EHRM, 15-10-2015, nr. 37553/05

The applicants argued that their conviction amounted to an interference with their right to organise and take part in a peaceful demonstration.

Before the Chamber the Government submitted that there had not been any interference with the applicants' right to freedom of peaceful assembly. They observed that the applicants and other participants had been given permission to organise peaceful meetings. They had availed themselves of that freedom and no one had been punished for that. The applicants had not been convicted for exercising their right to freedom of assembly, but rather for a serious breach of public order by organising riots.

However, in their observations before the Grand Chamber, the Government stated that they did not contest that there had been an interference with the applicants' right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

The Court must first determine whether the facts of the present case fall within the ambit of Article 11 of the Convention. It reiterates that the right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and, like the right to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of such a society. Thus, it should not be interpreted restrictively (see Taranenko v. Russia, no. 19554/05, § 65, 15 May 2014). As such this right covers both private meetings and meetings in public places, whether static or in the form of a procession; in addition, it can be exercised by individual participants and by the persons organising the gathering (see Djavit An v. Turkey, no. 20652/92, § 56, ECHR 2003-III; Ziliberberg v. Moldova (dec.), no. 61821/00, 4 May 2004; and Barraco v. France, no. 31684/05, § 41, 5 March 2009).

Article 11 of the Convention only protects the right to ‘peaceful assembly’, a notion which does not cover a demonstration where the organisers and participants have violent intentions (see Stankov and the United Macedonian Organization Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, § 77, ECHR 2001-IX). The guarantees of Article 11 therefore apply to all gatherings except those where the organisers and participants have such intentions, incite violence or otherwise reject the foundations of a democratic society (see Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia, no. 10877/04, § 45, 23 October 2008; Alekseyev v. Russia, nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, § 80, 21 October 2010; Fáber, cited above, § 37; Gün and Others v. Turkey, no. 8029/07, § 49, 18 June 2013; and Taranenko, cited above, § 66).

In the present case, the Lithuanian courts established that some of the farmers had used vehicles, especially tractors, to block the highways. This is not contested by the applicants. However, the vehicles at issue had not been used to cause bodily harm to the police officers or any members of the public. Even though the farmers and lorry drivers had a few arguments, more serious confrontations had been avoided (see paragraph 28 above). Moreover, neither the applicants nor the other farmers were reproached by the domestic authorities for any specific act of violence or for having any violent intentions.

In this connection, it is not without interest to note that an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to freedom of peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the demonstration if the individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own intentions or behaviour (see Ziliberberg, decision cited above). The possibility of persons with violent intentions, not members of the organising association, joining the demonstration cannot as such take away that right (see Primov and Others, cited above, § 155). Even if there is a real risk that a public demonstration might result in disorder as a result of developments outside the control of those organising it, such a demonstration does not as such fall outside the scope of Article 11 § 1, and any restriction placed thereon must be in conformity with the terms of paragraph 2 of that provision (see Schwabe and M.G., cited above, § 103, and Taranenko, cited above, § 66).

The Court further notes that the farmers had been authorised to hold peaceful assemblies and to display agricultural machineries. These gatherings pursued a political aim and were meant to express political ideas, in particular to contest the government's policy and to obtain the granting of subsidies in the agricultural sector.

The demonstrations were held in the designated areas from 19 to 21 May 2003 (paragraphs 19–20 above). On the latter date, the farmers moved onto the highways and parked tractors there, thus blocking the three major roads of the country and exceeding the scope of the permits issued by the Lithuanian authorities.

However, the applicants' conviction was not based on any involvement in or incitement to violence, but on the breach of public order resulting from the roadblocks. The Court further observes that, in the present case, the disruption of traffic cannot be described as a side-effect of a meeting held in a public place, but rather as the result of intentional action by the farmers, who wished to attract attention to the problems in the agricultural sector and to push the government to accept their demands (see also the arguments developed by the Court in paragraphs 169–175 below). In the Court's view, although not an uncommon occurrence in the context of the exercise of freedom of assembly in modern societies, physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention (see, for instance, Barraco, cited above, § 39, where the applicant's conviction for his participation in a traffic-slowing operation, consisting in a rolling barricade of vehicles across several lanes of the motorway to slow down the traffic behind, was held to be an interference with his Article 11 rights; see also Lucas v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 39013/02, 18 March 2003, concerning a demonstration during which a public road was blocked in order to protest against the retention of a nuclear submarine, considered to fall within the terms of Article 11; Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, § 92, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII, where the Court considered that the physical impediment of activities — a hunt and the construction of a motorway — of which the first and second applicants, respectively, disapproved, constituted expressions of opinion within the meaning of Article 10; and Drieman and Others v. Norway (dec.), no. 33678/96, 4 May 2000, where the Court proceeded on the assumption that Articles 10 and 11 could be invoked by Greenpeace activists who had manoeuvred dinghies in such a manner as to obstruct whaling). This state of affairs might have implications for any assessment of ‘necessity’ to be carried out under the second paragraph of Article 11.

Nevertheless, the Court does not consider that the impugned conduct of the demonstrations for which the applicants were held responsible was of such a nature and degree as to remove their participation in the demonstration from the scope of protection of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 of the Convention. The Court also notes that the Kaunas Regional Court accepted that the applicants enjoyed the right of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph 53 above) and considers that there is no indication that the applicants have undermined the foundations of a democratic society.

This is sufficient for the Court to arrive at the conclusion that the applicants are entitled to invoke the guarantees of Article 11, which is therefore applicable in the present case.

Secondly, the Court will establish whether the applicants' right to freedom of assembly has been interfered with. It reiterates that the interference does not need to amount to an outright ban, legal or de facto, but can consist in various other measures taken by the authorities. The term ‘restrictions’ in Article 11 § 2 must be interpreted as including both measures taken before or during a gathering and those, such as punitive measures, taken afterwards (see Ezelin, cited above, § 39; Kasparov and Others v. Russia, no. 21613/07, § 84, 3 October 2013; Primov and Others, cited above, § 93; and Nemtsov, cited above, § 73). For instance, a prior ban can have a chilling effect on the persons who intend to participate in a rally and thus amount to an interference, even if the rally subsequently proceeds without hindrance on the part of the authorities. A refusal to allow an individual to travel for the purpose of attending a meeting amounts to an interference as well. So too do measures taken by the authorities during a rally, such as dispersal of the rally or the arrest of participants, and penalties imposed for having taken part in a rally (see Kasparov and Others, cited above, § 84, with further references).

The Court observes that in the present case the applicants were permitted to exercise unhindered their freedom of peaceful assembly not only at the authorised locations but also when the demonstrations moved onto the public highways in excess of the authorisation granted. Indeed, the gatherings, even when the demonstrators resorted to roadblocks, were not dispersed by the police. However, the applicants were subsequently convicted because of their role in the organisation and implementation of the roadblocks during the latter part of the demonstrations. As already indicated above, their conduct in this respect, albeit reprehensible, was not deemed to have been of violent character. The Court is therefore prepared to accept that the applicants' conviction for their participation in the demonstrations at issue amounted to an interference with their right to freedom of peaceful assembly. In this connection, it is noteworthy that before the Grand Chamber the Government did not dispute the existence of an interference (see paragraph 89 above).

Such interference will constitute a breach of Article 11 unless it is ‘prescribed by law’, pursues one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2 and is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the achievement of the aim or aims in question (see, among many other authorities, Vyerentsov v. Ukraine, no. 20372/11, § 51, 11 April 2013, and Nemtsov, cited above, § 72).

The applicants argued that their conviction under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 62 above) had not been ‘prescribed by law’. In particular, the notion of ‘serious breach of public order’, as specified in the aforementioned provision, was not clearly defined and thus could not legitimately be regarded as a feature characterising the criminal offence in question. B.M. and A.K. insisted that they had not been convicted and sentenced in accordance with the law, but rather for having expressed their opinions at the farmers' meeting and for defending those opinions during a peaceful demonstration. The other three applicants — V.M., K.M. and A.P. — claimed that they had been convicted merely for having driven and parked their tractors on the highway, even though the latter had already been blocked by the police and the farmers. Accordingly, the criminal conviction had been an excessive measure and their actions should have been treated as an administrative offence, in accordance with Articles 124 or 131 of the Code of Administrative Law Offences (see paragraph 66 above), as was the case for farmer A.D. (see paragraph 49 above).

The applicants further noted that the Government had cited as a precedent a ‘riot’ which had taken place near the Parliament building (see paragraph 191 below). However, in that case, as opposed to the present one, the demonstrators had used violence, destroyed property and resisted the police, causing them physical and moral harm. By contrast, the applicants' intention had not been to use violence or to cause damage, but to demonstrate for the social and financial needs of the Lithuanian farmers.

The Government submitted that any possible interference with the applicants' right to freedom of peaceful assembly had been prescribed by law. The applicants had been convicted under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code, prescribing punishment for serious breaches of public order. Referring to the Court's judgment in Galstyan (cited above, § 107) and taking into account the diversity inherent in public order offences, the Government considered that the domestic legal norm had been formulated with sufficient precision (see also the arguments developed by the Government under Article 7 of the Convention — paragraphs 188–191 below).

The Government further disputed as unreasoned the applicants' argument that their acts ought to have been classified as breaches of administrative law. Administrative liability for parking agricultural vehicles on the public highway and leaving them in a prohibited place could hypothetically have been imposed on the applicants, pursuant to Article 124¹ or Article 131 of the Code of Administrative Law Offences (see paragraph 66 above). However, the scope of the breach of administrative law provided for in those provisions did not encompass the applicants' acts in the instant case. Firstly, the applicants had acted as part of a crowd of people. Secondly, tractors had not only been parked and left unattended, but had also been used to block a highway, thus threatening the rights of others and the normal functioning of State institutions. Lastly, a concrete result had been pursued — the roadblocks. Therefore, the applicants' intent had been to commit a serious breach of public order and not merely to contravene a parking regulation.

The Court reiterates its case-law to the effect that the expressions ‘prescribed by law’ and ‘in accordance with the law’ in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention not only requires that the impugned measure should have a legal basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, which should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see, among other authorities, Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 52, ECHR 2000-V; VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, no. 24699/94, § 52, ECHR 2001-VI; Gawęda v. Poland, no. 26229/95, § 39, ECHR 2002-II; Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 30, ECHR 2004-I; Vyerentsov, cited above, § 52; Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, §§ 64–65, ECHR 2004-I; and Sindicatul ‘Păstorul cel Bun’v. Romania [GC], no. 2330/09, § 153, ECHR 2013 (extracts)).

In particular, a norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen — if need be, with appropriate advice — to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see, for example, Djavit An, cited above, § 65). Experience shows, however, that it is impossible to attain absolute precision in the framing of laws, particularly in fields in which the situation changes according to the prevailing views of society (see, among other authorities, Ezelin, cited above, § 45). In particular, the consequences of a given action need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (see, among other authorities, Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 49, Series A no. 30; Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-III; Ziliberberg, decision cited above; Galstyan, cited above, § 106; and Primov and Others, cited above, § 125).

The role of adjudication vested in the national courts is precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as may remain; the Court's power to review compliance with domestic law is thus limited, as it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see Kruslin v. France, 24 April 1990, § 29, Series A, no. 176-A; Kopp v. Switzerland, 25 March 1998, § 59, Reports 1998-II; VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken, cited above, § 52; Mkrtchyan v. Armenia, no. 6562/03, § 43, 11 January 2007; and Vyerentsov, cited above, § 54). Moreover, the level of precision required of domestic legislation — which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality — depends to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, § 48, Series A no. 323, and Rekvényi, cited above, § 34).

In the present case, the applicants' conviction had a legal basis in Lithuanian law, namely Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code, which prescribes punishment for the offence of rioting (see paragraph 62 above). Whilst the Criminal Code was accessible, it remains to be ascertained whether the application of this provision was foreseeable.

Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code provides that imprisonment for up to five years will be the sanction imposed on ‘a person who organises or provokes a gathering of people to commit public acts of violence, damage property or otherwise seriously breach public order, or a person who, during a riot, commits acts of violence, damages property or otherwise seriously breaches public order’. The domestic authorities did not accuse the applicants of committing acts of violence or of damaging property. They maintained, however, that the applicants had ‘otherwise seriously breach[ed] public order’. In particular, on the basis of video-recordings, documentary evidence and witness statements, the District Court found that A.K. and B.M. had deliberately organised protests and coordinated the actions of the farmers in order to block the roads (see paragraphs 43 and 44 above) and that the other applicants V.M., K.M. and A.P. had driven and parked tractors on the highway and refused to obey lawful orders by the police to stop doing so (see paragraph 46 above). These findings were confirmed by the Kaunas Regional Court, which specified that A.K. and B.M. had been warned about their liability as organisers and had understood the unlawfulness of their actions (see paragraph 51 above). Finally, the Supreme Court provided an explanation of the substance of the offence punished under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code, indicating, inter alia, that a riot was a situation where a gathering of people deliberately and seriously breached public order and that blocking the roads, stopping the traffic and disturbing the work of the State border-control authority was a means of causing such a breach (see paragraphs 56 and 57 above).

The Court acknowledges that, by its very nature, the concept of ‘breach of public order’ used in Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code is to a certain extent vague. However, as ordinary life can be disrupted in a potentially endless number of ways, it would be unrealistic to expect the national legislator to enumerate an exhaustive list of illegitimate means for achieving the forbidden aim. The Court therefore considers that the terms in which Article 283 § 1 is formulated satisfy the qualitative requirements emanating from its case-law.

Moreover, the Court is of the opinion that the interpretation of this provision given by the domestic courts in the present case was neither arbitrary nor unpredictable, and that the applicants could have foreseen, to a degree reasonable in the circumstances, that their actions as described above, entailing long-lasting roadblocks with ensuing disruptions of ordinary life, traffic and economic activities, could have been deemed to amount to a ‘serious breach of public order’ attracting the application of Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code.

This is not altered by the fact that Article 283 of the Criminal Code published on 25 October 2000 was applied for the first time in the applicants' case. Indeed, the criminal Code entered into force on 1 May 2003 (see paragraph 62 above), the conduct reproached to the applicants occurred on 21–23 May 2003 and there must come a day when a given legal norm is applied for the first time (see, mutatis mutandis and in relation to Article 7 of the Convention, Huhtamäki v. Finland, no. 54468/09, § 51, 6 March 2012, with further references).

In these circumstances, it should have been clear to the applicants that disobeying the lawful orders of the police could engage their responsibility.

In passing the Court also notes that the permits to hold peaceful assemblies contained a warning about the possible liability of the organisers under the Code of Administrative Law Offences and under the Criminal Code, including Article 283 of the latter (see paragraphs 15–17 above). It is also to be noted that the police explicitly asked the demonstrators to lift the roadblocks.

In the light of the above, the Court reaches the conclusion that the interference complained of was ‘prescribed by law’ within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention.

The applicants argued that the government's ongoing and deliberate delay in regulating milk, grain and meat prices and its refusal to implement Parliament's resolution of 22 April 2003 allocating funds to the agricultural sector (see paragraph 13 above) had put the farmers — and especially small farmers — in a critical situation, as they were unable to cover their production costs, were suffering losses and were sometimes compelled to sell their livestock. The government's inaction and its unilateral decision to stop the negotiations with the farmers had significantly impoverished rural areas. In the applicants' opinion, the conduct for which they had been convicted was deprived, given that background, of the objective and subjective elements of criminal liability.

The applicants considered that their decision to stage the roadblocks had been their last resort in order to defend their interests as farmers. This was a form of demonstration accepted in Europe, in situations where no other means of protecting the demonstrators' rights existed. In such circumstances, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly should have prevailed over any resulting minimal disturbances to the free movement of goods. In this connection, the applicants alleged that EU Council Regulation No. 2679/98 (see paragraph 77 above) recognised roadblocks as a form of strike action.

In accordance with that Regulation, before the roadblocks started on 21 May 2003, the Lithuanian authorities had already known about the farmers' intention to demonstrate. Knowing that roadblocks were likely to occur, the police had prepared action plans and alternative itineraries in the vicinity of the demonstrations, thus reducing any possible disruption to the flow of goods. The farmers themselves had foreseen measures, which were fully implemented, to ensure that traffic was redirected onto secondary roads. According to the applicants, on the critical days the flow of traffic had been ‘even better than usual’. This was proven by the ‘data from posts where the roadblocks took place’. The Government's contention that further damage could have been caused to public safety (paragraph 189 below) was pure speculation.

The applicants also submitted that the demonstrations were peaceful and that no incidents had taken place: public order had not been breached, nor had there been any destruction of property belonging to others or damage caused to a person's health. On the contrary, the roadblocks had been symbolic and aimed at attracting the government's attention. B.M. and A.K., who were respected by the farmers, had maintained order among the demonstrators. Moreover, during the roadblocks, selected representatives of the farmers were still negotiating with the government in order to reach a compromise on milk prices. The farmers had acted calmly and had taken no actions that would require police special units or the army to intervene to restrain them. Their intention was not to breach public order, but to peacefully demonstrate for social justice. Only one lawsuit for civil damage, in the amount of LTL 1,100 (approximately EUR 290), had been upheld by a court (see paragraph 45 above). This amount was negligible when compared to what was at stake for the farmers.

By blocking the roads the farmers had in part obtained satisfaction of their requests — the milk purchasing price and the compensatory payments had been raised. The demonstration had been stopped as soon as the government had agreed to grant subsidies.

The applicants contended that the criminal proceedings against them had been a clearly disproportionate and unnecessary measure. Restrictions of movement had been imposed upon them in 2003, when, as suspects, four of them had been ordered not to leave their places of residence (see paragraph 33 above). Later on, those measures had been lifted. Subsequently, the Kaunas City District Court had imposed on the applicants a custodial sentence. Even though the execution of the sentences had been suspended, the applicants had not been able to leave their places of residence without the authorities' permission during the year in which the suspended sentences had been in force (see paragraph 47 above).

The applicants further challenged the relevance of the case-law cited by the Government. They noted, in particular, that the case of Éva Molnár, cited above, concerned a demonstration which had not been authorised, about which the police had not been informed and which had ended with acts of violence and disruption to traffic and public order. Similarly, the demonstration had not been authorised in the case of Barraco, cited above, where roadblocks had been sudden and unexpected and where before being charged the applicant had been requested to leave the motorway several times. Concerning the case-law of the ECJ, the applicants explained that in Schmidberger v. Austria (cited above) the demonstration had lasted for two days on the main trunk route along which no goods carriers could pass, while the police had allegedly not taken any measures to ensure the free movement of goods; in Commission v. France (cited above) the demonstrators had acted violently against lorry drivers transporting agricultural products from foreign countries. Conversely, in the present case the roadblocks had been the result of a critical economic situation in the country and of the government's inaction.

The applicants lastly considered that the Government had exaggerated the consequences of the demonstrators' actions, relying on hypothetical speculations, and had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support their conclusions. In reality, the domestic courts had ignored the fact that permits to hold assemblies had been issued and that, when the farmers had spontaneously moved onto the highways, the applicants had coordinated their actions with the police in order to maintain, and not to breach, public order.

The Government maintained that the interference pursued the legitimate aims of the ‘prevention of disorder’ and the ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. Moreover, the sanctions imposed had pursued not only the aim of discouraging reoffending, but also that of ensuring respect for the law in general.

With regard to the proportionality principle, the Government submitted that in 2003 the situation of the Lithuanian dairy sector had worsened, milk purchase prices had been reduced and farmers had become increasingly worried. They had demanded an increase in milk purchase prices and had organised various actions. Following negotiations between farmers, dairy processors and the government, in March-June 2003 the government had adopted a number of decisions providing subsidies to milk producers in the sum of LTL 52,000,000 (corresponding to approximately EUR 15,067,000). The government had organised and participated in meetings with the farmers' representatives and had actively sought possible solutions involving regulation of the dairy sector and of the milk market. In spite of these efforts, the applicants had staged roadblocks, thus violating the rights of other members of society.

In the Government's opinion, the applicants' conviction for organising or participating in a riot had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons. The applicants' incitement to block the roads and disobey the lawful orders of the police had been duly taken into account. The applicants had had a full and unhindered opportunity to exercise for several days their freedom of peaceful assembly and to draw the attention of the authorities and of society in general to the farmers' problems. Nonetheless, they had subsequently broken the law through their actions, which had constituted a serious breach of public order, inflicting harm on other persons, impairing the functioning of State institutions and creating a real danger of greater harm. The applicants had been convicted for their actual illegal behaviour, which had provoked general chaos in the country and not mere disruption of traffic. In this respect, the present case could be distinguished from that of Ezelin (cited above).

In this connection, the Government noted that the blockading of the three main trunk routes linking EU countries with their trading partners to the east had gone beyond the ‘inevitable disruption of traffic’ (see, by contrast and a fortiori, Primov and Others, cited above, concerning the blockading of the main road linking several mountain villages) and had elicited a strong response in civil society and the mass media.

The Government asserted that the applicants had not been convicted for participation in the protest actions, but for specific criminal behaviour during the demonstrations, which had put greater restraint on public life than the exercise of freedom of peaceful assembly should normally do. The roadblocks were not an immediate and spontaneous response to a sudden event, overriding the obligation of prior notification. Consequently, the mode of exercising their Article 11 rights chosen by the applicants had shown a severe lack of respect for other members of society.

The Government pointed out that the applicants had received only the mildest of possible sanctions — a short custodial sentence — provided for in Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code. Moreover, their punishment had mainly had a moral force, given that the execution of their sentences had been suspended for one year (see paragraph 47 above). It had therefore not entailed any ban, even temporary, on the applicants' continuing their professional and political activities. One year after their conviction, the applicants had been discharged by the Supreme Court upon the expiry of the term of their suspended sentences (see paragraph 60 above). With the discharge the applicants were no longer regarded as convicted persons. The obligation not to leave, without authorisation, their place of residence for a period exceeding seven days (see paragraph 47 above) had been a mere formality which had not created significant inconveniences for the applicants' daily life.

The Government argued that the Court should not depart from its precedent in the case of Barraco (cited above), where no violation had been found and where the traffic-slowing operation had lasted for only five hours on a single road. They also pointed out that the authorities had not been in a position to take preventive measures in order to limit as far as possible the effects of the disruption to traffic. The fact that, several days before the demonstration, the Klaipėda region police had accidentally learned about the demonstrators' intentions to block the roads could not be regarded as a ‘decent notification’ allowing the authorities to take appropriate measures. Moreover, the Marijampolė and Pasvalys regions police had remained unaware of such intentions.

The Government further referred to the case-law of the ECJ, which, in the case of Schmidberger v. Austria (cited above), had affirmed the State's duty to keep major trunk routes open in order to ensure the free movement of goods within the EU. It is true that in Schmidberger the ECJ found that by allowing the demonstration, Austria did not violate its obligations under the Treaty; however, Schmidberger could be distinguished from the present case for the timing of the demonstration (a bank holiday and the weekend, and not normal working days), its location (only one highway was blocked), the presence of a prior public warning (30 days in advance) informing the authorities of the roadblocks. Moreover, in Commission v. France (cited above) the ECJ had found that by not preventing private individuals from putting in place actions aimed at blocking free trade, the respondent State had failed to meet its obligations.

The Government also noted that at the time of the demonstrations, Lithuania was a candidate for EU membership, having signed an Association Agreement with the EU, and had thus undertaken to show its ability to comply on a political, legal and technical level with EU standards and norms. The blockading of the country's three main trunk routes of international importance might well have amounted to a restriction on the free movement of goods, and thus to a breach of EU law, for which Lithuania could have been held liable.

The Government finally relied on guideline 3.5 of the Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (second edition) prepared by the Panel of Experts on Freedom of Assembly of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in consultation with the European Commission for Democracy though Law (the Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe, which read: ‘Public assemblies are held to convey a message to a particular target person, group or organisation. Therefore, as a general rule, assemblies should be facilitated within ‘sight and sound’ of their target audience’. In the present case, the demonstrators had already gained the attention of the relevant State authorities, there was an ongoing dialogue between the latter and the farmers, decisions in their favour had been issued and the Ministry of Agriculture was constantly analysing the situation in the dairy sector. Under these circumstances, the recourse by the demonstrators to drastic measures such as unlawful roadblocks had been excessive and could hardly be justified.

In the light of the above, the Government considered that the interference with the applicants' Article 11 rights was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and that the domestic authorities had not overstepped their margin of appreciation.

The Court takes the view that the applicants' conviction pursued the legitimate aims of the ‘prevention of disorder’ (see, mutatis mutandis, Ziliberberg, decision cited above, Galstyan, cited above, § 110; Skiba v. Poland (dec.), no. 10659/03, 7 July 2009; Rai and Evans v. the United Kingdom (dec.), nos. 26258/07 and 26255/07, 17 November 2009; and Gün and Others, cited above, § 59) and of the ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ (specifically, the right to move freely on public roads without restriction, see, mutatis mutandis, Oya Ataman v. Turkey, no. 74552/01, § 32, ECHR 2006-XIII; and Barraco, cited above, § 40).

It remains to be ascertained whether the interference complained of was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the achievement of those aims.