‘The mere recitation of these factors demonstrates how far removed from Chandler v Cape is this case.’ Wel lijkt de beslissing Thompson v The Renwick Group Plc erop te wijzen dat een duidelijke samenhang is vereist tussen de geleden schade en de rol die de moedermaatschappij binnen de groep heeft vervuld; waar het volgens Tomlinson LJ om gaat is dat sprake is van een situatie waarin de moedervennootschap vanwege ‘its superior knowledge or expertise’ ‘is better placed’ om in te grijpen (punt 37). Of zich een dergelijke situatie voordoet - hetgeen Shell gemotiveerd betwist, onder andere door te wijzen op de beoordelingsruimte van de operating company bij de toepassing van de niet door de moedervennootschap zelf opgestelde standaarden - en of er ook overigens voldoende aansluiting bestaat bij bijvoorbeeld de uitspraak in Chandler v Cape zal zo nodig na verder debat hierover in fase 2 van het hoger beroep worden beoordeeld. Bij toepassing van Nigeriaans recht zal dan onder andere uitgangspunt zijn dat het niet aan de Nederlandse rechter is om een geheel nieuwe rechtsontwikkeling in het Nigeriaanse recht in te luiden. Voor nu kan dit punt verder blijven rusten.

Ook overigens is de betwisting door SPDC van de door de rechtbank aangenomen samenhang van de vorderingen en de doelmatigheid van een gezamenlijke behandeling ongegrond. Dit wordt hieronder nader toegelicht. Vooraf wordt kort stilgestaan bij de betekenis van art. 7 lid 1 Rv als bevoegdheidsgrond ingeval van pluraliteit van gedaagden. Deze bevoegdheidsgrond is blijkens de wetsgeschiedenis ingegeven door redenen van doelmatigheid en proces-economie. Om nu te voorkomen dat deze (aan de pluraliteit van gedaagden te ontlenen) bevoegdheid exorbitant zou zijn indien er geen verband tussen de onderscheiden vorderingen bestaat, heeft de wetgever de (in art. 6 sub 1 Brussel I-Verordening gecodificeerde) rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie over art. 6 sub 1 EEX-Verdrag in art. 7 lid 1 Rv verwerkt (HvJ EG 27 september 1988, C-189/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:459Kalfelis/Bank Schröder), ‘zodat van een afwijking van artikel 6, onderdeel 1 EEX geen sprake is’. Onder verwijzing naar HR 27 oktober 1978, NJ 1980, 102 en HR 16 mei 1986, NJ 1987, 456 is toegevoegd dat het hier bedoelde verband aanwezig wordt geacht wanneer ‘redenen van doelmatigheid een gezamenlijke behandeling wettigen’

(Kamerstukken II 1999/2000 26855, nr. 3, p. 37). Omdat aldus bedoeld is aan te sluiten bij art. 6 sub 1 Brussel I-Verordening (thans art. 8 sub 1 Verordening (EU) Nr. 1215/2012 betreffende de rechterlijke bevoegdheid, de erkenning en de tenuitvoerlegging van beslissingen in burgerlijke en handelszaken) zal bij de beantwoording van de voorliggende bevoegdheidsvraag ook aan die bepaling worden getoetst. Daarbij is ook de verdere rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie met betrekking tot die alternatieve bevoegdheidsgrond van belang. Hierna wordt eerst bezien of een gezamenlijke behandeling doelmatig is in de zin van art. 7 lid 1 Rv.

In aanmerking nemende: (i) dat tussen de als hoofdelijke medeschuldenaren aangesproken gedaagden een concernrelatie bestaat, waarbij het doen en (na)laten van SPDC als concernvennootschap een grote rol speelt bij de beoordeling van een eventuele aansprakelijkheid/gehoudenheid van RDS als top-holding; (ii) dat de tegen hen ingestelde eis gelijkluidend is en (iii) dezelfde feitelijke grondslag heeft, in die zin dat het om dezelfde lekkage gaat, terwijl (iv) het debat over de feiten zich in belangrijke mate toespitst op vragen als hoe die lekkage is ontstaan en of voldoende is gedaan om deze te voorkomen en de gevolgen ervan ongedaan te maken, in welk verband (v) mogelijk nader onderzoek geïndiceerd is, (vi) welk onderzoek, ter voorkoming van uiteenlopende bevindingen en beoordelingen, het beste bij één rechter kan worden geconcentreerd, moet de conclusie zijn dat tussen de vorderingen tegen RDS en die tegen SPDC een zodanige samenhang bestaat, dat redenen van doelmatigheid een gezamenlijke behandeling rechtvaardigen, zoals bedoeld in art. 7 lid 1 Rv. Ten overvloede wordt er in dit verband op gewezen dat bij een onbevoegdverklaring ten aanzien van de tegen SPDC gerichte vorderingen, hier te lande nog steeds moet worden geoordeeld over hetzelfde feitencomplex dat immers ook aan de vorderingen tegen RDS ten grondslag ligt.2.5 Wat de toets aan art. 6 sub 1 Brussel I-Verordening betreft geldt dat, gelet op de zojuist genoemde elementen, tussen de tegen RDS en SPDC ingestelde vorderingen een zo nauwe band bestaat dat een goede rechtsbedeling vraagt om hun gelijktijdige berechting, teneinde te vermijden dat bij afzonderlijke berechting van de zaken onverenigbare beslissingen worden gegeven. Van onverenigbare beslissingen is sprake wanneer zich in het kader van eenzelfde situatie, feitelijk en rechtens, divergentie in de beslechting van het geschil voordoet. Hier doet zich ‘eenzelfde situatie, feitelijk en rechtens’ (en daarmee een risico van onverenigbare beslissingen bij afzonderlijke berechting) voor, nu het gaat om de mogelijke aansprakelijkheid naar Nigeriaans recht van twee concernvennootschappen (een moeder- en een (klein)dochtervennootschap) voor het niet-voorkomen van dezelfde lekkage en het niet adequaat opruimen van dezelfde vervuiling. Toegevoegd wordt nog dat geen omzeiling van de in art. 6 sub 1 vastgelegde bevoegdheidsregel is vastgesteld; er is geen afdoende bewijs op grond waarvan geconcludeerd kan worden dat Milieudefensie c.s. de voorwaarden voor toepasselijkheid van deze bevoegdheidsgrond kunstmatig heeft gecreëerd of gehandhaafd (vgl. HvJ EU 21 mei 2015, C‑352/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:335CDC/Akzo); van bij voorbaat evident kansloze ankervorderingen is, zoals hiervoor werd overwogen, geen sprake.

Het voorgaande wordt niet anders doordat de rechtsgrondslagen van de vorderingen tegen SPDC en RDS verschillen, althans niet geheel en al samenvallen (vgl. onder meer HvJ EG 11 oktober 2007, C-98/06, ECLI:EU:C:2007:595Freeport/Arnoldson). Onjuist is ook de aan het eerdergenoemde Painer-arrest ontleende tegenwerping dat het voor SPDC niet voorzienbaar was dat zij voor een andere dan de Nigeriaanse rechter c.q. voor de Nederlandse rechter zou worden gedagvaard (daargelaten de vraag of dit vereiste steeds van toepassing is in het kader van art. 7 lid 1 Rv); tegen de achtergrond van (i) de al langer gaande ontwikkelingen op het gebied van de foreign direct liability claims (vgl. o.m.: de in de jaren ’90 in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika tegen Shell aangespannen procedures wegens een beweerdelijke betrokkenheid van het concern bij mensenrechtenschendingen; de zaak Bowoto v Chevron Texaco (09-15641); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013), alsook de zaak Lubbe v Cape Plc. [2000] UKHL 41), met daarbij gevoegd (ii) de vele olielekkages die zich jaarlijks voordeden bij de oliewinning in Nigeria, (iii) de juridische procedures die daarover sedert jaar en dag (volgens Shell al meer dan 60 jaar) worden gevoerd, (iv) de problemen die deze olielekkages teweegbrengen voor mens en milieu en (v) de toegenomen aandacht voor dergelijke problemen, moet het voor RDS als hoofd en voor SPDC als operationeel onderdeel van het Shell-concern redelijkerwijs voorzienbaar zijn geweest dat op den duur de pijlen ook op RDS zouden kunnen worden gericht, waarbij dan SPDC, die al meermalen in Nigeria in rechte was betrokken, ook wel eens zou kunnen worden opgeroepen voor een gerecht met bevoegdheid ten aanzien van RDS. In dit verband wordt er - terzijde - op gewezen dat SPDC wegens andere lekkages (tussen 2008 en 2009 aan een pijpleiding bij het dorp Bodo) voor de Engelse rechter is gedagvaard: The Bodo Community and Others v SPDC [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC). Diens bevoegdheid heeft SPDC niet betwist, naar zij stelt omdat het daarbij ging om ‘operational spills’ waarvoor zij aansprakelijkheid aanvaardt. De hier bedoelde voorzienbaarheid staat of valt echter niet met het al dan niet aanvaarden van aansprakelijkheid. Ook de tegenwerping van SPDC dat de onderhavige lekkages zich in Nigeria afspeelden en dat Nigeriaans recht in dezen van toepassing is, zodat de zaak het beste door de rechter in haar thuisland, Nigeria, kan worden beoordeeld legt, afgezet tegen de elementen die vóór een gezamenlijke behandeling pleiten, onvoldoende gewicht in de schaal.

In hetgeen hiervoor is overwogen ligt besloten dat van misbruik van procesrecht (art. 7 lid 1 Rv) geen sprake is; meer in het bijzonder is niet aannemelijk dat zich hier het geval voordoet dat de procedure tegen RDS slechts een schijnprocedure is, met als enig doel om SPDC op basis van bij voorbaat kansloze vorderingen tegen RDS van haar natuurlijke forum te beroven. Ook speelt hier geen rol dat art. 7 lid 1 Rv niet een woonplaatseis ten aanzien van één der gedaagden stelt en dat om die reden in een zaak als de onderhavige bij een beoordeling van de samenhang een (extra) antimisbruiktoets zou moeten worden aangelegd; RDS had immers woonplaats hier te lande (art. 60 lid 1 Brussel I-Verordening).

De conclusie na het voorgaande moet dan ook zijn dat aan het vereiste van een voldoende samenhang als bedoeld in art. 7 lid 1 Rv is voldaan, ook in de mate dat met deze bepaling aansluiting is gezocht bij art. 6 sub 1 Brussel I-Verordening. Art. 7 lid 1 Rv vormde derhalve een voldoende basis voor het aannemen van internationale bevoegdheid van de Nederlandse rechter met betrekking tot de vorderingen tegen SPDC. Verder is het niet zo dat een eenmaal ex art. 7 lid 1 Rv aangenomen internationale bevoegdheid weer komt te vervallen als de ankervordering ongegrond blijkt. De in art. 7 lid 1 Rv bedoelde samenhang moet aanwezig zijn op het tijdstip waarop de procedure in de eerste aanleg aanhangig wordt gemaakt; een dan op die grond bestaande internationale bevoegdheid kan, behoudens bijzondere, hier niet aan de orde zijnde omstandigheden, tijdens de loop van de procedure niet meer wijzigen. Een andere opvatting komt in strijd met het zgn. perpetuatio fori-beginsel (vgl. Hof Den Haag 30 november 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BP3078).

Shells eerste grief in het incidenteel appel in zaak b faalt derhalve; de Nederlandse rechter is internationaal bevoegd tot kennisneming van de vorderingen in de hoofdzaak tegen SPDC en dus ook van de mede tegen SPDC gerichte incidentele vordering ex art. 843a Rv.

bevoegdheid van de Nederlandse rechter m.b.t. de vorderingen tegen de moedervennootschap

Shell Petroleum is een hier te lande gevestigde vennootschap, reden waarom de Nederlandse rechter (ex art. 2 lid 1 Brussel I-Verordening) bevoegd is tot kennisneming van een tegen haar ingestelde vordering. Ten aanzien van de niet hier te lande gevestigde RDS bestaat die bevoegdheid op grond van art. 2 lid 1 juncto art. 60 lid 1 Brussel I-Verordening en ten aanzien van de evenmin in Nederland gevestigde Shell T&T, zo al niet op grond van art. 6 sub 1 dan toch op grond van art. 24 Brussel I-Verordening.

ontvankelijkheid van Milieudefensie

Shell bestrijdt het op art. 3:305a (oud) BW gebaseerde vorderingsrecht van Milieudefensie (grief 2 in incidenteel appel). Wie er bevoegd is om een collectieve actie voor de belangen van anderen in te stellen ziet zij als een materieelrechtelijke vraag die moet worden beoordeeld naar de lex causae, in dit geval Nigeriaans recht, dat naar zij stelt geen grondslag biedt voor zodanige actie. Deze zienswijze kan niet als juist worden aanvaard.

Voor de ontvankelijkheid van een eisende partij is in het algemeen vereist dat deze een eigen, rechtstreeks belang bij de ingestelde rechtsvordering heeft (vgl. art. 3:296, 302 en 303 BW). Art. 3:305a BW vormt hierop een aanvulling in die zin dat een stichting of vereniging met volledige rechtsbevoegdheid een vordering kan instellen indien deze strekt tot bescherming van gelijksoortige belangen van anderen, voor zover zij deze belangen ingevolge haar statuten behartigt. Deze mogelijkheid tot collectieve actie heeft zowel een materiële als een processuele zijde. Wat de materiële kant betreft kan worden gedacht aan de vraag of bij schending van de door de stichting/vereniging behartigde (milieu)belangen een materiële aanspraak bestaat, bijvoorbeeld op grond van een vordering uit hoofde van onrechtmatige daad. Deze vraag wordt, evenals die van de gegrondheid/toewijsbaarheid, beantwoord aan de hand van het recht dat de (onrechtmatige daad-)vordering beheerst, dat wil zeggen de lex causae. Of - en, zo ja, in hoeverre en op welke wijze - dat vorderingsrecht, behalve door of namens de gerechtigde, ook via een collectieve actie in rechte geldend kan worden gemaakt moet naar Nederlands internationaal privaatrecht echter worden gekwalificeerd als een vraag van procesrecht, waar de lex fori processus - dus Nederlands recht - op van toepassing is. Een negatieve beantwoording van die procesrechtelijke vraag zou de beoordeling van de zaak aan de rechter onttrekken. Dat geval doet zich hier niet voor, nu art. 3:305a BW voorziet in die mogelijkheid van een collectieve actie. Een andere vraag is of Milieudefensie als belangenvereniging volledige rechtsbevoegdheid heeft. Dat die laatste vraag, naar het daarop toepasselijke incorporatierecht, bevestigend moet worden beantwoord is niet in geschil.

Los van het voorgaande moet het er op basis van de thans beschikbare informatie over het Nigeriaanse recht voor gehouden worden dat ook naar dat recht een collectieve actie (als public interest) door een belangenorganisatie als Milieudefensie mogelijk is en dat haar daarbij geen gebrek aan locus standi kan worden tegengeworpen, maar dit terzijde (vgl. Fawehinmi v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2008) 23 WRN 65 en zie ook de preambule van de Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules van 11 november 2009).

Ook de overige gronden waarop Shell de niet-ontvankelijkheid van Milieudefensie bepleit bieden daarvoor onvoldoende basis. De rechtbank besprak en verwierp die gronden in het incidentele vonnis van 14 september 2011 - rov. 4.5 - en in het eindvonnis van 30 januari 2013, rov. 4.13 en 4.14. Die overwegingen zijn juist en dienen als hier herhaald en ingelast te worden beschouwd. Het volgende wordt eraan toegevoegd. Geen absolute voorwaarde voor ontvankelijkheid bij een actie ex art. 3:305a BW - ook niet in de huidige, op 1 juli 2013 in werking getreden versie - is dat het gevorderde niet langs een andere weg kan worden bereikt; in het onderhavige geval bijvoorbeeld via een groepsactie van alle leden van de Oruma-gemeenschap of een representative action, gevoerd door een aantal van die leden ten behoeve van zichzelf en van anderen. Voorwaarde is wel dat de vordering strekt tot bescherming van gelijksoortige belangen van andere personen. Aan die eis is voldaan indien de belangen ter bescherming waarvan de rechtsvordering strekt zich lenen voor bundeling, zodat een efficiënte en effectieve rechtsbescherming ten behoeve van de belanghebbenden kan worden bevorderd. Op die wijze kan immers in één procedure geoordeeld worden over de door de rechtsvordering aan de orde gestelde geschilpunten en vorderingen, zonder dat daarbij de bijzondere omstandigheden aan de zijde van de individuele belanghebbenden - bijvoorbeeld de processuele implicaties van het overlijden van één hunner - behoeven te worden betrokken, althans het debat domineren en/of de afloop ervan bepalen. Dat de belangen ter bescherming waarvan de onderhavige rechtsvordering strekt - meer in het bijzonder: het belang bij de vaststelling van aansprakelijkheid, bij het opruimen van de verontreiniging en bij het voorkomen van nieuwe schades - zich voor bundeling lenen is terecht niet weersproken, net zo min als de overweging van de rechtbank dat de hierop betrekking hebbende vorderingen het individueel belang van Oguru en Efanga duidelijk overstijgen. Ook is het niet zo dat de groep van personen ten behoeve van wie de rechtsvordering is ingesteld zo gering en wel omkaderd is dat het procederen op naam van de belanghebbenden eenvoudig te realiseren was. Onjuist, althans onvoldoende onderbouwd is voorts het verweer van Shell dat de milieubelangen van degenen die door de onderhavige lekkage zijn getroffen onvoldoende gewaarborgd zijn bij het optreden door Milieudefensie; de voorwaarde dat de belangen van de vertegenwoordigde personen ‘voldoende gewaarborgd’ dienen te zijn is bedoeld als handvat om de ontvankelijkheid kritisch te kunnen beoordelen in die gevallen waarin getwijfeld wordt aan de motieven voor het instellen van een collectieve actie. Dit voorkomt dat claimstichtingen het collectief actierecht gebruiken om hun eigen commercieel gedreven motieven na te streven. Daarbij is het niet zo dat een organisatie met geen of slechts een geringe achterban onder de kring der direct belanghebbenden per definitie niet aan deze voorwaarde kan voldoen. De parlementaire geschiedenis noemt als voorbeeld de Consumentenbond, die in een collectieve actie de rechter vraagt een oneerlijke handelspraktijk te verbieden. Dat doet zij dan ten behoeve van iedere consument die potentieel door deze handelspraktijk getroffen zou kunnen worden. Ook indien het aantal van deze consumenten dat feitelijk lid is van of aangesloten is bij de Consumentenbond slechts een kleine minderheid is zal er niet aan getwijfeld worden dat de belangen van deze grotere groep consumenten voldoende gewaarborgd zijn. Voor twijfel aan het uiteindelijke doel van Milieudefensie om ter plaatse een schoner milieu te bewerkstelligen bestaat evenmin aanleiding; het verder opruimen van (mogelijk) nog bestaande en het voorkomen van nieuwe olieverontreinigingen is daar dienstig aan. Terzijde wordt er nog op gewezen dat de hier bedoelde voorwaarde van het ‘voldoende gewaarborgd’ zijn van de belangen van de vertegenwoordigde personen in de plaats is gekomen van een aanvankelijk voorgestelde representativiteitseis, aan welke eis ideële organisaties en milieu- en dierenwelzijnsorganisaties in dat voorstel niet behoefden te voldoen; niet aannemelijk is dat de zienswijze op dat punt is gewijzigd.

De suggestie van Shell dat Milieudefensie niet beschikt over voldoende kennis en vaardigheden voor de onderhavige milieuactie mist een behoorlijke onderbouwing; dat Milieudefensie niet in het bewuste gebied werkzaam of gevestigd is, is daarvoor onvoldoende. Bijvoorbeeld blijkt niet van een relevante kennisachterstand ten opzichte van de wel in dat gebied woonachtige Nigeriaanse eisers met wie Milieudefensie bovendien samen optrekt. Het door Shell verder nog gebezigde argument dat de door Milieudefensie c.s. gevorderde verklaring voor recht hier te lande geen basis biedt voor een schadevergoedingsactie tegen SPDC, net zo min als in Nigeria, omdat naar Nigeriaans recht een vordering tot schadevergoeding inmiddels is verjaard, legt evenmin gewicht in de schaal, reeds omdat de vorderingen van Milieudefensie c.s. niet strekken tot schadevergoeding, in elk geval meeromvattend zijn. De juistheid van dit laatste argument kan daarom in dit stadium van het geding in het midden blijven. Andere, door de rechtbank (in de eerder aangehaalde overwegingen) verworpen, argumenten van Shell zijn: (i) dat de actie ex art. 3:305a BW niet bedoeld is voor het door een Nederlandse belangenorganisatie behartigen van een zuiver lokaal buitenlands belang dat geen enkele band met de Nederlandse rechtssfeer heeft; (ii) dat de statutaire doelomschrijving van Milieudefensie niet specifiek genoeg is om het beschermen van het milieu nabij Oruma daaronder te scharen en (iii) dat Milieudefensie ter plaatse geen activiteiten verricht. Aan de bespreking en verwerping van deze argumenten wordt nog het volgende toegevoegd. Voor een beperking van het toepassingsbereik van art. 3:305a BW zoals Shell met het eerste argument voor staat bestaat geen goede grond. Bovendien is hier een voldoende band met de Nederlandse rechtssfeer aanwezig, te weten voor zover het bestaan en de omvang van de zorgplicht van de hier te lande kantoorhoudende moedervennootschap ter beoordeling voorliggen. Dat die beoordeling plaatsvindt naar Nigeriaans recht doet hier niet aan af. De argumenten (ii) en (iii) falen omdat een voldoende verband bestaat tussen de statutaire doelstelling van Milieudefensie en het door haar gevorderde, terwijl zij ook voldoende bijbehorende activiteiten aan de dag heeft gelegd, o.m. door het voeren van campagnes, organiseren van bijeenkomsten, doen van onderzoek, etc. De conclusie is dat de grief faalt.

de vorderingsgerechtigdheid van Oguru en Efanga

Shell stelt zich op het standpunt dat voor het aannemen van vorderingsgerechtigheid van Oguru en Efanga vereist is dat zij exclusief eigenaar dan wel exclusief bezitter zijn van de getroffen gronden en visvijvers. Dit verweer wordt door Shell aangevoerd zowel in het kader van de thans (in fase 1) ter beoordeling voorliggende vordering ex art. 843a Rv (respectievelijk het hoger beroep tegen de beslissing van de rechtbank op die vordering) als in de hoofdzaak, waarover in fase 2 zal worden geoordeeld. Als verweer tegen de vordering ex art. 843a Rv heeft het als strekking dat de (hoofd)vorderingen van Oguru en Efanga tot schadevergoeding etc. niet toewijsbaar zijn en dat daarom de vordering ex art. 843a Rv ook niet toewijsbaar is. Het is echter niet aan de rechter die over een vordering ex art. 843a Rv beslist om ten gronde en definitief te oordelen over (elementen van) de hoofdvordering. Voor nu volstaat dat Oguru en Efanga voldoende aannemelijk hebben gemaakt dat zij in een zodanige relatie tot de vervuilde visvijvers en gronden staan dat zij uit dien hoofde gelegitimeerd zijn om de mogelijk voor de vervuiling aansprakelijke partij aan te spreken. Het hier bedoelde verweer wordt tegen die achtergrond beoordeeld.

Naar Nigeriaans recht is voor de vorderingsgerechtigdheid bepalend of het belang van de eisende partij in gronden die in familiebezit zijn wordt geschaad, bijvoorbeeld omdat hij die grond in gebruik heeft (vgl. o.a.: Balogun Ors. v Akanji Ors [2005] 10 NWLR (Pt.933) 394, Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited v Edamkue & Ors. [2009] 14 NWLR (Pt.1160) 1 en Ibator v Barakuro [2007] 9 NWLR 475, en zie in dit verband ook de ruime omschrijving van art. 11(5)(c) van de Oil Pipelines Act (verder: OPA): ‘The holder of a license shall pay compensation (a) to any person whose land or interest in land [..] is injuriously affected [..] and (b) any person suffering damage by reason of any neglect to protect, maintain or repair [..]’). De stelling van de door Shell geraadpleegde professor Oditah, dat de eiser ‘ownership or possession’ moet hebben, wordt weersproken door Akintan JSC in de zaak Ibator v. Barakuro, waaruit blijkt dat ook een ‘occupier (..) of land’ een vordering kan instellen. Dat het daarbij zou gaan om een obiter dictum doet niet af aan de overtuigingskracht van dit citaat. Ook indien echter de stelling van professor Oditah juist zou zijn, lijkt te zijn voldaan aan de voorwaarde dat bij Oguru en Efanga sprake is van ‘possession’. Uit de zaak Ekpan v. Uyo (1986) NWLR (Pt. 26) 63 volgt immers dat onder ‘possession’ moet worden verstaan ‘the occupation or physical control of the land either personally or through an agent or servant’. Oguru en Efanga hebben, onvoldoende gemotiveerd weersproken, gesteld dat zij vóór de lekkages het land en de visvijvers waar vervuiling is opgetreden exploiteerden en dat zij daarvan leefden, hetgeen impliceert dat die exploitatie door hen in ieder geval al gedurende een wat langere periode plaatsvond (vgl. ook de in het eindvonnis geciteerde verklaringen van de leden van de Oruma-gemeenschap: ‘owned and used by’), zodat ‘possession’ vooralsnog kan worden aangenomen.

Shell heeft verder als bezwaar aangevoerd dat Oguru en Efanga nog steeds niet duidelijk hebben gemaakt om welke gronden en visvijvers het gaat. Dit bezwaar verhoudt zich echter slecht tot haar eerdere stelling dat zij de gevolgen van de olielekkage van 26 juni 2005 nabij Oruma heeft opgeruimd en de grond en visvijvers heeft gesaneerd. Vooralsnog mag het ervoor worden gehouden dat de gronden en visvijvers waar de vorderingen van Oguru en Efanga betrekking op hebben, zijn gelegen binnen dat volgens Shell gesaneerde gebied.

Bovendien gaat het in de procedures niet om een geschil over de eigendomsrechten met betrekking tot de desbetreffende gronden en visvijvers en is in elk geval in deze fase 1 niet van groot belang om welke gronden en visvijvers het precies gaat.

De conclusie is dat ook Shells derde grief in het incidentele appel faalt.

de vordering ex art. 843a Rv.

Milieudefensie c.s. vordert inzage in de op pagina 73 van haar ‘memorie van grieven inzake de afwijzing van de vordering tot exhibitie ex art. 843a Rv’ onder a tot en met o. genoemde bescheiden. Deels gaat het daarbij om bescheiden waarmee Milieudefensie c.s. aannemelijk wil maken dat niet, zoals de rechtbank oordeelde, sabotage, maar onvoldoende onderhoud de oorzaak van de lekkage is. Duidelijkheid over die oorzaak acht Milieudefensie c.s. onder meer van belang omdat SPDC op grond van art. 11(5)(c) OPA (risico)aansprakelijk is indien de lekkage gevolg is van corrosie/onvoldoende onderhoud, terwijl sabotage als oorzaak van de lekkage onder die bepaling een bevrijdend verweer oplevert, waarbij het overigens wel aan SPDC is om de juistheid van dat verweer aan te tonen. Verschil van mening lijkt nog wel te bestaan over de vraag welke bewijsmaatstaf daarbij moet worden aangelegd: ‘preponderance or weight of evidence’ of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ (vgl. de hiervoor genoemde uitspraak Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited v Edamkue & Ors., voor zover inhoudende als oordeel van I.F. Ogbuagu, J.S.C ‘[..] it is now firmly established in a line of decided authorities by this court firstly, that civil cases are proved by preponderance or weight of evidence’ en van N. Tobi, J.S.C.: ‘The allegation that the spillage was caused by hostile act of some people is an allegation of a criminal act which needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.’). De rechtbank achtte - eerst voorlopig (in het bestreden tussenvonnis) en vervolgens definitief (in het eindvonnis) - voldoende vast staan dat sabotage de oorzaak van de lekkage was. Dat oordeel is mede redengevend voor de afwijzing van de vordering ex art. 843a Rv. Milieudefensie c.s., die het niet eens is met die afwijzing, beklaagt zich daarom over dat oordeel (grief 1).

Naar aanleiding hiervan wordt overwogen dat in deze fase van het hoger beroep niet als vaststaand kan worden aangenomen dat het gat in de pijpleiding het gevolg is geweest van sabotage zoals in het rapport van het Joint Investigation Team (hierna: JIT-rapport) beschreven. Hierbij wordt onder meer in aanmerking genomen: (i) dat het aanwijzen van sabotage als schadeoorzaak kennelijk van meet af aan controversieel is geweest; vgl. het niet door alle betrokkenen voor akkoord tekenen van het JIT-rapport waarin die schadeoorzaak is genoemd; (ii) dat op dit JIT-rapport gaandeweg ook door derden kritiek is geuit, in het bijzonder op de toegepaste onderzoeksmethode en de wijze van verslaglegging, welke kritiek zich klaarblijkelijk niet eenvoudig laat weerleggen, ook niet aan de hand van het video-/fotomateriaal, waaruit niet meteen onomstotelijk blijkt dat sabotage de enige mogelijke schadeoorzaak is; (iii) dat het om een oude, gecorrodeerde leiding ging die aan vervanging toe was en ten aanzien waarvan de verwachting was uitgesproken dat deze zou gaan lekken; (iv) dat Shell niet ontkend heeft dat eigen onderzoek had uitgewezen ‘that the remaining life of most of the SPDC Oil Trunklines is more or less non-existent or short, while some sections contain major risk and hazard’ en dat ‘outright replacement is necessary because extensive corrosion [..]’ en (v) dat uit de pigrun resultaten blijkt dat er al eens een repair sleeve was geplaatst, wat op een eerdere lekkage kan duiden. Toegevoegd wordt nog dat Milieudefensie c.s. erop gewezen heeft dat uit een rapport van Shell uit 2003 blijkt dat de kritiek op de JIT-onderzoeken, meer speciaal op het daarbij aanwijzen van sabotage als oorzaak van de lekkages, al langer speelde. Daarvan uitgaande is niet zonder meer begrijpelijk waarom niet meer aandacht is besteed aan de kwaliteit van de bewijsvoering op dat punt.

Bij gelegenheid van de in fase 1 van het hoger beroep gehouden pleidooien is ter sprake gekomen of niet alsnog meer duidelijkheid over de schadeoorzaak zou kunnen worden verkregen door middel van een deskundigenonderzoek, waarbij, voor zover dit ca. 10 jaar na het schadevoorval nog nuttig en vanuit veiligheidsoogpunt verantwoord is, het bewuste gat in de pijpleiding aan een fysiek onderzoek wordt onderworpen. Zijdens Shell is daarop verklaard dat een dergelijk onderzoek nog tot de mogelijkheden behoort en een veel voor de hand liggender manier is om bewijs over de oorzaak van de lekkage te vergaren – mocht daartoe worden besloten – dan het produceren van papierwerk. Naar aanleiding hiervan wordt partijen in overweging gegeven dat, mochten zij in onderling overleg besluiten dat het aanbeveling verdient om (reeds aan het begin van fase 2) een deskundigenonderzoek te laten plaatsvinden (bij voorkeur door drie deskundigen), hier in beginsel medewerking aan zal worden verleend door het wijzen van een tussenarrest.

Bij deze stand van zaken bestaat onvoldoende aanleiding om Shell thans te gelasten inzage te verlenen in bescheiden aan de hand waarvan Milieudefensie c.s. corrosie/onvoldoende onderhoud als schadeoorzaak aannemelijk hoopt te kunnen maken (onder meer het corrosion management framework, letter g). Naar Shell - onvoldoende gemotiveerd betwist - heeft gesteld, beschikt Milieudefensie c.s. reeds over alle stukken die rechtstreeks betrekking hebben op de onderhavige lekkage. De stukken waarvan Milieudefensie c.s. nu afgifte/inzage vordert zullen naar verwachting hooguit (zeer) zijdelings licht op de oorzaak van de lekkage werpen. Nu derhalve de oorzaak van de lekkage, naar verwachting, met meer zekerheid kan worden vastgesteld bij een onderzoek op de plaats van het onheil dan op basis van de door Milieudefensie c.s. bedoelde bescheiden – anders gezegd: redelijkerwijs kan worden aangenomen dat een behoorlijke rechtsbedeling ook zonder verschaffing van de gevraagde gegevens is gewaarborgd – is het belang van Milieudefensie c.s. bij inzage in die bescheiden onvoldoende gebleken. Daar komt bij dat, mocht een eventueel deskundigenonderzoek geen bevestiging brengen van de sabotage als oorzaak van de lekkage, die schadeoorzaak in beginsel kan worden geschrapt, waarmee het belang bij inzage in bedoelde bescheiden mogelijk vervalt. Uiteraard bestaat de mogelijkheid dat de deskundigen bij hun onderzoek inzage in bepaalde stukken nodig/nuttig achten. Daar dient dan medewerking aan te worden verleend (art. 198 lid 3 Rv).

Indien tot het oordeel zou moeten worden gekomen dat sabotage de schadeoorzaak is, dient in de hoofdzaken nog wel te worden beslist op het verwijt dat Shell nalatig is geweest in het voorkomen ervan. Voor zover Milieudefensie c.s. in het kader van dat verwijt inzage in bepaalde bescheiden verlangt, geldt ook daarvoor dat het belang hierbij kan komen te vervallen indien sabotage als schadeoorzaak afvalt. In het andere geval zal aan de hand van het in fase 2 nog nader te voeren debat tussen partijen moeten worden beoordeeld of naar Nigeriaans recht voor Shell in 2005 een verplichting bestond, en zo ja welke, om deze sabotage van de ondergrondse, volgens Shell ongeveer 1.25 tot 1.75 meter ingegraven oliepijpleiding te voorkomen, althans de schadelijke gevolgen van die sabotage te beperken. Wat Milieudefensie c.s. hierover stelt is dat Shell, wat zij inmiddels wel heeft gedaan, de pijpleiding voordien al had moeten vervangen. Partijen wordt opgeroepen om in het kader van fase 2 van het hoger beroep nadere informatie in te winnen (bij voorkeur gezamenlijk) over het destijds geldende Nigeriaanse recht op dit punt, mede in het licht van bijvoorbeeld de eerdere uitspraak SPDC v Otoko (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 159) en de latere uitspraak van de Engelse rechter in de zaak van The Bodo Community and Others v SPDC [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC), waarin Justice Akenhead ‘issue 2, whether SPDC can be liable under Section 11(5)(b) of the OPA 1990 to pay just compensation for damage caused by oil from its pipelines that had been released as the result of illegal bunkering and/or illegal refining’ als volgt beantwoordt: The answer to Issue 2 is strictly speaking “No”; there has to be neglect on the part of the licencee. It is conceivable however that neglect by the licencee in the protection of the pipeline (as defined above) which can be proved to be the enabling cause of preventable damage to the pipeline by people illegally engaged in bunkering which causes spillage could give rise to a liability; this may be difficult to prove but there is that theoretical possibility. I can not at the moment see that damage caused from illegal refining by criminal gangs of crude oil criminally taken from pipelines which have been broken into could fall within a duty “to protect…any work structure or thing executed under the licence” because (I assume) that the illegal refinery has not been executed under licence by the licencee.’

De rechtbank heeft de hier bedoelde vraag naar de gehoudenheid om sabotage te voorkomen ten aanzien van de moedervennootschap impliciet en ten aanzien van SPDC expliciet ontkennend beantwoord. De juistheid van die (nog) niet door grieven bestreden overwegingen ligt thans niet ter beoordeling voor; in een later stadium mogelijk wel, indien althans dient te worden uitgegaan van sabotage als schadeoorzaak. Daarbij kan dan mogelijk van belang zijn hoe vaak zich al eerder een dergelijke sabotage aan deze en eventueel andere ondergrondse pijpleidingen in de omgeving van Oruma had voorgedaan. Daarover kunnen partijen zich dan nog nader uitlaten, Shell aan de hand van onderliggende bescheiden (bijvoorbeeld de door Milieudefensie c.s. onder de letter d bedoelde Significant Incidents / High Potential Incidents). Voor nu bestaat onvoldoende aanleiding voor een bevel tot het verstrekken van (andere) bescheiden als door Milieudefensie c.s. in dit verband bedoeld, waaronder: j de surveillancecontracten; k helikopterlogs en de bescheiden aangeduid met de letters l, m, n, nog afgezien van het feit dat Shell aanvoert die stukken niet (meer) te hebben (de onder o bedoelde formulieren zijn door Shell inmiddels als prod. 53 overgelegd).

Milieudefensie c.s. vordert tevens bescheiden met het oog op haar vordering tegen de moedervennootschap; volgens de incidentele conclusie tot exhibitie punt 139 e.v. de bescheiden genoemd onder a t/m f, maar bij memorie van grieven mogelijk uitgebreid met die t/m i. In dat verband is het volgende van belang.

Aan de vordering tegen de moedervennootschap ligt ten grondslag een door Milieudefensie c.s. verweten falend toezicht op het systematisch tekortschieten van SPDC, of zoals Milieudefensie c.s. het ook omschrijft: ‘[..] de moedervennootschap wordt niet verweten dat ze geen vinger aan de pols hield bij de naleving van specifieke procedures, maar dat ze zag dat zich door de vele lekkages en gebrekkige opruimwerkzaamheden door SPDC in de Niger Delta een milieuramp voltrok en naliet om SPDC te bewegen daar iets aan te doen (curs., Hof).

Een steeds terugkerend verweer van Shell tegen de inzage-eis in het kader van de aldus gepresenteerde vordering is dat de moedervennootschap geen weet had van de (toestand van de pijpleiding ter plaatse van de) bewuste lekkage en dat de opgevraagde bescheiden daar ook geen betrekking op hebben. Bovendien bestaat een aantal van die bescheiden niet, aldus Shell, die in dat verband de bescheiden omschreven onder de letters a, e, h en i noemt. Daarnaast beroept Shell zich onder meer op een gewichtige reden als bedoeld in art. 843a lid 4 Rv, hierin gelegen dat in een aantal gevallen de bescheiden bedrijfsvertrouwelijke informatie bevatten. Openbaarmaking daarvan is volgens Shell te meer ongewenst nu Milieudefensie bezig is met een tegen haar als concern gerichte campagne, waardoor te voorzien valt dat verstrekte informatie gebruikt zal worden voor weer nieuwe procedures en het verdiepen van die campagne, bij welke campagne zonder enige grond ernstige beschuldigingen worden geuit, aldus Shell, die daar ook een voorbeeld bij geeft.

Wat betreft de door Shell gestelde onbekendheid van de moedervennootschap met de lekkage en de onderhoudstoestand van de pijpleiding ter plaatse geldt dat dit niet in alle gevallen een adequaat verweer lijkt, in het bijzonder niet indien sabotage als oorzaak van de lekkage afvalt. Mede in aanmerking nemende (i) dat Shell zich doelen en ambities stelt, onder andere op het gebied van milieu, en groepsbeleid heeft geformuleerd om die doelen en ambities op een gecoördineerde en uniforme manier te bereiken en (ii) dat RDS (gelijk ook de vorige moedervennootschap) controle uitoefent op de naleving van die groepsstandaarden en dat groepsbeleid, rijzen in dat geval vragen als: (a) welke (onderhoud)normen golden er voor een oude pijpleiding als de onderhavige; (b) werd aan die (onderhoud)normen voldaan; (c) zo ja, waar blijkt dit uit, en zo nee, had dit dan niet moeten worden opgemerkt in het kader van het door de moedervennootschap uitgeoefende toezicht (de audits), (d) ook niet bij een adequaat rapportagesysteem en (e) waarom niet. Een andere vraag is (f) of de moedermaatschappij - rekening houdende met de autonomie en eigen verantwoordelijkheid van (het bestuur van) SPDC - voldoende geëquipeerd was (qua kennis, mogelijkheden en middelen) om adequaat in te grijpen bij gebleken nalatigheden van SPDC.

Vooralsnog uitgaande van een naar Nigeriaans recht onder (zeer) bijzondere omstandigheden te aanvaarden mogelijkheid van aansprakelijkheid van een moedervennootschap wegens het schenden van een zorgplicht heeft Milieudefensie c.s. haar rechtmatige (bewijs)belang bij inzage in de door haar bedoelde bescheiden voldoende toegelicht. Hierna wordt bezien of de vordering tot inzage van die bescheiden ook overigens toewijsbaar is; het gaat daarbij om de bescheiden met de letters a tot en met i. Op het tegen die toewijzing aangevoerde bezwaar ex art. 843a lid 4 Rv wordt in 5.11 ingegaan.

Ad a Taakstellingen en uitgaven bij de jaarlijkse businessplannen inzake onderhoud, milieu en veiligheid met betrekking tot Oruma en de gehele pijpleiding bij Oruma uit de Businessplannen alsmede de maandelijkse businessrapportages daarover 2000-2005. Shell heeft aangevoerd dat er geen jaarlijkse businessplannen of maandelijkse business rapportages inzake onderhoud, milieu en veiligheid met betrekking tot de omgeving van Oruma bestaan. Milieudefensie c.s. heeft daar niet op gereageerd. Meer speciaal heeft zij niet vermeld dat en waarom dit verweer van Shell niet klopt. Evenmin heeft zij een nadere precisering van haar vordering gegeven, reden waarom deze wordt afgewezen, wat gezien de na te melden toewijzingen niet bezwaarlijk behoeft te zijn.

Ad b Het ten tijde van de lekkage meest recente Audit report m.b.t. asset integrity alsmede dat m.b.t. milieu- en veiligheidsbeleid, met bijbehorende findings, recommendations en approval and closeout of actions. Shell heeft aangevoerd dat op zichzelf juist is ‘dat op de naleving van het HSSE-beleid (HSSE staat voor: Health, Security, Safety and Environment, toev. Hof) binnen de Royal Dutch Shell-groep controle plaatsvindt door middel van audits’, maar dat dit niet wil zeggen ‘dat er een audit report zou bestaan met betrekking tot de pijpleiding nabij Oruma of met betrekking tot de Emergency and Oil Spill response, inclusief findings en recommendations approval and closeout van de litigieuze lekkage nabij Oruma.’ Milieudefensie c.s. heeft daarop bij memorie van grieven, punt 268, een nadere aanduiding gegeven van de door haar bedoelde bescheiden, te weten (voor zover in de onderhavige zaken van belang): (i) de ten tijde van de lekkage meest recente interne Asset Integrity Audit waarin de technical integrity en - voor zover van toepassing - de operational integrity werden beoordeeld van de pijpleiding(en) nabij Oruma; (ii) de ten tijde van de lekkage meest recente interne HSE audit (HSE staat voor: Health, Safety and Environment, toev. Hof) waarin SPDC’s Emergency and Oil Spill Response procedures zijn beoordeeld die van toepassing waren op de pijpleidingen en omgeving van Oruma; (iii) de naar aanleiding van deze audits gedocumenteerde audit results and remedial action plans (‘findings, recommendations and approval and closeout of actions’). Shell is hier niet concreet op ingegaan; zij heeft slechts haar eerdere, hiervoor geciteerde reactie herhaald. Daarmee heeft zij het bestaan van bescheiden zoals door Milieudefensie c.s. in bedoeld punt 268 nader omschreven onvoldoende gemotiveerd betwist. Dat die bescheiden niet specifiek op de onderhavige lekkage(plek) betrekking hebben is geen grond voor afwijzing. Daarmee is immers niet gezegd dat zij niet van belang kunnen zijn bij een beoordeling van de wijze waarop het toezicht was vormgegeven en relevante informatie met de moedervennootschap werd gedeeld. Dit deel de vordering is daarom op na te melden wijze toewijsbaar.

Ad c Assurance letters 2002-2005. Volgens Milieudefensie c.s. moeten werkmaatschappijen in die Assurance letters opgeven dat en hoe zij zich aan het veiligheids- en milieu (HSSE) beleid en de daaraan gerelateerde standaarden van de Group hebben gehouden. De tegenwerping van Shell dat bedoelde bescheiden ‘betrekking hebben op naleving van HSSE-beleid in het algemeen en niet zien op specifieke olielekkages’ is geen grond om inzage te weigeren. Ook daarvoor geldt dat hiermee niet gezegd is dat bedoelde bescheiden niet van belang kunnen zijn bij een beoordeling van de wijze waarop het toezicht was vormgegeven en relevante informatie met de moedermaatschappij werd gedeeld. Dit deel van de vordering is op na te melden wijze toewijsbaar, met daarbij de kanttekening dat het gaat om de door of namens SPDC opgestelde en ingestuurde Assurance letters.

Ad d Meldingen van Significant Incidents en High Potential Incidents 2002-2005. Gevorderd worden de over een periode van drie jaar voorafgaand aan de lekkage in 2005 door SPDC gedane meldingen met betrekking tot Oruma en de gehele pijpleiding bij Oruma. Ook met betrekking tot deze meldingen voert Shell het verweer dat zij geen betrekking hebben op de onderhavige lekkage, omdat die niet valt binnen de categorie ‘incidenten met ernstige gevolgen’ en daarom is opgenomen in een geaggregeerde kwartaalrapportage. Dat laat echter onverlet dat inzage in bedoelde meldingen van belang kan zijn in het kader van de verweten zorgplichtschending. Wat de meldingen van de sabotagepogingen kan van belang zijn of die een ondergrondse pijpleiding betroffen. Dit deel van de vordering is op na te melden wijze toewijsbaar.

Ad e Incident report, investigation report and review m.b.t. lekkage. Milieudefensie c.s. vordert deze stukken omdat die volgens haar met betrekking tot de lekkage van 2005 moesten worden opgemaakt. Shell heeft een en andermaal het bestaan van deze bescheiden ontkend. Zijdens Milieudefensie c.s. zijn geen aanwijzingen aangedragen die wijzen op het tegendeel. Dit deel van de vorderingen is daarom niet toewijsbaar.

Ad f Notulen van de moedermaatschappij met betrekking tot de onder b, d en e genoemde bescheiden. Voor toewijzing van dit deel van de vordering bestaat onvoldoende aanleiding. Tegen de achtergrond van de hiervoor onder 5.9 bedoelde stellingen (i) en (ii) van Shell wordt met het verlenen van inzage in de onder b, c en d bedoelde bescheiden voldoende tegemoetgekomen aan de belangen van Milieudefensie c.s. Anders gezegd is tegen die achtergrond en gelet op die toewijzing het belang bij inzage van de notulen onvoldoende toegelicht, immers alleen door een verwijzing naar weer andere documenten, waarvan Milieudefensie c.s. de inhoud niet kent.

Ad g Bescheiden uit het Corrosion Management Framework 2002-2005. Milieudefensie c.s. vordert bescheiden uit dit framework met betrekking tot de pijpleiding bij Oruma over de drie jaar voorafgaande aan de lekkage in 2005. In haar incidentele conclusie tot exhibitie noemde Milieudefensie c.s. deze bescheiden alleen in verband met haar vordering tegen SPDC. In zoverre wordt de vordering afgewezen op grond van hetgeen hiervoor is overwogen onder 5.3 en 5.4. Voor zover zij de bescheiden nadien tevens gevorderd heeft met het oog op haar vordering tegen de moedervennootschap heeft Shell daartegen ingebracht dat bescheiden als hier bedoeld, voor zover bestaand, niet ter kennis van de moedervennootschap werden en worden gebracht. Milieudefensie c.s. is daar nadien niet meer op ingegaan, terwijl er geen aanwijzingen zijn dat het anders is dan Shell stelt. Wat betreft de, wel bestaande, intelligent pig run geldt bovendien dat deze reeds is overgelegd.

Ad h en i Het op de pijpleiding bij Oruma ten tijde van de lekkage van toepassing zijnde HSE-plan en het Hazards en Effects Register en de HSE case van toepassing op de pijpleiding bij Oruma in 2004. Shell voert onder meer het verweer dat er geen specifiek HSE-plan voor ‘Oruma en de pijpleiding nabij Oruma’ ten tijde van de lekkage in 2005 bestond, evenmin als een Hazards en Effects Register en de HSE-case, terwijl die bescheiden ook niet bij de moedervennootschap bekend zijn. Daarmee weerspreekt zij echter niet, althans onvoldoende gemotiveerd, dat er (delen van) meer algemene documenten als bedoeld bestaan die (mede) van toepassing waren op deze pijpleiding en dit gebied. Voor zover bedoelde documenten bestaan dient Shell deze ter inzage te verstrekken op de wijze als hierna vermeld.

Naar aanleiding van het bezwaar van Shell dat een aantal bescheiden bedrijfsvertrouwelijke informatie bevat heeft Milieudefensie c.s. er - terecht - op gewezen dat art. 843a, lid 2, Rv voldoende mogelijkheden biedt om de belangen van Shell te beschermen, bijvoorbeeld door te bepalen dat de stukken uitsluitend ter inzage worden gelegd en/of dat ten aanzien van bepaalde bescheiden aan partijen een geheimhoudingsverplichting wordt opgelegd (vgl. ook art. 29 Rv), dan wel dat alleen de advocaten/rechters kennis nemen van de stukken die een bedrijfsvertrouwelijk karakter hebben. De vordering ex art. 843a Rv wordt thans - onder vernietiging van het afwijzende tussenvonnis van 14 september 2011 - in laatstbedoelde zin toegewezen; de hiervoor bedoelde bescheiden b, c, d, h en i dienen op kosten van Milieudefensie c.s. ter inzage te worden gelegd bij een door partijen in onderling overleg (en bij gebreke van overeenstemming door het Hof) aan te wijzen notaris(kantoor), met bepaling dat alleen de advocaten (inclusief de advocaten die op hun kantoor werkzaam zijn) van partijen, eventuele gerechtsdeskundigen en de leden van de kamer van dit Hof die deze zaken behandelen er kennis van mogen nemen. Uit de bescheiden blijkende informatie die van belang wordt geacht in het kader van de vorderingen in de hoofdzaken mag uitsluitend in deze procedure (zaak a en b) worden gebruikt. De advocaten die inzage hebben mogen aantekeningen maken van die informatie. Er mogen geen fotokopieën of foto’s van de bescheiden worden gemaakt. Indien zich problemen (van welke aard dan ook) voordoen bij de aldus toegestane wijze van inzien kunnen deze door de advocaten van partijen schriftelijk voor nadere beslissing aan het Hof worden voorgelegd.

De tegenwerpingen van Shell tegen de vordering ex art. 843a Rv zijn hiermee voldoende besproken; zij kunnen niet leiden tot een algehele afwijzing. Ook aan het bepaaldheidsvereiste is wat betreft de hiervoor nader omschreven bescheiden onder b, c, d, h, en i voldaan. Toegevoegd wordt nog dat wordt aangenomen dat Shell bij machte is om, tegen vergoeding door Milieudefensie c.s. van in redelijkheid te maken kosten, uitvoering te geven aan de hier bedoelde toewijzing.

afrondend

De over en weer aangevoerde grieven zijn met het voorgaande voldoende besproken. Zij kunnen in dit stadium niet tot een ander resultaat leiden.

De beslissing over de kosten in de incidenten wordt aangehouden tot de einduitspraak in de hoofdzaken.

Voor het openstellen van tussentijdse cassatieberoep, zoals door Shell verzocht, bestaat onvoldoende aanleiding.

conclusie

7. De conclusie is: (i) dat de Nederlandse rechter internationaal bevoegd is om kennis te nemen van de vorderingen tegen zowel de moedervennootschap als de Nigeriaanse (klein)dochtervennootschap SPDC, zowel in het incident ex art. 843a Rv als in de hoofdzaken; (ii) dat Milieudefensie ontvankelijk is in de door haar bij wijze van collectieve actie ingestelde vorderingen; (iii) dat vooralsnog kan worden uitgegaan van de vorderingsgerechtigdheid van Oguru en Efanga; (iv) dat Milieudefensie c.s. een rechtmatig belang heeft bij inzage van een aantal van de door haar genoemde bescheiden, doch (v) dat met het oog op de belangen van Shell voorwaarden worden verbonden aan de wijze waarop deze inzage kan plaatsvinden.

De beslissing

Het Hof, alvorens verder te beslissen:

in het bevoegdheidsincident in het incident betreffende de vordering ex art. 843a Rv - zaak b (200.126.834):

- verklaart de Nederlandse rechter internationaal bevoegd tot kennisneming van de vordering ex art. 843a Rv;

in het incident betreffende de vordering ex art. 843a Rv in beide zaken:

- vernietigt het tussen partijen in het incident ex art. 843a Rv gewezen tussenvonnis van 14 september 2011,

en opnieuw rechtdoende op de vordering ex art. 843a Rv:

- veroordeelt Shell om binnen acht weken na heden aan Milieudefensie c.s. inzage te verschaffen in de hiervoor in rechtsoverweging 5.10 ad b, c, d, h en i nader omschreven bescheiden;

- bepaalt dat inzage dient te worden verschaft door de hiervoor bedoelde bescheiden

op kosten van Milieudefensie c.s. ter inzage te leggen bij een door partijen in onderling overleg (en bij gebreke van overeenstemming op verzoek van de advocaten van partijen door het Hof) aan te wijzen notaris(kantoor), met bepaling dat alleen de advocaten van partijen, eventuele gerechtsdeskundigen en de leden van de kamer van dit Hof die deze zaken behandelen er kennis van mogen nemen;

- verwerpt de door Shell tegen de aldus gelaste toewijzing gevoerde verweren;

- bepaalt dat, indien zich problemen voordoen bij de uitvoering van bovenstaande veroordeling, de advocaten van partijen deze voor nadere beslissing kunnen voorleggen aan het Hof;

- verklaart dit arrest ten aanzien van bovenstaande veroordeling uitvoerbaar bij voorraad;

in de incidenten in beide zaken voorts:

- reserveert de kosten tot de einduitspraak in de hoofdzaken;

in beide hoofdzaken:

- verwijst de zaak naar de rol van 22 maart 2016 voor het indienen door Milieudefensie c.s. van een memorie van grieven fase 2.

Aldus gewezen door mrs. J.M. van der Klooster, S.A. Boele en S.J. Schaafsma en uitgesproken ter openbare terechtzitting van 18 december 2015 in aanwezigheid van de griffier.