EHRM, 21-07-2011, nr. 32181/04, nr. 35122/05

‘Sigma TV’ broadcast a report in a news bulletin concerning the arrest of a teacher for photographing naked minors. The CRTA found a violation of Regulations 21(3), 24(1)(a) and paragraph 10 of Part II of appendix VIII of the Regulations in that insufficient measures had been taken to conceal the suspect's identity, the information given concerning the reasons for the suspect's arrest had not been accurate and certain statements which had been made during the report ran contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence.

‘Sigma TV’ broadcast a news bulletin that included a report on the drug problem of a Cypriot family. The CRTA noted that the report included scenes which were taken possibly from a film or documentary and illustrated in detail the procedure of preparing and consuming drugs. The CRTA considered that the images shown had not been suitable for transmission during the ‘family zone’ (see definition in paragraph 88 below) and had possibly been dangerous for minors. It found a violation of Regulations 21(6), 24(1)(a) and 24(2)(d) as the applicant had not ensured that the material shown was suitable for minors, had not prepared and aired the particular news report with accuracy and had not issued a visual and/or verbal warning for viewers. The CRTA drew attention to the fact that minors tended to imitate acts out of curiosity and an inclination to experiment. It stressed that it was its duty to take due steps to protect minors from programmes that could cause them any mental or physical harm. In its submissions before the CRTA the applicant claimed that the purpose of the images had been to accompany the news story with visual material.

In one of its news bulletins ‘Sigma TV’ aired a news report concerning two murders. The CRTA noted that the report contained close-ups of the dead body of the victim covered in blood and of the grieving relatives. Furthermore, no visual or verbal warning had been given to viewers. It found a violation of Regulations 24(2)(a)—(d) and of paragraph 6 of part II of appendix VIII of the Regulations.

‘Sigma TV’ broadcast a report in a news bulletin about the transfer to court of three young men suspected of drug use. The CRTA considered that the news story had lacked objectivity, impartiality, accuracy and pluralism, in violation of Regulation 24(1)(a). It noted in this regard that although the allegations made over the phone by the mother of one of the accused as to the effectiveness of the relevant institutions and the attitude of the competent medical authorities towards drug addicts had been transmitted, the institutions and medical authorities concerned had not been given the opportunity to express their views. In this connection, the applicant had argued, inter alia, that the issues in question concerned society and that the report should have been evaluated on the basis of the data and information the station had had at its disposal. The applicant further admitted that it did not have a delay unit allowing live telephone conversations to be interrupted when something unsuitable was said.

In addition, the CRTA found that the news report had gone beyond the scope of information as comments, conclusions and information concerning private matters of the suspects had been broadcast, without the appropriate sensitivity towards human pain or respect for the suspects' personality, honour, reputation and private lives, in violation of Regulation 21(3) and paragraph 8(2), of part I of appendix VIII of the Regulations. The CRTA did not accept the station's allegations that the suspects had turned towards the cameras seeking help, as certain shots showed the suspects covering up their faces and making every effort to avoid the cameras. Even if the suspects had chosen to publicise their problem, the CRTA considered that the applicant should have taken into account that they had not been fully aware of their actions and had been in despair, vulnerable and under the influence of strong substances. In addition, the CRTA noted that the disclosure of the identity of the persons involved, their media exposure as well as the extensive coverage of their private lives, could stigmatise them in a society such as that of Cyprus. In the CRTA's view the promulgation of the drug problem could have been accomplished without revealing the suspects' identity and without disclosing information about their private lives.

The CRTA found that during a news bulletin broadcast on ‘Sigma TV’ the name of the victim of a car accident had been mentioned before it had been ascertained whether the victim's parents had been informed, in violation of Regulation 24(3). The applicant submitted before the CRTA that it was standard practice to obtain confirmation by the police and this case had not been an exception.

The CRTA held that an interview aired during a news bulletin on ‘Sigma TV’, with a female witness for the prosecution in pending criminal proceedings, advocating the innocence of a man under criminal charges, had lacked accuracy, objectivity, impartiality and pluralism. It was noted that although the interviewee had testified against the suspect in court, in the interview she had given information that pointed to the suspect's innocence.

The CRTA held that the manner in which the interview had been presented essentially exonerated the defendant in the proceedings. The CRTA found that the broadcasting of such information violated paragraph 10 of part II of appendix VIII of the Regulations. Further, the CRTA pointed out that during the interview the interviewee had claimed that the investigating authorities had used her to put pressure on the arrested man to give them information. However, the views of authorities involved had not been stated, in violation of Regulation 24(1)(a), and no mention had been made in the interview of any attempts by the applicant to secure them.

In another news bulletin ‘Sigma TV’ broadcast a news report concerning a car accident, as well as a trailer for the report. The CRTA considered that the report contained an inappropriate and unnecessary description of the circumstances of the accident. In particular the CRTA held that the applicant had not shown due respect for the personality, honour, reputation and privacy of the female driver of the car involved in the accident as it had overstepped the bounds of information and transmitted unnecessary details, comments and conclusions about the accident, in violation of Regulation 21(3). In addition, the CRTA found that remarks had been made in the news report that were an insult to the personality, the reputation and the privacy of the driver, in violation of section 26(1)(e) of the Law, and that a clear distinction had not been drawn between fact, comment and speculation, in violation of paragraph 1(2) of part II of appendix VIII of the Regulations. In respect of the above, the CRTA, noted inter alia, that it had been stated in the news report that a young lady had been found injured and half-naked in the driver's seat wearing only underwear on the lower part of her body, that eye-witnesses had claimed that they had seen two young men, fleeing from the accident scene and heading towards the fields and that two doors of the young woman's car, and more specifically the front passenger door and the rear door, were open. The CRTA further pointed out that the information given in the report, which included video footage of the cars involved in the accident and reference to the place and time the accident occurred, had been sufficient to enable recognition, in particular, of the identity of the female driver. In its submissions before the CRTA, the applicant claimed that there was only a slender possibility of recognising the persons involved. In reaching its decision, the CRTA also took into account the unpleasant consequences the report had had on the driver's personal, family and social life, and that the persons involved in the case had not been public figures or public officials and the publication of information concerning their private lives had not served the public interest.

The CRTA found in a number of cases that the applicant had breached the provisions of the Law and/or the Regulations by broadcasting on ‘Sigma TV’, within or partly within family viewing hours, certain films and series and trailers thereof which included scenes of violence unsuitable for children. The CRTA held that the scenes in question were likely to impair the physical, mental or moral development of minors, in violation of Regulation 32(3)(a). In one of the cases the CRTA found that the film in question contained scenes of humiliation and cruel treatment, in violation of regulation 32(2) (a rape scene). Furthermore, the CRTA found in these cases either that the viewers had not been informed of the true content of the programmes as the acoustic and visual warnings given did not correspond to their content, in violation of Regulation 21(5) and (b), with a rating of ‘15’ and ‘18’ had been shown during the family zone, in violation of Regulation 22(2) (see paragraph 90 below). The CRTA held that the applicant had not ensured that programmes transmitted during the family zone had been suitable for all ages, in violation of Regulation 21(6).

The applicant admitted the violations in two of the cases.

In its decisions concerning cases nos. 125/2001(3), 133/2001(3), 143/2001(3) and 5/2002(3) the CRTA noted, inter alia, that the content of all broadcasts during the family zone had to be suitable for the whole family. It stressed that the protection of minors was the primary concern of everyone, including the European Community and the Council of Europe, and that the Cypriot legislator had set limitations as to the content of programmes which could be transmitted for family viewing in order to protect children from programmes that were unsuitable for them because they contained violent or erotic scenes, or verbal material or subject matter unsuitable for minors. The CRTA pointed out that it attached great weight to the above matters and to compliance with the relevant legal provisions.

In case no. 117/2000(3), following a complaint, the CRTA found, in respect of an episode of an entertainment series, ‘Prison Bars’ (‘Tis Filakis ta Sidera’) produced and broadcast by ‘Sigma TV’,

The CRTA noted that in the episode in question it had been stated in the context of a dialogue between characters of the series, inter alia, that ‘according to recent excavations in Paphos, it was probable that the town had a lot of brothels, not for the locals, of course, but for foreigners’, ‘during the 50's, 60's and part of the 70's most of the whores were from the town of Paphos’, ‘in the old times, in Limassol it was all Arabs, phoenicians, houllou, ya habibi, all of them. Most of them were darker than chocolate and some of them were very snobbish’, ‘the town of Paphos was a whores' town, with thousands of whores. All of them Greek (‘καλαμαροὺδες’), which we imported then, like we import Russian women nowadays’. The CRTA noted that following the broadcast of the episode a Paphos newspaper had criticised the series as being crudely offensive to people from Paphos and completely unacceptable. The repeated violations by the applicant in other episodes of the same series were taken into account when imposing the fine.

In case no. 1/2001(12) the CRTA found that ‘Radio Proto’ had broadcast a programme containing inappropriate language unsuitable for minors. More specifically, it noted that the presenters had used sexually explicit Greek slang. The CRTA found that the programme contained remarks that did not comply with the generally accepted rules of decency and good taste in language and behaviour, in violation of Regulation 21(4) and that the applicant had failed, in violation of Regulation 21(6), to ensure that the programme, transmitted during family listening hours, was suitable for children.

In cases nos. 10/2001(3) and 11(2001)(3) the CRTA found that during the family zone ‘Sigma TV’ had broadcast and shown a repeat of a ‘social documentary’ concerning the drug problem in Cyprus, as well as a trailer for the programme, containing visual and audio material unsuitable for children under the age of fifteen, in violation of Regulation 21(6), and which could seriously impair the physical mental or moral development of minors, in violation of Regulation 32(3)(a). In particular, the programme included scenes showing, inter alia, the consumption and trading of illegal drugs and statements made by drug addicts concerning the consumption of drugs. Moreover, the CRTA held that the trailer for the documentary contained visual and audio material that might offend the sensitivity of viewers, in violation of Regulation 24(2)(d). It further found that the visual and acoustic warning that had been given did not correspond to the actual content of the trailer and documentary, in violation of Regulations 21 (5) and 22, and that information transmitted about one of the drug addicts had not shown the appropriate sensitivity towards human suffering, in violation of paragraph 8(2) of part I of appendix VIII of the Regulations.

The CRTA also noted that the personal information concerning the drug addicts in the documentary had been broadcast without due respect for their personality, honour, reputation and private lives, in violation of Regulation 21(3). For example, the identity of a caller, a light drug user, had been displayed on screen, despite his wish to remain anonymous. The CRTA considered that the drug addicts who had participated in the programme did not appear to have been fully aware of their actions, and that their free consent and decision should therefore not have been taken into full account because they had been in a state of despair, vulnerable and under the influence of strong substances that had affected their judgment. In any event, the disclosure of their identity, the media exposure and the extensive coverage of their private lives was likely to have numerous negative consequences for them. The CRTA stated that it was also concerned about the personalisation of the drug problem through the disclosure of the identity of certain drug addicts, as this might lead to their becoming role models or even ‘heroes’ for vulnerable people who would like to identify with them. According to the CRTA the documentary had also lacked objectivity and pluralism, as criticisms and negative comments had been made against the medical authorities, the police drug squad, the Minister of Health and the Director of a Psychiatric Clinic, without them having been given the opportunity to present their position on the matter, in violation of section 26(2) of the Law.

The applicant argued before the CRTA that the social content of the documentary was of interest to families. It admitted that a mistake had been made with regard to the disclosure of the identity of one of the callers in question and informed the CRTA that measures had been taken to restore the name and honour of a nurse in respect of whom allegations had been made in the programme.

In case no. 60/2001(3) the CRTA found that a ‘social documentary’ broadcast by ‘Sigma TV’ had not been characterised by objectivity and pluralism, as opinions and allegations had been voiced against doctors and officials working in an institution that had a bone marrow bank, without a complete picture or opposing views being presented, in violation of section 26(2) of the Law. The CRTA considered that the discussion, the direction it had taken and the manner in which it had developed indicated that it had been orchestrated to favour the views of the presenter and, more broadly, the station's views on the issues raised, to the disadvantage of participants with opposing views.

The applicant alleged that he had been denied a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. In this connection he complained about

First, the applicant considered that due to its multiplicity of functions in prosecuting, investigating, trying and deciding, the CRTA did not fulfil the requirements of independence and impartiality set out in Article 6: the CRTA could initiate an investigation not only upon complaint but also ex proprio motu; the investigation was carried out by an investigating officer who was an employee of the CRTA; the CRTA then played the part of the prosecution, and its members determined the violation of the legislation; and lastly, the fine which was imposed was paid into its own Fund from which, inter alia, the salaries of its staff and the remuneration of its members were paid. In support of its assertions the applicant pointed to sections 38(1)(d) and 38(2)(a) of the Law. It was the applicant's submission, therefore, that the CRTA's staff and members had a direct and personal interest in the imposition of fines. The applicant also claimed that the income generated by fines formed a substantial part of the annual budget of the CRTA, and that the continuing operation of the CRTA was therefore dependent upon that income. The applicant relied on figures given in press releases issued by the CRTA concerning fines imposed during the first six months of 2006. There were no figures available for the fines imposed during the rest of that year or for the period in which the CRTA had issued decisions against and imposed fines on the applicant.

It was the applicant's submission that the review carried out by the domestic courts had not remedied the defects of the proceedings before the CRTA to such a degree as to justify a finding that the proceedings as a whole had been in conformity with Article 6. The domestic courts did not have ‘full jurisdiction’ to consider its claims and did not provide the fairness guarantees required under Article 6 § 1.

With regard to the judicial review proceedings, the applicant emphasised that the Supreme Court, in its judicial review capacity, could only determine the legality of the administrative decisions in question and could not look into their merits, hear evidence or decide on matters afresh. The applicant submitted that the Supreme Court did not and was not able to examine the facts of the case, whether the CRTA had made correct or adequate findings of fact and whether it had adequately reasoned its decisions.

The applicant also stressed that the Supreme Court could not decide upon the necessity of the imposition of the fines by the CRTA and the amounts of the fines on the basis of proportionality; it was the applicant's submission that this had been the essence of its cases. The applicant relied on the dissenting opinion given by two of the Supreme Court judges in the joint recourses to support his arguments that the Supreme Court could not consider issues pertaining to the fines.

In view of the above, the applicant claimed that, as in the case of Tsfayo v. the United Kingdom (no. 60860/00, 14 November 2006), the Supreme Court could not be said to have examined the crux of its case, and that it had not had the benefit of a full review. In support of its arguments the applicant also relied on the cases, inter alia, of Albert and Le Compte, cited above; Belilos v. Switzerland, 29 April 1988, Series A no. 132; and Gradinger v. Austria, 23 October 1995, Series A no. 328-C.

The applicant also maintained that the Supreme Court had not been impartial in the judicial review proceedings, as one of the judges who had sat on the full bench, had given judgment, at first instance, in another recourse brought by the applicant raising the same and/or similar questions15.. The applicant noted that it had unsuccessfully raised this issue with the Supreme Court in its application of 10 February 2004. In its observations of 30 July 2007 the applicant extended this complaint to another three judges on the same grounds16.. All the first-instance judgments referred to by the applicant had been given before the Supreme Court's judgment of 24 February 2004 was delivered17.. The applicant argued that as these judges had already issued judgments rejecting identical and/or similar arguments put forward by the applicant in other cases, they had the same preconceived opinions on how to decide the recourses, and could reasonably be expected not to rule against their initial decisions. As a result the whole bench had been tainted.

Finally, with regard to the civil proceedings, the applicant claimed that the civil courts had also not examined the merits of its claims as they had decided that the decisions of the CRTA could not be examined in the context of the civil proceedings.

The Government argued that the present case differed from the Tsfayo case. The CRTA did not act as a reviewing body in respect of decisions taken by other administrative bodies but was an independent body set up by Law 7(I)/1998 with the purpose of giving effect to its provisions concerning the standards and principles to be adhered to in the public interest by television and radio stations. Unlike in Tsfayo, the applicant had not submitted any evidence showing a lack of impartiality on the part of the CRTA. In this connection, the Government submitted that the applicant's arguments concerning the alleged financial interest of the CRTA in imposing fines were flawed. They noted that the members of the CRTA, including the President and Vice President, did not receive a fixed salary and were not engaged on a full time basis. All the members received an amount as compensation for attending meetings, plus travel expenses. This was the usual practice in Cyprus with members of public benefit bodies and organisations. In addition the President of the CRTA received an additional annual amount as compensation and/or reimbursement for attendance costs.

Furthermore, the Government pointed out that the CRTA, being a licensing authority, received various fees, including, annual licence fees, an annual fee of 5% on the proceeds received by stations from advertising, as well as fees for the examination, issuing, renewal and amendment of licences. The sums received went into a separate fund and could be used by the CRTA to pay its operational costs. The Government referred to sections 24 and 38 of the Law and Regulation 5. It could not therefore be said that the CRTA was dependent on administrative fines to cover its operating costs, including salaries and compensation paid for attending meetings. The Government considered that the figures the applicant relied on concerning fines, licence fees and operational costs were irrelevant as they concerned a different period in time.

Notwithstanding, the Government argued that even if the Court considered that the proceedings before the CRTA did not comply with Article 6 of the Convention, they had been challenged before the Supreme Court, which had sufficient jurisdiction to ensure that the process as a whole complied with the guarantees of that provision. In this regard the Government submitted that the general principles of administrative law developed in civil law jurisdictions by, for example, the French Conseil d'Etat, the Greek Council of State and the German constitutional and administrative courts, were applicable to judicial review proceedings under Article 146, and that the grounds of invalidity set out in that provision were broadly interpreted. For example, the Supreme Court would declare a decision to be null and void, where, inter alia, it lacked adequate reasoning, where it was based on a misconception of the facts or a mistake of law, or where there had been a breach of natural justice or a breach of the principle of proportionality. A misconception of the facts would be found to exist in a number of situations, including where the administration had failed to take into account material facts or had taken irrelevant facts into consideration. In support of its submissions the Government relied on a number of Supreme Court judgments (Yiallourides v. the Republic (1969) 3 CLR 379); Kontos v. the Republic (1974) 3 CLR 112; Constantinou v. the Republic (1966) 3 CLR 793; Christides v. the Republic (1966) 3 CLR 732; Hadjisavva v. the Republic (1972) 3 CLR 174; Meletiou v. the Republic (1969) 3 CLR 578; Thalassinos v. the Republic (1974) 3 CLR 290).

Unlike the applicant in the Tsfayo case, in the present case, the applicant had not alleged or shown that its recourses raised a core issue which was not and could not be determined by the Supreme Court. On the contrary, the Government emphasised, that all the main legal issues raised by the applicant had been fully examined, including the issues as to constitutionality, the interpretation of the applicable Law, the rules of natural justice, and the lack of a proper enquiry and adequate reasoning. That the Supreme Court had made detailed reference to one particular case was due to the fact that the parties, having agreed with the court, put forward their arguments with reference to that case. Despite that, it was evident from the Supreme Court's judgment that specific grounds of annulment, such as lack of due enquiry and reasoning, were examined by the Supreme Court in relation to each case.

The Government further submitted that the applicant had not alleged in its recourses that the decisions of the CRTA had been based on findings of fact that had been wrong or that the CRTA had relied on any specific facts that had been wrong. The arguments put forward by the applicant in its attempt to show that the Supreme Court lacked full jurisdiction did not concern facts or the credibility of evidence before the CRTA but rather the conclusions of the CRTA as to, for example, whether a particular broadcast was unsuitable for children or did not respect the private life or reputation of others. The Government also pointed out that the applicant had not raised in its recourses before the Supreme Court as a ground for annulment of the CRTA's decisions issues pertaining to the necessity of the imposition of the fines or their proportionality. In this respect they submitted that the applicant's claim that the Supreme Court could not examine such arguments in its judicial review capacity was unfounded. The Government relied on a number of judgments of the Supreme Court, mainly concerning the imposition of fines by the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (‘CySec’), in which the court examined allegations concerning, inter alia, the amount and proportionality of the fines and the reasoning justifying their imposition (Cyprus Stock Exchange v. Lordos Hotels (Holdings) Ltd, revisional appeal no. 3623, judgment of 26 January 2004, (2004) 3 CLR 48; Sharelink Securities Ltd v. CySec, recourse no. 641/2002, judgment of 30 April 2004; AAA United Stockbrokers Ltd v. CySec, recourse no. 642/2002, judgment of 5 August 2003; Costas Kirkos v. CySec, recourse no. 194/2005, judgment of 20 September 2006; CySec v. Exelixi Ependitiki Ltd, revisional appeal no. 3721, judgment of 2 June 2006, (2006) 3 CLR 310).

Moreover, referring to two Supreme Court judgments, the Government highlighted that it was possible to bring a separate recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution against an administrative decision imposing a fine (Michalakis Ioannides v. CySec, recourse no. 729/2003, judgment of 22 February 2005; Elma Holdings Ltd v. CySec, recourse no. 728/2003, judgment of 14 July 2005). The Government also pointed out that the applicant had chosen not to make oral or written submissions in a number of the cases against it, including submissions on the imposition of the fines.

Relying on the case of Bryan v. the United Kingdom (22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-A), the Government submitted that although the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to substitute its own views for those of the administration, such an approach on questions of fact by an administrative law tribunal was common in relation to appeals against administrative decisions in the Council of Europe Member States and could be reasonably expected, particularly where the facts had already been established in the course of a quasi judicial procedure governed by many of the safeguards of Article 6 and the issues required a measure of professional knowledge or experience, and exercise of administrative discretion pursuant to wide policy aims.

With regard to the impartiality issue, the Government submitted that the applicant had raised an objection before the Supreme Court only in respect of one of the judges and not in relation to any of the other members of the bench. The Supreme Court had therefore never decided on the matter.

Consequently, the Government argued that to the extent the applicant complained about these other judges, it had not exhausted domestic remedies.

Furthermore, the Government considered that the applicant's claims as to the impartiality of the judge in question were groundless. In the Government's view there was no merit in the argument that a judge was not impartial or might taint a bench because he had given judgment in another case in which the parties and some of the legal grounds had been the same.

According to the domestic court's case-law, pronouncement on a legal issue should not disqualify a judge from entertaining the same legal question in a subsequent case, whether between the same parties or other parties. A judge's role was to solve legal and factual points that arose in each case on the basis of the Constitution and the law. A previous decision or opinion by a judge on a specific matter did not necessarily prejudge his or her opinion on constitutional and legal issues. This was applicable to the present case, the consideration and outcome of which depended on the particular facts of each case, the investigation that had been carried out by the CRTA, the procedure and the reasoning given in each decision. In this regard the Government noted that the applicant had been successful in two of the recourses.

The Government accordingly concluded that the Supreme Court, in its judicial review capacity, had had ‘full jurisdiction’ in respect of the applicant's complaints and that these had been determined by an independent and impartial tribunal which provided the guarantees of Article 6.

Finally, with regard to the applicant's complaints as to the scope of jurisdiction of the civil courts, the Government, referring to their submissions concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see paragraph 112 above), underlined that the civil courts did not have jurisdiction to examine allegations that had been made by the applicant, in the context of its defence, which were directed against the legality of the CRTA's decisions.

The Court observes that the applicant's grievance as to the proceedings before the CRTA concentrated on its dissatisfaction with that body and, in particular, the multiplicity of its functions in prosecuting, investigating, trying and deciding cases and imposing sanctions. In addition, the applicant complained that the members and staff of the CRTA had a direct and personal interest in imposing fines as the amounts thus collected were deposited in the CRTA's Fund from which their salaries and/or remuneration were paid. However, no allegation of personal bias on the part of specific members or staff of the CRTA was made.

The applicant's complaint is therefore directed at the CRTA's ‘structural impartiality’ and raises, as such, questions of objective impartiality rather than problems of actual bias or independence. In fact, the Court has not found any evidence to suggest any irregularities in these respects.

The Court notes the presence of a number of procedural guarantees in the proceedings before the CRTA. For example, the station in question is provided with details of the probable violation or the complaint made against it and is given the opportunity to make written and/or oral submissions during the hearing of the case (Regulation 42). Such submissions may also be made with regard to the imposition of a fine (see paragraph 9 above). Further, the CRTA is required to give a reasoned decision (Regulation 42).

Despite the existence of these safeguards, the combination of different functions of the CRTA and, in particular, the fact that all fines are deposited in its own fund for its own use, gives rise, in the Court's view, to legitimate concerns that the CRTA lacks the necessary structural impartiality to comply with the requirements of Article 6.

Nonetheless, the Court reiterates that even where an adjudicatory body, including an administrative one as in the present case, which determines disputes over ‘civil rights and obligations’ does not comply with Article 6 § 1 in some respect, no violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body are ‘subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has ‘full’ jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 (see Albert and Le Compte, cited above, § 29).

Both the Commission and the Court have acknowledged in their case-law that the requirement that a court or tribunal should have ‘full jurisdiction’ will be satisfied where it is found that the judicial body in question has exercised ‘sufficient jurisdiction’ or provided ‘sufficient review’ in the proceedings before it (see, amongst many authorities, Zumtobel v. Austria, 21 September 1993, § §§ 31–32, Series A no. 268-A; Bryan, cited above, §§ 43–47; Müller and others v. Austria (dec.), no. 26507/95, 23 November 1999; and Crompton v. the United Kingdom, no. 42509/05, §§ 71 and 79, 27 October 2009).

In adopting this approach the Convention organs have had regard to the fact that it is often the case in relation to administrative law appeals in the Member States of the Council of Europe, that the scope of judicial review over the facts of a case is limited and that it is the nature of review proceedings that the reviewing authority reviews the previous proceedings, rather than taking factual decisions. It can be derived from the relevant case-law that it is not the role of Article 6 of the Convention to give access to a level of jurisdiction which can substitute its opinion for that of the administrative authorities. In this regard, particular emphasis has been placed on the respect which must be accorded to decisions taken by the administrative authorities on grounds of ‘expediency’ and which often involve specialised areas of law (for example, planning — Zumtobel, §§ 31 and 32, and Bryan, § 47, both cited above; environmental protection — Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, no. 33538/96, § 52, 28 July 2005; regulation of gaming — Kingsley v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35605/97, § 32, ECHR 2002-IV).

In assessing the sufficiency of a judicial review available to an applicant, the Court will have regard to the powers of the judicial body in question (see for example, Gradinger, § 44, and Bryan, §§ 44–45, both cited above; Potocka and Others v. Poland, no. 33776/96, § 55, ECHR 2001-X; and Kingsley, § 32, cited above), and to such factors as

Whether the review carried out is sufficient for the purposes of Article 6 will very much depend on the circumstances of a given case: the Court will confine itself as far as possible to examining the question raised in the case before it and to determining if, in that particular case, the scope of the review was adequate.

The Court has held in a number of cases, where the court in question did not have full jurisdiction as such but examined the issues raised before it concerning the adjudicatory body's decision, that the judicial review in the case was sufficient and that the proceedings complied with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. This has been the case, for example, where upon judicial review the applicants' submissions on their merits or grounds of appeal were examined point by point, without the court having to decline jurisdiction in replying to them or in ascertaining various facts (see inter alia, Zumtobel, § 32, cited above; Fischer v. Austria, 26 April 1995, § 34, Series A no. 312; and Bryan, § 47, Müller and Potocka, §§ 56–58, cited above; see also the Commission decisions in Kristavcnik — Reutterer v. Austria, no. 22475/93, 10 September 1993; ISKCON and 8 others v. the United Kingdom, no. 20490/92, 8 March 1994; Stefan v. the United Kingdom, no. 29419/95, 9 December 1997; Wickramsinghe v. the United Kingdom, 9 December 1997 no. 31503/96; and X. v. the United Kingdom, no. 28530/95, 19 January 1998). Similarly, in the case of Crompton (cited above, §§ 78–80) the Court held that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 as the High Court had examined the central issue in the case before it.

Where, however, the reviewing court is precluded from determining the central issue in dispute, the scope of review will not be considered sufficient for the purposes of Article 6 (see Tsfayo, cited above, § 48). The Court has therefore found violations of Article 6 § 1 in cases where the domestic courts considered themselves bound by the prior findings of administrative bodies which were decisive for the outcome of the cases before them, without examining the issues independently (see, amongst many authorities, Obermeier v. Austria, 28 June 1990, §§ 69–70, Series A no. 179; Terra Woningen B.V. v. the Netherlands, 17 December 1996, § 46 and §§ 50–55, Reports 1996-VI; I.D. v. Bulgaria, no. 43578/98, §§ 50–55, 28 April 2005; Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, no. 49429/99, §§ 99–108 ECHR 2005-XII (extracts); Tsfayo, cited above; and Družstevní záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, no. 72034/01, § 112–115, 31 July 2008). In addition the Court has found a violation of Article 6 where a ground of challenge has been upheld by the reviewing court but it was not possible to remit the case for a fresh decision by the same or a different body (see Kingsley, cited above, § 32).

Accordingly, in the present case, the Court must first decide whether, in the circumstances, the scope of review exercised by the Supreme Court met the requirements of Article 6, taking into consideration all relevant factors (see paragraph 154 above), and, whether that court provided the safeguards required by that provision (see paragraph 151 above).

At the outset, it is common ground that the power of review of the Supreme Court under Article 146 of the Constitution was not capable of embracing all aspects of the CRTA's decisions. In particular, as is usually the case in the systems of judicial control of administrative decisions found throughout the Council of Europe's Member States (see paragraph 153 above; see also Bryan, cited above, § 44), the Supreme Court could not substitute its own decision for that of the CRTA and its jurisdiction over the facts was limited. Notwithstanding, it could have annulled the decisions on a number of grounds, including if the decision had been reached on the basis of a misconception of fact or law, there had been no proper enquiry or a lack of due reasoning, or on procedural grounds.

Such an approach by an appeal tribunal conducting the review of a decision of an administrative body can reasonably be expected, having regard to the nature of review proceedings and the respect which must be given to decisions taken by administrative authorities on grounds of ‘expediency’ (see paragraph 153 above; see also, for example, Bryan, § 47 and Müller, both cited above).

As to the subject-matter of the decision appealed against, the Court notes that the decisions challenged before the Supreme Court were taken by the CRTA, which was set up to regulate broadcasting pursuant to, and to monitor compliance with, the relevant legislation. In its decisions the CRTA had found that the applicant had violated certain provisions of the Law and Regulations in various broadcasts. Their subject matter was therefore a classic exercise of administrative discretion in the specialised area of law concerning broadcasting taken in the context of ensuring standard setting and compliance with the relevant legislation and regulations pursuant to public interest aims (contrast Tsfayo and Crompton, both cited above).

In connection with the manner in which the decisions were arrived at, the Court observes, as it noted above (see paragraph 149), that a number of uncontested procedural guarantees were available to the applicant in the proceedings before the CRTA: the applicant was given details of the probable violation or the complaint made against it and the decisions were arrived at after a hearing had been held. The applicant was able to make written submissions and/or oral submissions during the hearing of the cases although it chose not to do so in some of the proceedings (see Annex). Further, it was open to the applicant to make a wide range of complaints in the context of the judicial review proceedings before the CRTA. It is noted in this respect that the applicant's allegations as to shortcomings in the proceedings before the CRTA, including those concerning objective partiality and the breach of the principles of natural justice, were subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Lastly, with regard to the content of the dispute, the Court observes that in its recourses to the Supreme Court the applicant raised a number of points concerning the legality of the CRTA decisions (see paragraphs 40 and 41 above). In particular, it claimed:

The applicant also (d) raised various points concerning the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions relating to the imposition of sanctions for the infringement of the Regulations, and (e) alleged certain shortcomings in the proceedings, such as a lack of proper enquiry and due reasoning, and composition problems.

As is evident from the extensive reasoning in its judgment the Supreme Court examined all the above issues, point by point, without refusing to deal with any of them. The Supreme Court gave clear reasons for the dismissal of the applicant's points. It should be noted in this regard, that the applicant has not complained before this Court that the Supreme Court's judgment lacked adequate reasoning.

It is also clear from the above that the applicant's cases did not centre on a fundamental question of fact which the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to revisit (contrast Tsfayo, cited above).

To the extent that the applicant argues that the crux of its recourses was the necessity and proportionality of the fines imposed by the CRTA, questions the Supreme Court did not examine, the Court points out that these issues were not raised by the applicant before that court in the legal points on which its recourses were based. The Court further notes that it is clear from a reading of the recourses and the applicant's written addresses and replies that any submissions made by the applicant concerning the fines were related to the legal points raised under Articles 12 and 19 of the Constitution and the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions relating to the imposition of sanctions for the infringement of the Regulations (see points (b) and (d) above). These points were examined by the Supreme Court.

Further, to the extent that the applicant can be taken to suggest that, in any event, the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to examine the necessity and proportionality of the fines, the Court notes that it is not its task to decide in abstracto that the Supreme Court would not have examined these issues if raised or that it would have declined jurisdiction to deal with them. Such an exercise would, in the circumstances of the present application, be pure surmise. The applicant has not put forward any case-law in support of its claim. The Government, however, have referred the Court to a number of Supreme Court judgments in judicial review proceedings which indicate that the Supreme Court has the competence to examine such issues in its judicial review role. The Court therefore cannot find that the applicant was justified in not raising these issues in its recourses.

Having regard to all the above, the Court finds that the scope of the review of the Supreme Court in the judicial review proceedings in the present case was sufficient to comply with Article 6 of the Convention.

The Court notes, however, that in addition to its complaint about the scope of review of the Supreme Court, the applicant claims that that court did not itself provide the guarantees of Article 6. In particular, the applicant challenges the fairness of the judicial review proceedings on two counts.

Its first complaint concerns the alleged lack of impartiality on the part of four of the judges who sat on the full bench on the ground that they had already given judgment, at first instance, in different recourses brought by the applicant against various CRTA decisions raising identical or similar questions.

The Court considers that it does not need to decide on the questions of the six-month rule and exhaustion of domestic remedies that arise in respect of three of the judges concerned by the above complaint (see paragraph 134 above), as in any event it finds, for the reasons set out below, that the applicant's complaint as a whole is not well-founded.

The Court first of all finds that the applicant's submissions do not disclose any element to cast doubt on the impartiality of the four judges in question under the subjective test.

As regards the objective test, the Court observes that the mere fact that a judge has been involved in other proceedings concerning the same parties is not in itself reasonably capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts as to his or her impartiality (see, for example, Gillow v. the United Kingdom, 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 28, § 73; Schmid v. Austria, no. 11831/85, Commission decision of 9 December 1987, Decisions and Reports (DR) 54, p. 144; Krone-Verlag GmbH and Mediaprint Anzeigen GmbH & Co KG v. Austria, no. 28977/95, Commission decision of 21 May 1997, unreported; Galya Pavlova v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 39855/03, 14 October 2004; and Anguelov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 45963/99, 14 December 2004).

The Court notes that the judgments referred to by the applicant concerned different CRTA decisions and therefore constituted separate executory administrative acts. Although it appears that some of the grounds for annulment raised in those cases were akin to or the same as some of those raised in the joint recourses, this does not, in the Court's view objectively justify any fears as to a lack of impartiality on the part of the judges concerned in the latter proceedings. The Court notes that it is a usual and inevitable occurrence in any judicial system that judges deal with similar or identical issues in different unrelated cases.

The Court therefore finds that the applicants' complaints as to a lack of impartiality of the Supreme Court because of the presence of these four judges on the bench, cannot be regarded as being objectively justified.

The applicant's second complaint concerns the dismissal of its application of 10 February 2004 (see paragraph 43 above). Taking into account the grounds on which this application was requested and the reasons given by the Supreme Court for its dismissal, the Court finds that this complaint does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the applicant's rights under Article 6.

The Court therefore finds that the Supreme Court fully satisfied the requirements of independence and impartiality and provided the other guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention.

To the extent that the applicant contests the sufficiency of the review carried out by the District Court and the Supreme Court in the civil proceedings brought against it, the Court recalls its findings in paragraphs 100–111 and 114–117 above.

As regards the applicant's complaint as to the infringement of the principle of equality of arms, the Court finds, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, that it does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

In conclusion, the Court finds that the applicant's complaints under this head are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

The Court finds that the fines imposed on the applicant in the above cases amounted to an ‘interference’ with the applicant's freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.

The Court reiterates that in order to comply with Article 10, the interference in question must be ‘prescribed by law’, pursue one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 and be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in order to achieve the aim or aims in question.

The Court notes that the parties agree that the interference complained of had a basis in domestic law, namely, Law 7(I)/1998 (as amended) and the relevant regulations. The applicant, however, claimed in general that the provisions of the legislation on which the findings of a violation were based were not sufficiently foreseeable and were extremely rigid.

In this connection, the Court reiterates that one of the requirements flowing from the expression ‘prescribed by law’ is the foreseeability of the measure concerned. A norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able — if need be with appropriate advice — to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Whilst certainty in the law is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (see, for example, Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-III).

The Court notes that Law 7(I)/1998 and the Regulations constitute a detailed legislative scheme aimed at regulating broadcasting. The violations found in respect of the various broadcasts in question were based on an array of different provisions of the Law and Regulations, some more specific than others. It cannot be said, however, that any of these provisions or Regulations were so vague and imprecise as to lack the required quality of law. The Court is therefore satisfied that the interference with the applicant's rights under Article 10 § 1 was ‘prescribed by law’ within the meaning of Article 10 § 2.

Further, the Court agrees with the Government that the interference pursued at least one of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 of Article 10, namely, the protection of the rights of others.

The question therefore that arises is whether the interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’.

The Court reiterates that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, without which there is no ‘democratic society’ (see Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 49, Series A no. 24, and Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 37, Series A no. 298). This freedom is subject to the exceptions set out in Article 10 § 2, which must, however, be strictly construed. The need for any restrictions must be established convincingly (see, for example, Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, § 41, Series A no. 103, and Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no. 23118/93, § 43, ECHR 1999-VIII).

The test of necessity requires the Court to determine whether the interference corresponded to a ‘pressing social need’, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it were relevant and sufficient. In assessing whether such a need exists and what measures should be adopted to deal with it, the national authorities are left a certain margin of appreciation. This power of appreciation is not, however, unlimited, but goes hand in hand with a European supervision by the Court, whose task it is to give a final ruling on whether a restriction is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10. The Court's task in exercising its supervisory function is not to take the place of the national authorities, but rather to review under Article 10, in the light of the case as a whole, the decisions they have taken pursuant to their margin of appreciation. In so doing, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see Karman v. Russia, no. 29372/02, § 32, 14 December 2006, and Grinberg v. Russia, no. 23472/03, § 27, 21 July 2005, with further references).

Turning to the cases in question, the Court notes that in each of its decisions concerning the broadcasts the CRTA set out the grounds on which violations of the Law and the Regulations were found. These in general, included, the protection of consumers and children from unethical advertising practices, including surreptitious advertising, the protection of children from broadcasts containing violence or any other material likely to impair their physical, mental or moral development, the importance of ensuring that viewers were informed of the true content of the broadcasts by the use of appropriate acoustic and visual warnings, the protection of pluralism of information, the need for a fair and accurate presentation of facts and events and the protection of the reputation, honour, good name and privacy of persons involved in or affected by the broadcast.

Having regard to the broadcasts and their content and/or subject-matter, the reasons given by the CRTA in its decisions for the findings of violations against the applicant, the amount of the fines imposed and the submissions of the parties before it, the Court considers that the impugned interference was proportionate to the aim pursued, and the reasons given to justify it were relevant and sufficient. The Court finds therefore, that the interference with the applicant's exercise of their right to freedom of expression in these cases can reasonably be regarded as having been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of others.

It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.