Partijen en gegevens

— Reaffirm their deep conviction that the Treaty — for the speedy conclusion of which all possible efforts have for years been made by the Italian Government — represents a milestone on the way to disarmament, to international détente and peace and is a fundamental contribution to the establishment of a new international society based upon the security of nations and the progress of mankind.

— Deem it important to underline their conviction that the principles, stated in the clauses of the Treaty's preface and regarding the signatories' commitment, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, to refrain, in their international relations, from threatening to use or from using force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any other country, are an essential condition to the Treaty itself and that their thorough and general observance will be in the supreme interest of all those concerned.

— Consider the Treaty not as a point of arrival, but only as a starting point for those negotiations on disarmament, on peaceful use of nuclear power and the benefits deriving therefrom which are contemplated by the Treaty for its natural completion and its effective enforcement.

— Sign the Treaty in the conviction that nothing in it is of hindrance to the aspirations of the Western European countries to unification and to the rightful expectations of the peoples of this area in the development and progress of the unification process, in view of the establishment of a European entity.

— Express the belief that the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are compatible with the rules of the EURATOM Treaty of Rome.

— Take note of the full compatibility of the Treaty with existing security commitments.

— Take note that the Treaty is in no way an obstacle to the essential need for freedom in scientific and technological research.

— Take note that the bans mentioned in article I and II of the Treaty — also in consideration of the general spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty — only refer to those nuclear explosive devices which are not different from nuclear armaments, and that, therefore, should technological progress eventually enable the development of peaceful nuclear devices different from nuclear weapons, the bans on their manufacture and use will no longer apply.

— Trust, with reference to the provisions of art. III, Paragraph 4, of the Treaty, that the agreements on the matter of controls therein contained will be concluded between IAEA and EURATOM on the basis of the concept of verification. Whilst awaiting the conclusion of the Agreement between EURATOM and IAEA, existing agreements on supplies between EURATOM and signatory Governments of the Treaty will remain in force.

— Take note that according to the letter and spirit of the Treaty the controls referred to in art. III of the Treaty itself are intended to apply to ‘source material’ and to ‘special fissile material’ only, and believe that the meaning of the words ‘source material’ and ‘special fissile material’ used in the Treaty should be interpreted — with the exception of amendments explicitly accepted by Italy — in accordance with the definition in the present text of art. XX of the IAEA Charter.

— Interpret the provisions of article IX, Paragraph 3 of the Treaty, concerning the definition of a militarily nuclear State, in the sense that it refers exclusively to the five countries who have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to the 11th of January, 1967. Under no circumstance, a claim of pertaining to such category will be recognised by the Italian Government to any other State, whether sign atory or non signatory of the Treaty.

— Declare as of now, in the event that Governments of States at present members of Unions of States should sign or ratify the Treaty in addition to the Government of the Union itself, that they will be unable to recognise juridical validity to such signature and ratification, as such Governments are already covered by the signature and ratification of the Government of the Union.

The Government of Japan hopes that as many states as possible, whether possessing a nuclear explosive capability or not, will become parties to this treaty in order to make it truly effective. In particular, it strongly hopes that the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China, which possess nuclear weapons but are not parties to this treaty, will accede thereto.

The Government of Japan urges the nuclear-weapon states, which have special responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, to take concrete nuclear disarmament measures such as the reduction of nuclear arms and the realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, in accordance with Article VI of this treaty. It urges the nuclear-weapon states not party to this treaty also to take nuclear disarmament measures.

The Government of Japan takes particular note of the declarations in June 1968 of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the security of non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as of Security Council Resolution 255 (1968), and hopes that the nuclear-weapon states will make further efforts towards effective measures for the security of non-nuclear-weapon states. It further urges all states, both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, to refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or use of force in their international relations involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.

The Government of Japan is convinced that, for the well-being of all mankind, international cooperation with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be vigorously promoted in accordance with the provisions of this treaty. It considers that peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty should in no way be hampered by this treaty and also that Japan should not be discriminated against in favor of other states party to the treaty in any aspect of such activities.

The Government of Japan appreciates the declarations of the United Kingdom and the United States, both nuclear-weapon states, that they will accept the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to their peaceful nuclear activities. It urges the other nuclear-weapon states to take similar action.

The Government of Japan hopes that review conferences, as provided for in this treaty, will continue to be held at regular intervals in order to ensure the appropriate operation of this treaty.

The Government of Indonesia has decided to deposit today the Instrument of Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In signing the Treaty on 2 March 1970 the Government of Indonesia stated that it would ratify the same only after all aspects of national security of military, economic and social natures have been duly considered.

Indonesia today is actively carrying out its national development. With a view to supporting and accelerating the development process, including the economic and social development, Indonesia has decided from the outset to make use of the nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Indonesia's efforts in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in its national development, require the assistance and cooperation of technologically advanced nuclear countries. With the ratification of this Treaty, the Government of Indonesia wishes to draw the attention of the nuclear countries to their obligations under Article IV of the Treaty and expresses the hope that they would be prepared to cooperate with non-nuclear countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and implement the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty for the benefit of developing countries without discrimination.

If, on the one hand, States Parties to the Treaty which are not in possession of nuclear weapons, have, under Article II of the Treaty, the obligation not to receive, possess or manufacture nuclear weapons, Indonesia holds, on the other hand, the view that nuclear weapons states should equally observe the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty relating to the cessation of nuclear arms race.

By depositing this Instrument of Ratification Indonesia is confident that in becoming Party to the Treaty it would contribute to the efforts made by the international community in the strengthening of international peace and security. ’

Pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace, China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. With a view to bringing about this objective and maintaining international peace, security and stability, and taking into consideration the aspirations and demands of the large numbers of non-nuclear-weapon countries, China has decided to accede to the Treaty.

China pursues a policy of not advocating, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nor helping other countries to develop nuclear weapons. China supports the objectives set forth in the Treaty, namely, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, acceleration of nuclear disarmament and promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and believes that these three objectives are interrelated.

China maintains that the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself, but a measure and step in the process towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament should be mutually complementary. Only when substantial progress is made in the field of nuclear disarmament can the proliferation of nuclear weapons be checked most effectively and the authority of the nuclear non-proliferation regime truly enhanced. At the same time, an effective nuclear non-proliferation regime is conducive to the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. To attain the lofty goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should earnestly fulfill their special obligations by taking the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and drastically reducing those weapons of all kinds they have deployed inside and outside their countries. Tangible progress they make in all these aspects will create conditions for the convening of a widely representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon states.

China maintains that in order to improve and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and help attain the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the following specific measures should also be taken:

The signing and ratification of the Treaty by the Taiwan authorities in the name of China on 1 July 1968 and 27 January 1970 respectively are illegal and null and void.

The provisions of the Treaty do not encompass fully the unique situation that has arisen as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a nuclear weapons state.

Ukraine possesses weapons that it inherited from the former USSR. Following the dismantlement and destruction of those weapons under the supervision of Ukraine and in accordance with procedures which exclude the possibility of the reuse of the nuclear materials which are components of such weapons for their original purpose. Ukraine intends to use the above materials exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The presence in the territory of Ukraine of nuclear weapons prior to their complete destruction and also any corresponding work relation to their maintenance, servicing and destruction shall not contravene the provisions of Articles I and II of the Treaty.

The threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine or its political independence by any nuclear weapons state, or the application of economic coercion aimed at subordinating the exercise by Ukraine of rights inherent in its sovereignty to the interests of that state, shall be deemed by Ukraine as the only circumstances where its supreme interests have been jeopardised.

The instruments relating to Ukraine's accession to the Treaty shall be communicated to the depositary states of the Treaty following their entry into force under this Law.

This Law shall enter into force after the nuclear weapons states have granted Ukraine security guarantees confirmed by the signing of the relevant international legal Instrument. ’

The invention of the nuclear weapon spelled a nightmare on this planet. Today the entire humanity and everything on this earth sit on a worldwide minefield of nuclear weapons that can detonate any time to incinerate and extinguish all forms of life. This is indeed of concern to every nation, man, woman and child.

The first serious step to restrict manufacture of these weapons was taken in 1963 by a treaty, the Martial Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited the testing of such weapons in the atmosphere, in water and in outer space. Unfortunately agreement was not reached to ban such testing underground. Nevertheless it was a big step in the right direction, as the hope was that the next step, at the earliest opportunity, would be to ban underground testing. Many countries welcomed and signed that treaty, Tanzania among them.

Five years later another treaty on nuclea r arms was concluded but to our disappointment that treaty did not address the question of underground testing. Instead it only sought to prevent the spread of weapons to those who did not have them. The Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty of 1968 not only avoided the issue of underground testing but said little about the existing nuclear weapons or their improvement. Few countries, if any among the targeted countries had the economy to finance the production of such weapons even if they had the know-how and will. The treaty therefore delt with a problem that was peripheral if not non-existent. It not only served to divert attention from the real problems but also sought to inject a sense of complacency which clearly contrasted with the realities. By not prohibiting underground testing NPT did, in a sense, condone it.

Todate, more than 20 years later, underground testing continues unabated and now the build up of nuclear weapons will require to more planets like this to use up.

Tanzania has also several other misgivings towards certain provisions of the treaty, as the records will show, and for all these reasons we opposed the treaty and did not sign it. In doing so we were showing our impatience at the slow pace of nuclear disarmament and were calling for more serious and urgent steps on the well acknowledged problem.

For the last 20 or so years we have maintained that position. At the same time we have untiringly worked for disarmament, nuclear as well as non nuclear, as our records bear testimony.

In those same years we have received a lot of representations to persuade us to become party to that treaty. These representations have given us opportunity to express with all vigour our views on the subject and we hope they have been well taken.

Of late the political atmosphere which fanned the nuclear arms race has drastically changed, thanks to the rapprochement between the two super powers. There is also an encouraging indication that disarmament, especially nuclear will be accorded the urgent attention it requires.

Now we have reviewed the matter taking into account these developments and have come to the conclusion that continued debate on the pros and cons of NPT only serves to further divert attention from the otherwise obvious peril facing us.

To cut short this discussion between us and the advocates of NPT we have decided to accede to that treaty. We do so therefore, first, in the hope that our attention will be directed and dedicated to facing seriously the more real issues of vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and existing stockpiles.

We do so, secondly, in the hope that those concerned will take it up as a challenge to them to play their part more seriously in fulfilling those obligations and undertakings under the treaty which concern them.

We do so, thirdly, to reconfirm our opposition to the possession of these weapons by any State whether already nuclear or non nuclear weapon state.

We look forward to making concerted efforts with all concerned to deal earnestly with these spectral objects to rid our planet, our only home, ourselves, our children and future generations of the threat of total obliteration. ’