EHRM, 12-11-2008, nr. 34503/97

Article 2 of Convention No. 87 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (adopted in 1948 and ratified by Turkey on 12 July 1993) provides as follows:

In its Individual Observation to the Turkish Government concerning Convention No. 87, adopted in 2005, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations stated as follows:

The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association declared as follows concerning municipal civil servants (see Digest of Decisions 1996, paragraph 217):

Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides as follows:

Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides as follows:

The relevant articles of ILO Convention No. 98 concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (adopted in 1949 and ratified by Turkey on 3 January 1952) read as follows:

The ILO's Committee of Experts interpreted this provision as excluding from the scope of the Convention only those officials who are directly employed in the administration of the State. With that exception, all other persons employed by the government, by public enterprises or by autonomous public institutions should benefit, according to the Committee, from the guarantees provided for in Convention No. 98 in the same manner as other employees, and consequently should be able to engage in collective bargaining in respect of their conditions of employment, including wages (General Survey 1994, freedom of association and collective bargaining, on Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 [ILO, 1994a], § 200).

The relevant provisions of ILO Convention No. 151 (adopted in 1978 and ratified by Turkey on 12 July 1993) concerning Protection of the Right to Organise and Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public Service read as follows:

The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation, in the preamble to Convention No. 151, noted ‘the terms of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, [and] the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949’ and took into account:

Article 5 of the European Social Charter (revised), not yet ratified by Turkey, provides as follows:

Principle no. 8 of Recommendation No. R (2000) 6 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the status of public officials in Europe reads as follows:

Article 12(1) of the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights provides as follows:

As to European practice, it can be observed that the right of public servants to join trade unions is now recognised by all Contracting States. This right applies to public servants under a career or contractual system and to employees of publicly owned industrial or commercial enterprises, whether national or municipal. Civil servants, whether they work for central government or a local authority, are generally entitled to join the trade union of their choosing. The density of trade-union membership is generally higher in the public sector than in the private sector, which constitutes a manifest indication of a favourable legal and administrative environment created by member States. In the majority of member States, the few restrictions that can be found are limited to judicial offices, to the police and to the fire services, with the most stringent restrictions, culminating in the prohibition of union membership, being reserved for members of the armed forces.

Article 6 of the European Social Charter (revised), not yet ratified by Turkey, contains the following provision concerning the right to bargain collectively:

According to the meaning attributed by the Charter's Committee of Independent Experts (now the European Committee of Social Rights — ECSR) to Article 6 § 2 of the Charter, which in fact fully applies to public officials, States which impose restrictions on collective bargaining in the public sector have an obligation, in order to comply with this provision, to arrange for the involvement of staff representatives in the drafting of the applicable employment regulations (see, for example, in respect of Germany, Conclusions III, pp. 34–35).

Article 28 of the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights provides as follows:

As to the practice of European States, it can be observed that, in the vast majority of them, the right for public servants to bargain collectively with the authorities has been recognised, subject to various exceptions so as to exclude certain areas (disciplinary procedures, pensions, medical insurance, wages of senior civil servants) or certain categories of civil servants who hold exclusive powers of the State (members of the armed forces and of the police, judges, diplomats, career civil servants at federal level). The right of public servants working for local authorities and not holding State powers to engage in collective bargaining in order to determine their wages and working conditions has been recognised in the vast majority of Contracting States. The remaining exceptions can be justified by particular circumstances.

The Government argued that the Court was not entitled to create, by way of interpretation, any new obligations not already provided for in the Convention. They contended, among other submissions, that an international treaty to which the party concerned had not acceded, could not be relied upon against it. Whilst the Government accepted that the Court had always taken into account, when necessary, ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ (see Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, § 55, ECHR 2001-XI), they considered that this approach was only legitimate if it complied with the criteria set out in Article 31 § 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and in particular, if account was taken only of those instruments by which the State concerned was bound.

Turkey was not a party to Article 5 (the right to organise) or Article 6 (the right to bargain collectively) of the European Social Charter, which it ratified in 1989. An interpretation that rendered these provisions binding on an indirect basis was even more problematic where, as in the present case, the absence in the Convention of an express provision guaranteeing the right to enter into collective agreements was counterbalanced by consideration of other instruments to which the State concerned was not a party.

The applicants criticised the manner in which the Government had raised the question concerning interpretation of the Convention. They pointed out that the Chamber had not applied the above-mentioned provisions of the Social Charter in the present case, but that it had taken into account, in its interpretation of Article 11 of the Convention, an opinion of the Committee of Independent Experts concerning the connection between the right to organise and collective bargaining.

In order to determine the meaning of the terms and phrases used in the Convention, the Court is guided mainly by the rules of interpretation provided for in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (see, for example, Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 29, Series A no. 18; Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 18 December 1986, §§ 51 et seq., Series A no. 112; Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1986, §§ 114 and 117, Series A no. 102; and Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, §§ 57–59, ECHR 2000-III). In accordance with the Vienna Convention the Court is required to ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the words in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the provision from which they are drawn (see Golder, cited above, § 29; Johnston and Others, cited above, § 51; and Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention). Recourse may also be had to supplementary means of interpretation, either to confirm a meaning determined in accordance with the above steps, or to establish the meaning where it would otherwise be ambiguous, obscure, or manifestly absurd or unreasonable (Article 32 of the Vienna Convention; see Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, § 62, ECHR 2008-…).

Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must interpret and apply it in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. The Convention must also be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions (see, among other authorities, Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, §§ 47–48, ECHR 2005-X).

In addition, the Court has never considered the provisions of the Convention as the sole framework of reference for the interpretation of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein. On the contrary, it must also take into account any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations between the Contracting Parties (see Saadi, cited above, § 62; Al-Adsani, cited above, § 55; and Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, § 150, ECHR 2005-VI; see also Article 31 § 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention).

The Court further observes that it has always referred to the ‘living’ nature of the Convention, which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions, and that it has taken account of evolving norms of national and international law in its interpretation of Convention provisions (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 102, Series A no. 161; Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, § 82, ECHR 2004-VIII; and Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 121, ECHR 2005-I).

Before the Grand Chamber, the Government raised a plea of incompatibility ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention: Article 11 of the Convention not being applicable to ‘members … of the administration of the State’, it could not be applied to the applicants in the present case as they belonged to that category of worker. The Court has decided to join this objection to the merits (see paragraph 56 above).

In support of their argument, the Government observed that all public officials in Turkey were covered by a specific set of rules. The situation of municipal civil servants was no different from that of other civil servants, as local-government bodies were clearly governmental organisations performing public duties.

The Government were of the opinion that it was impossible to render ineffective, by means of interpretation or use of case-law, the express terms of Article 11 in fine, which authorised States to impose, in respect of members of the armed forces, the police or the administration of the State, restrictions other than those that had to pass the test of necessity in a democratic society.

The Government further argued before the Grand Chamber that the cassation judgment of 6 December 1995 had had no repercussions on the intensive union activities of the trade union Tüm Bel Sen, because it had subsequently displayed an undeniable organisational efficiency and had been able to enter into hundreds of collective agreements, currently for the benefit of some ten thousand municipal employees.

As regards the fact that civil servants were prohibited from forming trade unions, the applicants agreed with the view of the Chamber, but pointed out that their main grievance related to the annulment of the collective agreement. They observed that the prohibition as applied in the present case did not take into account the fact that certain civil servants performed exactly the same work as employees in the private sector.

As to the effects that the cassation judgment of 6 December 1995 had had on the activities of the trade union Tüm Bel Sen, the applicants observed in the first place that the Ministry of the Interior had brought criminal and civil proceedings, for abuse of authority, against mayors who had entered into collective agreements with trade unions. Even though, more recently, such proceedings had been abandoned, the municipal authorities, fearing fresh proceedings, had ceased to engage in collective bargaining with trade unions. The activities of the trade union Tüm Bel Sen had thus been considerably limited.

The applicants also claimed, in this connection, that the Audit Court, following the cassation judgment of 6 December 1995, had invalidated the collective agreements signed by the trade union Tüm Bel Sen and that civil servants belonging to the union had had to reimburse all the additional wages or allowances they had received as a result of the defunct agreements. This development, which in itself constituted interference with the trade union's activities, had also prevented the union from persuading other municipal authorities to sign new collective agreements.

The Court must now deal with the Government's objection that the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention on the ground that Article 11 of the Convention is not applicable to ‘members … of the administration of the State’.

It is true that paragraph 2 in fine of this provision clearly indicates that the State is bound to respect the freedom of association of its employees, subject to the possible imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise by members of its armed forces, police or administration of the rights protected in that Article (see Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, § 37, Series A no. 20).

In this connection, the Court considers that the restrictions imposed on the three groups mentioned in Article 11 are to be construed strictly and should therefore be confined to the ‘exercise’ of the rights in question. These restrictions must not impair the very essence of the right to organise. On this point the Court does not share the view of the Commission that the term ‘lawful’ in the second sentence of Article 11 § 2 requires no more than that the restriction in question should have a basis in national law, and not be arbitrary and that it does not entail any requirement of proportionality (see Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 11603/85, Commission decision of 20 January 1987, Decisions and Reports 50, p. 241). Moreover, in the Court's view, it is incumbent on the State concerned to show the legitimacy of any restrictions to such persons' right to organise. The Court further considers that municipal civil servants, who are not engaged in the administration of the State as such, cannot in principle be treated as ‘members of the administration of the State’ and, accordingly, be subjected on that basis to a limitation of their right to organise and to form trade unions (see, mutatis mutandis, Tüm Haber Sen and Çınar, cited above, §§ 35–40 and 50).

The Court observes that these considerations find support in the majority of the relevant international instruments and in the practice of European States.

Whilst paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which concerns the same subject matter, includes members of the administration of the State among the categories of persons who may be subject to restrictions, Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the wording of which is similar to that of Article 11 of the Convention, provides that the State is entitled to restrict the exercise of the right to freedom of association only of members of the armed forces and of the police, without referring to members of the administration of the State.

The Court points out that the principal instrument guaranteeing, internationally, the right for public officials to form trade unions is ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association, Article 2 of which provides that all workers, without distinction whatsoever, have the right to establish and to join organisations of their own choosing (see paragraph 37 above).

The Court observes that the right of public officials to join trade unions has been confirmed on a number of occasions by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. This Committee, in its Individual Observation to the Turkish Government concerning Convention No. 87, considered that the only admissible exception to the right to organise as contemplated by that instrument concerned the armed forces and the police (see paragraph 38 above).

The Court further notes that the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association adopted the same line of reasoning as regards municipal civil servants. In the Committee's view, local public service employees should be able effectively to establish organisations of their own choosing, and these organisations should enjoy the full right to further and defend the interests of the workers whom they represent (see paragraph 39 above).

The instruments emanating from European organisations also show that the principle whereby civil servants enjoy the fundamental right of association has been very widely accepted by the member States. For example, Article 5 of the European Social Charter guarantees the freedom of workers and employers to form local, national or international organisations for the protection of their economic and social interests and to join those organisations. National legislation may impose partial restrictions on the police and total or partial restrictions on members of the armed forces, but no possibility of restriction is provided for in respect of other members of the administration of the State.

The right of association of civil servants has also been recognised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in its Recommendation R (2000) 6 on the status of public officials in Europe, Principle no. 8 of which declares that public officials should, in principle, enjoy the same rights as all citizens, and that their trade-union rights should only be lawfully restricted in so far as that is necessary for the proper exercise of their public functions (see paragraph 46 above).

Another European instrument, the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights, has adopted an open approach to the right to organise, declaring, in its Article 12(1), among other things, that ‘everyone’ has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests (see paragraph 47 above).

As to European practice, the Court reiterates that the right of public servants to join trade unions is now recognised by all Contracting States (see paragraph 48 above). This right applies to public servants under a career or contractual system and to employees of publicly owned industrial or commercial enterprises, whether national or municipal. Civil servants, whether they work for central government or a local authority, are generally entitled to join the trade union of their choosing. The Court also takes note of the fact that the density of trade-union membership is generally higher in the public sector than in the private sector, which constitutes a manifest indication of a favourable legal and administrative environment created by member States. In the majority of member States, the few restrictions that can be found are limited to judicial offices, to the police and to the fire services, with the most stringent restrictions, culminating in the prohibition of union membership, being reserved for members of the armed forces.

The Court concludes from this that ‘members of the administration of the State’ cannot be excluded from the scope of Article 11. At most the national authorities are entitled to impose ‘lawful restrictions’ on those members, in accordance with Article 11 § 2. In the present case, however, the Government have failed to show how the nature of the duties performed by the applicants, as municipal civil servants, requires them to be regarded as ‘members of the administration of the State’ subject to such restrictions. Accordingly, the applicants may legitimately rely on Article 11 of the Convention and any interference with the exercise of the right concerned must satisfy the requirements of paragraph 2 of that Article.

Accordingly, the applicants may legitimately rely on Article 11 of the Convention and the objection raised by the Government on this point must therefore be dismissed.

The Court reiterates that Article 11 § 1 presents trade-union freedom as one form or a special aspect of freedom of association (see National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 27 October 1975, § 38, Series A no. 19; and Swedish Engine Drivers' Union, cited above, § 39). The Convention makes no distinction between the functions of a Contracting State as holder of public power and its responsibilities as employer. Article 11 is no exception to that rule. On the contrary, paragraph 2 in fine of this provision clearly indicates that the State is bound to respect freedom of assembly and association, subject to the possible imposition of ‘lawful restrictions’ in the case of members of its armed forces, police or administration (see Tüm Haber Sen and Çınar, cited above, § 29). Article 11 is accordingly binding upon the ‘State as employer’, whether the latter's relations with its employees are governed by public or private law (see Swedish Engine Drivers' Union, cited above, § 37).

The Court further reiterates that, although the essential object of Article 11 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the exercise of the rights protected, there may in addition be positive obligations on the State to secure the effective enjoyment of such rights. In the specific context of the present case, the responsibility of Turkey would be engaged if the facts complained of by the applicants — that is to say, principally, the non-recognition of their union by the State at the material time — resulted from a failure on its part to secure to the applicants under domestic law the rights set forth in Article 11 of the Convention (see Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 30668/96, 30671/96 and 30678/96, § 41, ECHR 2002-V; and Gustafsson v. Sweden, 25 April 1996, § 45, Reports 1996-II).

However, as the Court has pointed out in the context of Article 8 of the Convention, whether the case is analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the rights of an applicant under the Article or in terms of an interference by a public authority, to be justified in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Article, the applicable principles are broadly similar (see Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022/97, § 98, ECHR 2003-VIII).

The Court must ascertain in the first place whether the Government's argument that the cassation judgment of 6 December 1995 had no effects on the union activities of Tüm Bel Sen is confirmed by the facts of the case.

It observes in this connection that the said judgment, to the extent that it was found therein that the applicant trade union had not acquired legal personality when it was created and, accordingly, that it was not entitled to take or defend legal proceedings, had two effects on the union's activities, one retrospective, the other prospective.

The judgment in question had the retrospective effect of rendering null and void ab initio all the activities and actions that Tüm Bel Sen had undertaken between 1991 and 1993 in relation to the Gaziantep Municipal Council for the purpose of protecting its members' interests, including the collective agreement involved in the present case. That effect was compounded by the decisions of the Audit Court requiring the reimbursement of the advantages obtained by members of the trade union as a result of negotiations with the employing authority.

As to the prospective effect of the cassation judgment in question, the Court regards as credible the applicants' argument that the trade union Tüm Bel Sen had seen its activities considerably restricted as a result of the reluctance on the part of the heads of local authorities to enter into negotiations with it. It can be seen from the case file, firstly, that heads of municipal authorities who had agreed to grant advantages to civil servants under collective agreements had faced administrative, financial and judicial proceedings prior to the enactment of Law no. 4688 on 25 June 2001, and, secondly, that even after that date they were themselves obliged to reimburse to the State any additional sums that had been paid at the material time and then in turn bring proceedings against the civil servants who had received them.

As noted above (paragraph 88), the Chamber not only considered that there had been an unjustified interference with the rights of the applicants under Article 11 but that, in refusing to recognise the legal personality of the applicants' union, the State had failed to comply with its positive obligation to secure the enjoyment of the rights enshrined in that Article. Like the Chamber, the Grand Chamber considers that the present case can be analysed either as an interference with Article 11 or as a failure by the State to comply with its positive obligation to secure the applicants' rights under this provision. In the particular circumstances of the present case the Court considers that both approaches are possible given the mixture of action and inaction on the part of the authorities with which it is confronted. Accordingly it will proceed on the basis that this part of the case should be analysed from the standpoint of whether there was an interference with the applicants' rights but it will also have regard to the State's positive obligations in so doing.

The Government argued that the complaint relating to the annulment of the collective agreement had to be examined separately, in so far as, in their opinion, it raised separate legal questions from those raised by the applicants' right to form a trade union.

In the Government's opinion, it was not appropriate to modify the case-law established in the 1970s to the effect that the right to enter into collective agreements was not a right guaranteed as such by Article 11. Going beyond the early classical cases of National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium or Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, this case-law had been reiterated more recently in inadmissibility decisions (see Francesco Schettini and Others v. Italy (dec), no. 29529/95, 9 November 2000; and UNISON v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 53574/99, ECHR 2002-I).

The Government pointed out in this connection that trade-union rights could be implemented in a number of different forms and they argued that the State was free to select those that were to be used by trade unions. They claimed that it was not for the Court to impose any particular form on Contracting States for the purposes of Article 11.

They contended, moreover, that it was impossible to establish a common European practice as regards the right of civil servants to enter into collective agreements. In certain Contracting States, only contractual State employees (as opposed to career civil servants) enjoyed such a right, whilst in others only those civil servants who held senior posts were excluded.

Lastly, the Government considered that the ILO Conventions ratified by Turkey were not pertinent in the context of Article 11 of the Convention. They argued that the Court should not make use of them to create new rights that could be relied upon under the Convention.

The applicants explained that their principal complaint concerned the annulment of the collective agreement between them and the Gaziantep Municipal Council. They stated that they shared the Chamber's analysis of this question, whilst pointing out that the Court of Cassation's position totally disregarded their rights in this connection.

They further agreed with the concurring opinion of three judges in the Chamber who had stated that the right to bargain collectively should be regarded nowadays as one of the essential elements inherent in the right to form trade unions, within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention.

In the light of the foregoing principles, the Court considers that the trade union Tüm Bel Sen, already at the material time, enjoyed the right to engage in collective bargaining with the employing authority, which had moreover not disputed that fact. This right constituted one of the inherent elements in the right to engage in trade-union activities, as secured to that union by Article 11 of the Convention.

As to the impugned collective agreement entered into after collective bargaining, the Grand Chamber, like the Chamber, takes note of the following facts:

Accordingly, the Court observes that the collective bargaining in the present case and the resulting collective agreement constituted, for the trade union concerned, an essential means to promote and secure the interests of its members. The absence of the legislation necessary to give effect to the provisions of the international labour conventions already ratified by Turkey, and the Court of Cassation judgment of 6 December 1995 based on that absence, with the resulting de facto annulment ex tunc of the collective agreement in question, constituted interference with the applicants' trade-union freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention.

As to the applicants' arguments concerning the insufficiency of the new legislation with regard to the trade-union rights of civil servants, the Court points out that the object of the present application does not extend to the fact that the new Turkish legislation fails to impose on the authorities an obligation to enter into collective agreements with civil servants' trade unions, or to the fact that those unions do not have the right to strike in the event that their collective bargaining should prove unsuccessful.

The Government and the applicants agreed with the Chamber's finding that the interference in question was prescribed by law. For the purposes of the present case, the Grand Chamber can accept that the interference was prescribed by law, as interpreted by the combined civil divisions of the Court of Cassation, the highest judicial body to have ruled on the case.

The Court can also accept, like the Chamber and the parties themselves, that the interference in question, in so far as it aimed to prevent discrepancy between law and practice, pursued a legitimate aim: the prevention of disorder. As to the fact that the risk of such discrepancy was the result of the time taken by the legislature to adapt the legislation to Turkey's international commitments in the field of international labour standards, the Court considers that its assessment must likewise relate to the question whether such a measure was necessary in a democratic society.

The Court refers in this connection to the case-law set out above concerning the negative and positive obligations imposed on the Government by Article 11 of the Convention (see paragraphs 119 and 110 above).

As to the application of these principles in the present case, the Court notes that the Government have omitted to show how the impugned restriction was necessary in a democratic society, standing by their principal argument to the effect that the applicants, in their capacity as civil servants, did not have the right to bargain collectively or enter into collective agreements.

The Court, performing its own examination, considers that at the material time a number of elements showed that the refusal to accept that the applicants, as municipal civil servants, enjoyed the right to bargain collectively and thus to persuade the authority to enter into a collective agreement, did not correspond to a ‘pressing social need’.

Firstly, the right for civil servants to be able, in principle, to bargain collectively, was recognised by international law instruments, both universal (see paragraphs 147–148 above) and regional (see paragraphs 149–150 above). Moreover, an examination of European practice shows that this right was recognised in the majority of member States (see paragraphs 52 and 151 above).

Secondly, Turkey had in 1952 ratified ILO Convention No. 98, the principal instrument protecting, internationally, the right for workers to bargain collectively and enter into collective agreements (see paragraphs 42–43 and 151 above). There is no evidence in the case file to show that the applicants' union represented ‘public servants engaged in the administration of the State’, that is to say, according to the interpretation of the ILO's Committee of Experts, officials whose activities are specific to the administration of the State and who qualify for the exception provided for in Article 6 of ILO Convention No. 98.

In these circumstances, the Grand Chamber shares the following consideration of the Chamber:

Moreover, the Grand Chamber observes that the Government failed to adduce evidence of any specific circumstances that could have justified the exclusion of the applicants, as municipal civil servants, from the right, inherent in their trade-union freedom, to bargain collectively in order to enter into the agreement in question. The explanation that civil servants, without distinction, enjoy a privileged position in relation to other workers is not sufficient in this context.

The Court thus finds that the impugned interference, namely the annulment ex tunc of the collective agreement entered into by the applicants' union following collective bargaining with the authority was not ‘necessary in a democratic society’, within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention.

There has therefore been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention on this point also, in respect of both the applicants' trade union and the applicants themselves.