59 Information duties

Rules which might be said to promote market efficiency (at least when compared to some more traditional approaches) are those on information duties in Book II.1. There is a public value in better-informed decision making across the board. Interferences with freedom of contract may be justified on the ground that they can serve to promote economic welfare if there is reason to think that because of some market failure (such as that caused by inequality of information) the agreement is less than fully efficient. Consumer protection rules, for example, can be seen not only as protective for the benefit of typically weaker parties but also as favourable to general welfare because they may lead to more competition and thus to a better functioning of markets. This holds true in particular for information duties, where consumers' lack of information about either the characteristics of the goods sold or the terms being offered leads to forms of market failure. Rules that, in relation to the making of a contract of a particular type or in a particular situation, require one party (typically a business) to provide the other (typically a consumer) with specified information about its nature, terms and effect, where such information is needed for a well-informed decision and is not otherwise readily available to that other party, can be justified as promoting efficiency in the relevant market. Indeed a legislator should consider whether this is the justification for the proposed intervention, or whether it is based on a protective notion that consumers simply should have the right in question. The answer to that question may influence the choice of the extent and form of intervention.